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Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology has been expanded to be used 
in different fields that need automatic identifying and verifying  of tagged objects 
without human intervention. RFID technology offers a great advantage in 
comparison with barcodes by providing accurate information, ease of use and 
reducing of labour cost. These advantages have been utilised by using passive 
RFID tags. Although RFID technology can enhance the efficiency of different 
RFID applications systems, researchers have reported issues regarding  the use 
of RFID technology. These issues are making the technology vulnerable to many 
threats in terms of security and privacy. 
Different RFID solutions, based on different cryptography primitives, have been 
developed. Most of these protocols focus on the use of passive RFID tags. 
However, due to the computation feasibility in passive RFID tags, these tags 
might be vulnerable to some of the security and privacy threats. , e.g. 
unauthorised reader can read the information inside tags, illegitimate tags or 
cloned tags can be accessed by a reader.   Moreover, most consideration of 
reserchers is focus on single tag authentication and mostly do not consider 
scenarios that need multi-tag such as supply chain management and healthcare 
management.  Secret sharing schemes have been also proposed to overcome 
the key management problem in supply chain management. However, secret 
sharing schemes have some scalability limitations when applied with high 
numbers of RFID tags. 
This work is mainly focused on solving the problem of the security and privacy in 
multi-tag RFID based system. In this work  firstly,  we studied different RFID 
protocols such as symmetric key authentication protocols, authentication 
V 
protocols based on elliptic curve cryptography, secret sharing schemes and multi-
tag authentication protocols. Secondly, we consider the significant research into 
the mutual authentication of passive RFID tags. Therefore, a mutual 
authentication scheme that is based on zero-knowledge proof have been 
proposed . The main object of this work is to develop an ECC- RFID based system 
that enables multi-RFID tags to be authenticated with one reader by using 
different versions of ECC  public key encryption schemes. The protocol are relied 
on using threshold cryptosystems that operate ECC to generate secret keys then 
distribute and stored secret keys among multi RFID tags. Finally, we provide 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
 
Radio frequency identification system (RFID) is an auto-identification 
technology that enables the identification of objects automatically over a wide 
range of distance without any contact with tagged objects. The idea of the RFID 
system was first introduced in 1940 to identify aircrafts of friend or enemy and 
was called Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) system.  The IFF is a radar system that 
uses a transponders and integrator to identify planes by transmitting a radio 
signal and detecting the reflected signal (Rieback et al., 2006). After decades, 
RFID system emerged to become one of the most promising technologies. 
RFID technology has expanded to be used in various fields of application that 
need an automatic identification and easy in tracking objects. These fields are 
needed to store important data and communicate wirelessly with other objects 
over a wide range without any contact with tagged objects. 
 The typical parts of RFID technology contain RFID tag, RFID reader, and a 
back-end server. Depending on the power supply, there are three types of RFID 
tags; passive, semi-passive and active RFID tag. Passive RFID tags are 
considered most popular because of the low-cost RFID tags’ production. 
Identification of RFID tagged objects is done without human intervention by 
sending radio frequency signal from a reader to activate  RFID tags. 
Subsequently, the RFID reader collects and reads RFID tag’s data and sends it 
to a back-end server to verify and analyse RFID data. Practically, some RFID 
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system often work offline, so verifying and analysing RFID data can be done 
through the reader. 
Nevertheless, the transformation of data through RF has to be secured due to 
important information that mostly contains secret information in the RFID tag. 
RFID tag communicates with RFID reader via wireless communication while 
RFID reader communicates with a back-end server via wire of wireless 
communication. Because of the wireless communication between RFID tags 
and RFID reader, the security vulnerability can be increased; many threats  
such as eavesdropping or interception of the message exchange between RFID 
tag and RFID reader which increases the demand for security and privacy.   
Authentication is considered as the first line of defence against the wireless 
attacks due to its ability to trust and validate an identity to a reader for 
verification (Malek, 2012). This process is usually divided into two types: 
forward authentication and backward authentication. The forward 
authentication performs when an RFID tag proves its identification number to a 
verifier (an RFID reader). In contrst, backward authentication performs when a 
tag works as a verifier to a reader and identifies the access of reader to get the 
tag’s information. The term of mutual authentication protocol refres to the term 
when both parties need to authenticate each other.  
The performance of authentication protocols mainly depends on the time 
complexity of computations of the identification process. The classification of 
performance in terms of time complexity classes can be divided into three 
classes constant time O (1), logarithmic time O (log (N)) and linear time 
protocols O (N), where N denotes the number of tag in the server (Nance & 
Naps, 1992; Korsh, 1986) 
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In order to achieve the security demands, cryptographic primitives have been 
introduced in authentication protocols to decrease the security and privacy 
issues of RFID system. Cryptographic mechanisms for traditional 
authentication can be either one-way hash function or symmetric key encryption 
or asymmetric key encryption. This type of authentication is called Full-fledged 
protocols. Simple type protocols require one-way hash function and random 
number generator and called lightweight protocols. Lightweight protocols use 
random number generator and simple function such as Cyclic Redundancy 
Code (CRC), and checksum. In comparison, ultra-lightweight protocols use a 
simple bitwise operation on tags (Chen, 2007).  
Even though cryptographic authentication protocols have been proposed to 
strengthen the security of RFID systems, most of these protocols still have 
some limitation in terms of satisfying enough security requirements against 
tampering with RFID tags or eavesdropping through communication. Despite 
the fact that the passive RFID systems improves the commercial usage, the 
security perspective has been affected due to low computation feasibility. 
Moreover, most of these protocols still focus on a single tag to single reader 
authentication and do not consider scenarios of using multi-tag authentication. 
For instance, multi-tag authentication protocols are used in practical 
applications scenarios that need to distribute RFID tags such as supply chain 
management. In supply chain management, some number of goods are packed 
into boxes at a manufacturer, shipped to warehouses, and then sent to retailers 
and distributors. As an RFID tagged box leaves the manufacturer a quick 
identification is needed to generate an evidence of verification and scanning at 
every stage from manufacturers until distributors. Therefore, the primary aim of 
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the thesis is to improve the security and privacy of RFID system by designing 
different cryptographic techniques that can be used in single RFID tag 
authentication and multi RFID tag authentication. This thesis presents firstly the 
design of a mutual authentication protocol that supports the authentication of 
single tag to single reader. Secondly, it designs and implements protocols that 
allow a package of RFID tags to be authenticated within a reader in an RFID 
system. 
1.2 Thesis Structure and Organisation 
The sequence of this thesis is structured as follows:  
• Chapter two goes through defining backgrounds on cryptographic 
primitives that are used in this thesis. It reviews basic concepts to 
provable security and elliptical curve cryptography. 
• Chapter three presents comprehensive background of RFID technology, 
how it does work, essential components of the system and its 
applications. Moreover, it presents the related security and privacy 
attacks that can affect the utility of the system. 
• Chapter four surveys different cryptographic authentication techniques 
for RFID system. These protocols are involved with using symmetric key 
techniques, asymmetric key, and secret sharing techniques. In addition 
to related research that involves using group of authentication protocols 
for RFID system in both symmetric key and asymmetric key techniques. 
• Chapter five addresses the use of zero-knowledge proof as an 
authentication protocol for RFID system. It also proposes a mutual 
authentication protocol that is based on using elliptical curve with zero-
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knowledge and hash function. The main contributions of this chapter are 
as follows. 
1. Identifies and formalises possible RFID threats that can influence 
the system. 
2. Proposes mutual authentication protocol that relies on adopting 
Keccak hash function with zero knowledge proof. 
• Chapter six involves designing and presenting two RFID systems that 
can be used in supply chain management. Both protocols rely on the 
idea of allowing three or more tags to be authenticated within a reader. 
These approaches are based on using threshold cryptosystem in 
association with an elliptical curve. The threshold cryptosystems are 
used to distribute shared keys amongst needed RFID tags and stored 
only sharing information. The main contribution of this chapter are 
depicted as follows: 
1. An efficient encryption method for storing data in each RFID tag. 
2. Tags are not required to perform any computation in the first 
approach and perform symmetric key technique in the second 
approach. 
3. Ensuring security and privacy requirement for the system. 
• Chapter seven presents the conclusion derived in the thesis, concludes 
the contribution of the thesis and discusses direction for further research. 
 
1.3 Contribution to Knowledge  
 
The following lists summarise the main contributions of the thesis which are 
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The main aim of this thesis is to design a provable secure RFID based system. 
Therefore, this chapter will introduce basic concepts of cryptographic protocols 
that will be used further in the design  and implementations of the RFID based 
systems. In particular, this chapter will start by defining some basic concepts of 
cryptography protocols. 
 
2.2 Provable security  
The term cryptography refers to the use of a method for securely storing and 
transmitting data between parties. Historically, the term cryptography refers to 
using a mathematical algorithm to hide information. Nowadays, the term of 
cryptography has been associated with mathematical models and computer 
algorithms. The objective of using cryptography is to enable parties to 
communicate over secure channels. Any cryptographic protocol is considered 
as a provable secure protocol unless there is a vulnerability on the protocol that 
can violate the security of information. This means that in a polynomial-time 
algorithm a legitimate user can execute a cryptographic protocol with no 
dangers of breaking the protocol by an adversary. There are many techniques 
in cryptography which are involved with algorithms such as symmetric key 




2.2.1 Pseudo- Random Bit Generator  
A pseudo-random bit generator (PRBG) is an algorithm that maps a bit 
sequence of input k to a bit string sequence of lengths n where 𝑛 ≥ 𝑘. The input 
k is called the length’s seed and the output is called bit sequence. The PRBG 
is commutable and negligible in a polynomial time. 
Thus, the security depends on the probability distribution and the period of the 
output procedure (Menezes, 1996). 
 
2.2.2 Message Authentication Codes 
 A message authentication code (MAC) is a cryptographic checksum that is 
used to ensure the authenticity and integrity of data information. MAC allows 
parties to compute a match function by using a secret key k and a message m 
and output an authentication function. The MAC algorithms produce fixed 
lengths of bits by taking an input message, and a secret key then sends the 
message to the other parties. Upon receiving the MAC message, parties 
recomputed the MAC message in order to complete the matching process. A 
MAC algorithm is resistant to existential forgery if and only if there is no 
advantage in an adversary ability to compute a valid MAC of the data 
information message (Menzence, 1996). 
  
2.2.3 Cryptographic Hash Function 
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic algorithm that takes a string-
length input into a string fixed length output. Hash functions output an arbitrary 
length called hash value by inputting a string-length called preimage such that 
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any change into the input produces a different output. Hash function can be 
used in cryptography applications for its property to reduce the size of value and 
ensure the data integrity protection. Moreover, the hash function must have the 
one-way property that can be used as pseudorandom generator to generate 
several keys with a fixed size value. The one-way property isolates different 
parts of the system and ensuring that if an attacker knows one value, he cannot 
know the other values (Ferguson and Schneier, 2003). 
A hash function ℎ: {0,1}∗ → {0,1}𝑙 is an efficient function that require the 
following properties: 
• Preimage resistant: For all output 𝑦 ∈ {0,1}𝑙, its is not feasible to find an 
element 𝑥 ∈ {0,1}∗ such that 𝑦 = ℎ(𝑥). 
• 2nd preimage resistant: For all 𝑥 ∈ {0,1}∗, it is not computationally feasible 
to find another input 𝑥′ ≠ 𝑥 such that  ℎ(𝑥) = ℎ(𝑥′) . 
• Collision resistant: it is not computationally feasible to find two different 
input message messages  𝑥 ≠ 𝑥′ ∈ {0,1}∗ such that ℎ(𝑥) = ℎ(𝑥′). 
 
2.2.4 Encryption  
An encryption scheme consists of three processes, key generation KeyGen, 
encryption Enc and decryption Dec. The key generation process is a 
probabilistic expected polynomial time algorithm that is responsible for 
generating public parameters and used to output encryption key 𝐾𝑒 and 
decryption key 𝐾𝑑. The encryption process is a deterministic polynomial time 
algorithm which involves a message 𝑀 and the encryption key 𝐾𝑒 and outputs 
cipher message. The decryption process is a probabilistic polynomial  time 
algorithm  that is used to extract the message 𝑀 from the cipher message 𝐶 by 
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using the decryption key 𝐾𝑑. The encryption process can be illustrated as 𝐶 =
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑘𝑒(𝑀) ≡ 𝑀 = 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑑(𝐶). Depending on the key types, there are two types of 
encryption symmetric key encryption and public key encryption. The symmetric 
key encryption uses a shared key between the sender and receiver while the 
public key encryption uses a pair of keys one for the encryption called a public 
key and one private key for decryption.  
 
2.2.4.1. Symmetric key encryption 
A symmetric key encryption is an encryption scheme that uses the same key 
for encryption and decryption such that 𝐾𝑒 = 𝑘𝑑 .  The symmetric key encryption 
algorithm takes a plain text as an input with a key and a message from the plain 
text  then output a cipher message such that 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝐾, 𝑀) = 𝐶 , the encryption 
process executes difference substitution and transformation on the plain text in 
order to produce a cipher message. A decryption process inputs the shared key 
and the cipher message in order to output the message 𝑀 such that 𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝐾, 𝐶) =
𝑀. 
According to different encryption methods that are used, symmetric key 
encryption, symmetric key encryption can be classified into two ciphers; stream 
cipher and block cipher. Stream cipher algorithm is based on combining a bit of 
plaintext with a stream of pseudo random bits as  key encryption in each time 
in order to encrypt a plain text. Block cipher is an algorithm that take an input of 
block plain text and secret key for encryption process and output blocks of 
cipher text as a decryption process. The principal role of symmetric key 
encryption is to provide confidentiality for the broadcasted data and commonly 
used by security protocols as session keys for confidential online. Regarding 
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efficiency symmetric key encryption performs a high level of efficiency. 
However, there is a limitation in terms of the difficulty in distributing keys 
securely especially when a large number of parties communicate privately at 
the same time.  
 
2.2.4.2. Public key  encryption  
A public key encryption scheme is an encryption scheme that uses different 
keys in the encryption process and decryption process such that 𝐾𝑒 ≠ 𝑘𝑑. 
The term public key encryption or asymmetric encryption was first introduced 
by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976 (Menezes, 1999). The idea is to 
use two different keys in the encryption process, and decryption process with 
the property that knowing the Public key does not permit some to conclude the 
private key. The public key and private key are different, and the way of 
generating keys are mathematically related. In public key encryption, key 
exchange is simpler than symmetric key encryption and can be broadcasted 
publically especially with network communication. Moreover, the public key 
encryption is based on a hard mathematical problem thus provides a high level 
of security in term of confidentiality and integrity but due to the complex 
computation of mathematical function, public key encryption needs a memory 
size for complex computations and high size of keys (Staling, 2011).  
Public key encryption involves three probabilistic polynomial time algorithm 
such as key generation algorithm, encryption algorithm, and decryption 
algorithm. The key generation process inputs a parameter to generate a public 
key for encryption and a private key for decryption. The encryption process is 
used to transforms plain text into cipher message by using a public key and 
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outputs a cipher message such as  𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝐾𝑒 , 𝑀) = 𝐶. Upon receiving the cipher 
message, the decryption operation starts by converting the cipher message into 
the original message by using the private key 𝐾𝑑 such that 𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝐾𝑑, 𝐶) = 𝑀. All 
public key encryption algorithms satisfy the property of 𝐶 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑘𝑒(𝑀) ≡ 𝑀 =
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑑(𝐶). 
 
2.2.4.3. Security concepts of encryption 
Any cryptosystem is a goal to an adversary to reveal the cipher message and 
extract the plain-text information. These challenges depend on the adversary 
goals and types of attack that involve with the adversary ability (Bellare & 
Rogway, 1998). 
There are two goals for an adversary, One-Wayness (OW) and 
Indistinguishability (IND).   
One-Wayness (OW) is a cryptosystem’s designer goal to prevent an adversary 
from  having access to the decryption key without a knowledge of the cipher.  
On the other hand, Indistinguishability is a cryptosystem’s designer goal to 
prevent an adversary from  having a  knowledge about the probability of 
encrypting two messages is larger than one half. For instance, suppose that an 
adversary has the challenged cipher message 𝐶 and there are two messages 
𝑚0 and 𝑚1 in a message space 𝑀. The adversary can learn if the challenged 
cipher message encrypt a chosen message 𝑚0 or 𝑚1. In other word, the 
adversary  can learn any information about the plain message from the 
challenged cipher message. In indistinguishability, the adversary aim is to 
predict given ciphertext from the plaintext corresponding. However, the ability 
of an adversary is restricted to  decrypt only with the above information, but the 
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adversary ability is to modify a valid ciphertext from  the original ciphertext by 
computing some operations. Therefore, the modified cipher-text for some other 
plain text, becomes a valid ciphertext. This type of forgery refers to the non-
mealleability notion . 
Furthermore, in relation to the adversary goal, there are two attacks considered 
in any cryptosystem that depends on the adversary ability to have the 
information knowledge. There are two types of attacks related to an adversary 
which are  Chosen Plaintext Attack CPA and Chosen Cipher message Attack 
CCA. In CPA a chosen message from an adversary can be encrypted and 
generated an attacker cipher message.  In CCA an attacker generates a cipher 
message query to the decryption oracle in order to reveal plain text information 
gradually by the decryption process. There are two cases in CCA called non-
adaptive chosen cipher text attack (CCA1) and adaptive chosen cipher text 
attack CCA2. The difference between CCA1 and CCA2 is if the adversary 
obtains the challenge cipher message by using the decryption oracle this leads 
to CCA1 else leads to CCA2. A cryptosystem is called semantic secured, or 
indistinguishability (IND) secured if there is no information  that is revealed from 
the cipher message by an adversary. This includes the knowledge of the cipher 
message and the length of the cipher message with a probability of 
distinguishing the chosen cipher message more than one half. Subsequently, 
there are security models that are related to these attacks.  Depending on the 
adversary power, such models are OW-CPA, IND-CPA, IND-CCA1, and IND-
CCA2. The OW-CPA security model refers to the ability of an adversary with 
given key parameter and cipher message to output his own message 𝑚∗. A 
cryptosystem is called OW-CPA if the probability of winning any value of 
security parameter is negligible.  
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The IND-CPA can experiment when the investigator generates a public key and 
private 𝐾𝑒 , 𝐾𝑑 and send the public key 𝑘𝑑 to an adversary. Upon receiving the 
public key, the adversary generates the cipher message 𝑐′ by choosing two 
plain text messages 𝑚0, 𝑚1 of the same length then selecting randomly  𝑏 ∈
{0,1} and returning the encryption message𝑚𝑏. The adversary tries to guess 
whether 𝑏′ ∈ {0,1} and wins if the 𝑏 = 𝑏′. 
An encryption scheme is secuue against IND-CPA if the probability of an 
adversary to wil the final challenge is negligable.  
A similar notion is called indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack 
(IND-CCA1). The adversary goal starts when requesting queries to the 
decryption oracle and decrypts a chosen cipher message. After that, the 
adversary also chooses two plain text messages of the same lengths𝑚0, 𝑚1. 
Sends the chosen message to the encryption oracle to encrypt the message 𝑚𝑏 
by choosing a random 𝑏 ∈ {0,1}. The adversary has an access to the decryption 
oracle to decrypt the chosen challenge cipher message 𝐶′ and guess if 𝑏′ ∈
{0,1} = 𝑏. The additional capability of the adversary is that he can encrypt or 
decrypt messages before the challenge cipher message. Furthermore, in 
relation to the capability of IND-CCA1, the adversary can have access to the 
encryption or decryption oracles after receiving the challenge cipher message 
𝐶′ without the ability to send the challenge cipher message to the decryption 
oracle.  
A cryptosystem is called semantic secured, or indistinguishability (IND) secured 
if there is no information is revealed from the cipher message by an adversary. 
This includes the knowledge of the cipher message and the length of the cipher 
message with a probability of distinguishing the chosen cipher message more 
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than one half. An encryption scheme is called semantically secure against 
chosen cipher text attack (IND-CCA2) if the adversary has no negligible 
advantage to perform the following processes. The adversary goal starts when 
requesting queries to the decryption oracle and decrypts a chosen cipher 
message. After that, the adversary also chooses two plain text messages of the 
same lengths𝑚0, 𝑚1. Sends the chosen message to the encryption oracle to 
encrypt the message 𝑚𝑏 by choosing a random 𝑏 ∈ {0,1}. The adversary has 
an access to the decryption oracle to decrypt the chosen challenge cipher 
message 𝐶′. After receiving 𝐶′, the adversary can ask again for the polynomial 
bound numbers of quires on the decryption oracle adaptively in the same way 
of the previous process except that the adversary cannot ask for decrypt query 
that involve the challenge 𝐶′. After that, the adversary outputs 𝑏′ and win if 𝑏 =
𝑏′. The notion refers to an encryption scheme if it is IND-CCA2 is the highest 
level of security compared to IND-CCA1 and IND-CPA. The IND-CPA notion is 
the lowest level of security.  
2.2.5 Zero-Knowledge proof  
Goldwasser and Micali introduced zero-knowledge proof in 1989. The idea of 
the zero-knowledge proof is based on proving a statement without revealing 
any information including the information of proving a statement (Goldwasser & 
Micali, 1989). The Zero-knowledge proof uses an intractable computation 
process between two entities: a claimant A and a verifier B (Goldreich, 2003; 
Blahut, 2013). A claimant controls a part of secret knowledge while revealing 
no information to the verifier. Moreover, zero-knowledge proof allows proof of 
confirmation while conveying no information about the initial confirmation. A 
claimant A sends a random challenge to the verifier B, then the verifier B replies 
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with a random challenge and sends it to A. A secretly calculates the result which 
is then sent to B. B verifies the challenge response, if the verification was 
successful then it will be accepted otherwise the process will stop. The 
verification process can be repeated N times depending on the requirement for 
the verification. The procedure of zero-knowledge proof can be shown in figure 
2.1.  
Claimant A                                                                                             Verifier B 
 
Random number 
                                                                                                       Random 
Challenge 
 
Calculate result  
                                                                                                          Verification 
Figure 2 1: Zero-knowledge proof procedure 
The zero-knowledge proof has three properties: completeness, soundness, and 
zero-knowledge. The completeness means if the process of the claimant and 
the verifier are complete and the statement is true then the completeness was 
proven. Soundness means that if the statement of verification is false, then the 
verifier cannot be cheated. The zero-knowledge means if the statement is true 
then the verifier cannot obtain other information that can affect the privacy of 
the process.  
The idea of the zero-knowledge proof is that the secret key is must be held by 
the claimant as a proof of ownership. Similar to public key cryptosystem, zero-
knowledge proof protocols are based on several mathematical problems such 
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as the square root problem, the large integer factoring and discrete logarithm 
problem. The feature of using the zero knowledge proof technique it does not 
suffer from retreating of security by repeated use (Blahut, 2013). 
 
2.2.6 Secret sharing  
Secret sharing and key splitting is a technique that is used to share secret 
information among parties in a manner way that keep the confidentiality of data, 
such that there is no single share to reveal secret information. The idea behind 
this technique is that the secret information is to be hidden and divided into 
shared keys such that these keys are a subset of the original keys then 
distribute shares among some number of parties.  For example, consider a 
function that split keys to n parties by inputting a value 𝑠 such that the shares 
will be 𝑠1, 𝑠2, … 𝑠𝑛. The reconstruction of the secret key s is combined by defining 
a set of shares as the shared keys made as a part of the secret key.  
The main of aim of using secret sharing techniques is hide and split information 
among parties such that it’s difficult to gain the secret information without 
authorised participation. The secret sharing techniques are used for protecting 
the confidentiality of secret information that cannot be randomly notable.  
Therefore, shared keys require to be computationally indistinguishable for an 
adversary to collect different information and reconstruct the secret key. 
Splitting secret keys to parties is a simple way of distributing keys. However, an 
adversary can easily construct the secret key from shared keys. Thus, a secret 
sharing scheme needs to split and distribute keys to n  parties in a certain 
method such that secret key can only be reconstructed when a number of 
needed shares k is less than the number of n shares. Secret shares techniques 
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is a useful method to distribute shares among at least three parties because 
computations two parties can easily be revealed (Blakley, 1979). 
 
2.2.6.1. Additive secret sharing  
 An additive secret sharing scheme is a way where the secret share is 
distributed as a sum of shares among parties. The requirement for 
reconstructing the secret shares is the knowledge of all shares, such that the 
method is used for creating shared keys and reconstructs the secret key from 
the shared keys. The additive secret sharing algorithm can be used over a finite 
field ℤ𝑝 where 𝑝  is a prime number and starts when the secret key 𝑠 is 
distributed among n parties such that 𝑠𝑛 = 𝑠 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
𝑛−1
𝑖=1 . For 
reconstruction, all shared keys are known and the secret key is computed by 
completing the sum of shared keys such that  𝑠 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝.
𝑛
𝑖=1  
The additive secret sharing is a powerful scheme unless there is no change in 
the shared key information (Trappe & Lawrence, 2006). However, if there is a 
messing in one shared key, the reconstruction will be failed. Therefore threshold 
secret sharing scheme is being used to solve this problem.  
 
2.2.6.2.  Threshold secret sharing  
 Threshold secret sharing is a technique that is used to overcome the problem 
of missing one or more shared key in the additive secret sharing scheme. The 
threshold idea or (k,n) secret sharing scheme is to use a polynomial of degree 
k-1 that creates numbers of needed shared keys n from secret key s and 
recombs shared keys k such that  𝑛 ≠ 𝑘 . In the reconstruction procedure, the 
parties do not know any information about other shared keys; therefore a 
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process of interpolation computation is done to reveal the secret key (Shamir, 
1979).  
 
2.2.7 Elliptical curve cryptography   
For cryptography applications, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was first 
introduced by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller in 1985 a public key cryptosystem. 
ECC required a small key size in comparison with other public key cryptosystem 
which leads to having higher efficiency and speed in generating keys. For 
example, using small parameters in ECC leads to having the same security with 
a big parameter in other public key cryptosystems. For that reason, ECC can 
be used with small devices such as RFID tags.  
 Elliptic curves can be defined on different algebraic fields. For cryptography, 
elliptic curves use coordinates that are from a prime field 𝔽𝑝 or a power of 2, 𝔽2𝑚 
(Hankerson et al., 2006).  
The elliptic curve is given by: 
𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑜 𝑝                                                     (2.1) 
  
Where (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈  𝔽2𝑚. For some 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈  𝔽2𝑚 there is a constraintt that the 
determinant ∆ should be non-zero where ∆= −16(4𝑎3 + 27𝑏2) 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑜 𝑝 ≠ 0.  
As the coordinate 𝑦 is given by (𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏)0.5 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑜 𝑝 then 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 +
𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑜 𝑝  must be a quadratic residue of 𝔽𝑝. If (𝑥1, 𝑦1) is a point on the curve 
then (𝑥1, −𝑦1) = (𝑥1, 𝑝 − 𝑦1) is also on the curve. 
The point of the curve forms a group 𝔼(𝔽)𝑝 and the total number of points on 
the curve is|𝔼(𝔽)𝑝 | ≤ 𝑝 + 1 + 2𝑝
0.5 (Washignton, 2008). The total number of 
points 𝑃(𝑥, 𝑦) satisfies equation 2.1 with infinite order 𝑂 that should be also 
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prime. By defining the order 𝑂, The set of points under the operation is an 
Abelian group and has the following properties (Shanmugam et al., 2001): 
(1) A point P is called base point such that 𝑛𝑃 = 𝑂. 
(2) Base point 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) has an inverse denoted as −𝑃(𝑥, −𝑦). 
(3) Adding two points together 𝑃 + 𝑄 result in a third point (𝑥3, 𝑦3) as 
follows: 
𝑥3 = 𝜆
2 − 𝑥1 − 𝑥2                                                 (2.2) 











 𝑖𝑓 𝑃 = 𝑄
}                                           (2.4) 
(4) For all points in the Abelian group, there is a scalar k or a point 
multiplication of P by k such that 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 ≥ 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑘𝑃 = 𝑃 + 𝑃 … 𝑃. 
The scalar multiplication is an important operation in elliptic curve that is 
given an integer n then find the value point value of 𝑛𝑃 on the elliptic curve. 
On the other side, the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on the elliptic curve 
is to find an integer n by giving points 𝑃 and 𝑄 such that = 𝑄 . Elliptic curves, 
in general, possess the discrete logarithm property that is so useful in 
cryptography Blake et al., 1999). Points on the curve may be defined by a 





2.2.8 Diffie-Hellman Key exchange  
Diffie and Hellman (1976), introduced a key exchanged protocol that is based 
on using discrete logarithm problem. The Diffie-Hellman introduces the first idea 
of public key encryption. Their protocol allows two parties to set up a shared 
secret by exchanging messages through a public key authentication channel. 
The protocol starts when both parties choose a prime 𝑝 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 and a 
generator 𝑔 ∈ 𝔽𝑝. The first party selects a random 𝑎 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 then computes and 
sends 𝑔𝑎 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. Upon receiving the 𝑔𝑎, the second party chooses 𝑏 ∈ 𝔽𝑝, then 
computes and sends 𝑔𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. The secret key is now 𝑔𝑎𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. Both parties 
need to compute 𝑔𝑎𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 and 𝑔𝑏𝑎 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 and send these values to each 
other. If these values are correct then the protocol is completed otherwise the 
process will be rejected (Diffie & Hellman, 1976). 
There are two types of Diffie-Hellman problem, Computational Diffie-Hellman 
problem (CDH) and the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH). In the CDH 
problem, a randomly points 𝑃, 𝑃𝑎 , 𝑃𝑏 in the Abelian group is given then 
computes 𝑃𝑎𝑏. In the DDH problem, random points 𝑃, 𝑃𝑎 , 𝑃𝑏 and 𝑃𝑧  are given 
then decide if z= 𝑎𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑜 the group order of point 𝑃.  
 
2.2.9  Bilinear Pairing  
A pairing is a function that uses two points on the elliptical curve as input and 
output  a valid element in the cyclic group (Boneh & Franklin, 2001). Let 𝐺1, 𝐺2 
and 𝐺𝑇 be cyclic groups of prime order 𝑝 and 𝑔 be a generator of 𝐺. A map 𝑒 is 
called bilinear map if the following properties are satisfied: 
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• Bilinearity  For 𝑔1, 𝑔2 ∈ 𝐺1, 𝐺2, and 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 there is a map 𝑒 such that 
𝑒(𝑔1
𝑎, 𝑔2
𝑏) = 𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2)
𝑎𝑏 
• Non-Degenracy  If 𝑔1 ∈ 𝐺1 and 𝑔2 ∈ 𝐺2 then 𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2) ≠ 1 is consider as 
a generator for 𝐺𝑇 
• Computationality There is an efficient algorithm to compute 𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2) for 
all 𝑔1 ∈ 𝐺1 and 𝑔2 ∈ 𝐺2 
The bilinear pairing is called symmetric if 𝐺1 = 𝐺2 otherwise its called 
asymmetric. 
The bilinear pairings were introduced to construct fast algorithm to solve the 
Discrete logarithm problem and the DDH problem in elliptical curves. Thus, new 
assumptions are based on the bilinear pairing to be used in cryptography. Such 
assumptions are Bilinear computational Diffie-Hellman problems and Bilinear 
Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (Boneh & Franklin, 2001). 
Given (𝑔, 𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏 , 𝑔𝑐) ∈ 𝐺 for unknown 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ 𝔽𝑝, the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
(BDH) problem is to compute that for any probabilistic polinoyal time algorithm, 
the advantage to guess the probability of (𝑔, 𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏 , 𝑔𝑐) = 𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2)
𝑎𝑏𝑐 is 
nigigable.  
The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDH) is Given 
(𝑔, 𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏 , 𝑔𝑐) ∈ 𝐺 for unknown 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ 𝔽𝑝, the DBDH problem is to decide 
whether 𝑧 = (𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏𝑐 so the advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time 
algorithm in solving DBDH is negligible. That means the probability of 
(𝑔, 𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏 , 𝑔𝑐, 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏𝑐 = 1 minus the probability of (𝑔, 𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏 , 𝑔𝑐, 𝑍 = 1) and is 
computationally infeasible for any polynomial time algorithm to distinguish 




2.3 Summary  
In this chapter, we surveyed some of the concepts of provable security, together 
with the cryptographic primitives that will be used in the rest of this thesis. We 
also provided an overview of secret sharing techniques alongside with elliptic 
curve cryptography and key exchanged protocol s which are used to design 


























3. Overview of RFID technology  
3.1 Introduction 
Automatic Identification and Data Capture technology (AIDC) is one of the 
effective methods which are used to identify objects automatically without 
human intervention. AIDC technology is often used in many applications due to 
its services which include recognition of objects and obtaining information from 
objects, then enter information into a database system without human 
intervention (Finkenzeller, 2010). Moreover, AIDC technology is used by 
decreasing errors during the data entry process, ensures time and ensures 
lower labour costs. Over the past decades, AIDC technologies have been 
increasingly used in supply chain management to improve the efficiency of the 
supply chain by providing information and identifying products, people, goods 
and animals. Data capture technologies consist of many technologies, such as 
the barcode, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), biometric, magnetic stripes 
and smart cards. The cheapest and appropriate technologies that are used in 
supply chain management are barcodes and RFIDs. In this chapter, a brief 
overview of RFID system will be introduced. The application of using RFID and 
RFID security and privacy problem will also be introduced. 
3.2 Barcode technology  
Barcode is one of the common AIDC technologies which have been used over 
the past 30 years. It consists of sequential black and white labels that can be 
read by an optical scanner. Barcode has been developed in the early 1970’s to 
accomplish the requirement of the organisations in supply chain management 
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that needs labelling each product around the world. There are many types of 
barcode standards, but the barcode mainly used is the Universal Product Code 
(UPC), which is a 12-digit barcode that is used extensively for retail packaging 
in the United States. EAN (European Article Number) is a barcode standard that 
consists of either 12 or 13-digit product identification code. ISBN is the 
International Standard Book Number (ISBN), which is a unique commercial 
book identifier barcode that contains either 10 or 13 digits. UPC and EAN are 
the leading providers that make available barcode over goods. Typically, a 
unique serial number is stored in a database; The database provides the 
information of objects by their serial numbers. Barcodes are divided into three 
types: linear barcode and 2-D barcode and 3-D barcode. Linear barcode uses 
linear serial numbers which are scanned by an optical barcode scanner. 
 The linear barcode is very common and used everywhere due to its low costs. 
Most items in shops are labelled by using linear barcode. However, data cannot 
be stored in the linear barcode due to the small barcode size of the linear 
barcode. Usually, barcode contains numbers and characters, these numbers 
are unique, so the data of the barcode is read from the barcode, sent to a 
computer, then the computer returns the information about the item. The two- 
dimensional barcodes are barcodes that need to be read in two dimensions. 
The advantage of 2-D barcodes over the linear barcodes is the storage capacity 
of a small amount of data. However, these types of barcodes need special 
scanners that can scan the barcode, which in effect involve more expense than 
linear barcode. Typically, there are over 20 types of 2-D barcodes such as QR 
Code, PDF417, Data Matrix, Semacode, and MaxiCode, etc. The three 
dimensional barcode is the same linear barcode but embossed on the surface.  
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Barcodes are reliable to use as means of supply chain management in order to 
improve information accuracy, sharing information, tracking and controlling 
products (Manthon & Vlachopoul, 2001). Moreover, barcodes can be attached 
in particular to all products (Schutzberg, 2004). However, data cannot be reused 
or modified after reading or writing the barcode. Also, data storage is limited 
and reading distance is limited.  
3.3 RFID technology 
RFID technology is a technology that identify items, animals, and people by 
using radio frequency which  communicate the ID of small devices that attached 
to the items. The attached devices are used to store information and details 
about each item. RFID technology, being similar to the barcode, can also be 
read at a distance.This particular property gives RFID system the priority to be 
used in many applications rather than the barcode, which will be explained in 
details in this chapter.  
The essential parts of RFID technology includes three components, RFID tag, 
RFID reader and the back-end server. The function of RFID technology uses 
RFID reader to read the attached RFID tags by using radio frequency, and then 
send information via wire or wireless means to a back-end server for verifying 
or updating information of items (Wies, 2007). 
 
Figure 3. 1:RFID system 
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3.3.1 RFID tag 
RFID tag or transponder is similar to barcode in identifying devices which are 
attached to an object by using RFID reader. Basically, each tag consists of an 
antenna, a microchip and encapsulating material. Some of an RFID tag antenna 
is structured from a small coil of wire or dipoles and used to connect with RFID 
reader through radio frequency signals. In some cases, RFID tag has some 
sensors for the measurement of temperature or humidity value. RFID microchip 
is used to store object information that RFID can read through radio frequency 
signal. RFID tags have different memory sizes and each tag contains a unique 
identifier number. 
Depending on the power supply, there are different types of tags, which use 
different types of power, such as passive tags, semi-passive tags, and active 
tag. RFID reader powers a passive RFID. Usually, passive RFID tags are 
inactive, however, as soon as they receive the emission from a reader they 
wake up and start the process and transmit data. The majority of RFID tags 
produced are passive RFID tags, due to their low-cost. The distance for reading 
passive RFID tags is limited due to power limitation (Burmester.,et al 2008). 
Active RFID tags contain a battery that powers radio communication. The power 
of active tags allows the transmission of data to the RFID reader or to other 
RFID tags. In addition, active RFID tags have a more extended reading range. 
Also, the size of RFID tag is bigger than passive tags due to the capacity of 
storing processing data. Semi-Passive RFID tags are based on integrated 
power sources to run the tag chip circuit and extract the communication energy 
from the reader for regular radio communication. Additionally, semi-passive 
tags have a more extended reading range than passive tag but not longer than 
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active tags. Table 3.1 describes the difference types of RFID tags (Finkenzeller, 
2010).  
RFID tag  Advantage Disadvantage 
Passive Longer life time 
Lowest cost 
more flexible in devices  
Limited distance 3 Meter 
or less  
Semi-Passive More extended range for 
communication 100 
Meter 






                         
Table 3. 1:Comparison between RFID tags 
3.3.2 RFID reader 
The RFID reader is controlled by a digital signal processor, which can 
communicate with RFID tags. Reader consists of two parts: an antenna and 
electronic module. The antenna is used to wirelessly connect with RFID tags 
through radio frequency signal, then capture data, while the electronic module 
is networked to the backend server through a wired or wireless network. The 
functionality of the RFID reader is to read / write information into or from the 
RFID tag. In the passive systems, RFID readers transmit energy through 
electromagnetic fields to tags and provide the energy necessary for the tag to 
respond to reader operation queries. In the active systems, a reader is used to 
read and write information into the tag and the battery is used to enhance the 
query range between the reader and the active tag. There are different types of 
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RFID readers such as wire reader or wireless reader or integrated into a mobile 
computer. 
3.3.3 Back-end server 
The back-end server is responsible for the reception of data from the reader. It 
filters and processes data. Moreover, the back-end is for the reception of data 
from the reader, records objects, tracks movement, verifies identifiers and gives 
authorization for tags and for the control system database.  
 
3.3.4 RFID communication  
The communication between RFID reader and RFID tag can be categorised into 
two communication channels, the forward communication channel and the 
backward communication channel. The forward channel provides energy to the 
RFID tags and transfer of data from the reader to the tags, while the backward 
channel is used for sending data from the RFID tag to the reader (Bolic et al., 
2010). The forward channel is more extended than the backward channel. The 
power of forwarding communication channel can be increased to expand the 
network domain as it determined by the transmission signal strength of the 
reader. The backward communication channel works with proximity 
requirement between RFID reader and RFID tags. Taking into consideration the 
communication, it can be run using several radio frequency bands, such as low 
frequency (LF), high frequency (HF), ultra-high frequency (UHF) and microwave 
frequency (MF) (Rieback et al., 2006), (Wies, 2007)  
The Low-Frequency signal operates between 125 kHz and 142 kHz. HF tags 
can be used over a short range for less than 1 meter with the lowest data 
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transfer rate among other frequency rates. Usually, this type of tag is passive, 
and its ability to read on metal is the best among other frequency ranges. Most 
of the passive tags cannot be readable when they are attached to metal. 
The High-Frequency signal operates at 13.56 MHz; the operation is similar to 
LF but offers better range than LF extending up to 1 meter with larger memory 
size. Usually, this type of tags is passive, and its ability to read on metal is not 
as good as at the LF. 
The Ultra High-Frequency signal operates at 433 MHz and 860- to 960- MHZ, 
using UHF in reading tags within a distance up to 20 Meter. Also, data 
processing is faster than LF and HF signals with a smaller size of the tag. 
Usually, UHF tags are used with products that do not contain metal or water. 
Use of UHF signal over 860-960 MHz is used for passive tags and 430 MHz is 
used for active tags. 
The Microwave Frequency (MF) operates at 2.45 –GHz and can be used for 
active and passive tags. The MF is used for higher data rate and uses a real-
time location system; also the size of tag is smaller than those at other 
frequencies, and the distance is up to 10 meters. 
 
3.3.5 RFID standards 
There are international standards for RFID technology and depending on the 
allowed frequencies in different countries. Significant organizations develop 
standards for RFID technology such as International standards organization 
(ISO) and EPC Global. Moreover, there are specific industry groups who work 
on RFID standards, such as the European Telecommunication Standards 
Institutes (ETSI), Federal Communication Commission (FCC), American 
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Trucking Association in the transport industry, Near Field Communication 
(NFC) in electronics and mobile devices industries, Asian Group in the 
automotive industry. An RFID ISO standard covers different areas of 
technology, such as proximity cards, air interface, animal identification and 
supply chain management. The EPC standard mainly covers the area of supply 
chain management (Korkmaz and Ustandag, 2007; Huang, 2009). 
3.3.5.1. EPC Standards 
In 1999, Uniform Code Council (UCC) and EAN international joined a project to 
make the final EPC (Electronic Product Code) standard as an official global 
standard and to research RFID technologies aimed at establishing the 
standards for the RFID technologies. The former AUTO-ID society carries this 
mission at Massachusetts Institute of Technology centre including numbers of 
partners, such as Wal-Mart, Procter and Gamble, and Gillette. EPC standards 
work at UHF frequency and mainly work with data management, supply chain 
management, and inventory management. EPC enables identification of 
objects over the world by providing a unique identifier number for each object. 
The EPC code is a unique 96 bit number that allows each manufactured object 
to be identified, instead of a type of product (Hutto and Atkinson, 2004). EPC 
can be classified into five types; these types are different in each class used in 
an application. The classification of EPC standard depends on the ability of 




















Table 3. 2: Type of EPC classes (Violino, 2005) 
3.3.5.2. ISO standard 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a non-government 
organisation which focuses on creating standards for products. ISO published 
over 13000 international standards for products (Bhuptani and Moradpour, 
2005). Moreover, ISO has developed RFID standards which are used in 
different frequency bands and for different RFID applications.  
ISO 18000 to ISO 18000-6 series especially used for the air interface, ISO 
14443 is used for proximity cards, and ISO 17358, ISO 17363, ISO 17364, ISO 
EPC Class Type Properties Type of tag 

























17365 ISO 17366, ISO 17367, and ISO 17374.2 are used for supply chain 
management (Bhuptani and Moradpour, 2005).  
3.3.6 RFID Applications  
RFID is a promising technology that can be used in many applications, such as 
supply chain management, building access, human and animal implantation, 
libraries, transportation, health care management and e-passports (Henrici, 
2008; Liu et al., 2010; Karmakar, 2010). 
As the RFID system has different type of tags such as passive RFID tags, semi-
passive RFID tags and active, the applications of using these tags are varied. 
Passive RFID tags do not require long scan ranges and apply multiple radio 
frequencies. LF passive RFID tags have a very short scan ranges and it can be 
used in tracking animals and embedded keys. High frequency passive RFID 
tags have also a short ranges for scanning and its been used for access control, 
library books pharrmaceuticals. In addition, NFC  is another type of High-
Frequency passive RFID tags wich is widely use with contactless payment. UHF 
passive RFID tags have the longest scan ranges  and mostly use in inventory 
system, supply chain management, health care management, assest 
management personal tracking and patient tracking. In addition it can be used 
for anti-counterfeiting such as casion token and expensive goods. 
MF passive RFID tags are the faster in data transfer and  least common tags 
that are used in passive RFID system. They have used in applications that 
require fast transfer and less scanning range of items such as inventory 
tracking. Semi-passive RFID tags are use UHF and similar to passive RFID 
tags. As they have more computation power and memory, semi-passive RFID 
tags are mostly use in applications that require long scan range and sensors. 
 
 34 
Such applications are tracking temperature in food, chemicals, medecin  and 
other industrial products.  
Active RFID tags provide the longest range in scanning, reliable in different 
environments and much more computations power and memory. Therefore , 
the applications of using active RFID tags are mainly used in military assist, 
logistic tracking and ocian containers and work on the frequency of 433 MHz. 
other application such as real time locations   is worked on 2.45 GHz. Some 
other active RFID tags are carried sensors and can be used in temperature 
tracking, In addition, active RFID tags can work on UHF and can be used in 
logistic and container tracking and work on the frequency 915 MHz. 
 
3.3.7 RFID in Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
The term SCM means the management of goods flows; it consists of all parties 
that deal with customer request. The term SCM management was first 
developed in 1980 to integrate the key business process from supplier until 
customer. The main goal of SCM is to have a holistic view depending on 
effective cooperation between enterprises about the customer needs and get 
the best result of cost, time and efficiency (Liu et al., 2010).  
The process of SCM system starts with orders of objects from the supplier then 
manufactured object or product assembly. The products are transported to the 
distributor then to the retailer and finally to the users. Suppliers are responsible 
for receiving correct quantity, quality, and prices of the material. Manufacturers 
are responsible for the inventory of raw material, the progress of work and the 
finished works. Distributors are responsible for transportation, shipping costs, 
vendor requirement. Retailers are responsible for goods distribution and 
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delivery; finally, customers are concerned with delivery time, return policy and 
the quality of goods (Chopra  and Meindl, 2007) 
 The SCM parties may be national or global, although the level of technologies 
and security are different. Sharing information among SCM parties can be 
vulnerable to the SCM security systems. Information between SCM passes 
through all parties including supplier, manufacturer, distributor, retailer, and 
customer. Information needs to have security characteristics such as 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Information between parties must be 
accurate and the system is accessible in a timely manner and satisfied (Knorr 
et al., 2001), (Alkattan and Allkhudairi, 2008). 
 
Figure 3. 2: RFID in supply chain management (Vaidya et al., 2012) 
In recent years, RFID technology has been increasingly used in SCM due to its 
high offer in providing accurate information, visibility control in SCM and 
reducing labor cost. These advantages have taken place by using RFID in SCM.  
In 2003, Wal-Mart Company adopted RFID technology and ordered their 
supplier to implement RFID technology in their product. Moreover, the US 
Department of Defense (DoD) carried out efforts to develop RFID technology 
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and compel their suppliers over the world to tag their services by using RFID 
tag. Subsequently, large numerous organizations and suppliers have been 
launched RFID technology and thereby changed their SCM process. RFID 
technology has grown significantly in SCM, according to Bagchi et al. (2007), 
the prediction of RFID growth will be 20 billion Dollars while a billion Dollar in 
2003 and 4 billion in 2008. (Masum et al., 2013) 
The SCM plays a significant role in the success of company’s strategy and 
depending on the adopted technology that can be used in their services. 
Technologies are used to achieve the purpose of SCM needs that information 
from supplier to distribute should be accurate in the identification and tracking 
of the object. In addition, information about the inventory should be accurate 
about the number, types, and conditions. Furthermore, this information is very 
critical for an organization because of the demands and pressures of factories, 
distributor, and retailer to maximize work process and minimize cost while 
providing good value for customers.  One of the most popular of AIDC 
technology, which is still used in SCM is barcode technology. Barcode also 
supports automated data capture and is still being used in many applications of 
SCM due to the cost of the services in comparison with other services such as 
RFID technology. 
RFID technology offers several advantages in traceability and identification due 
to its unique identification of project with the property of communication at 
distance and providing real-time information (Sayging et al., 2007; Michael and 
McCathie, 2005; Masum et al., 2013). Moreover, it can improve the accuracy of 
inventory system and visibility of the information flow in SCM process. Despite 
the cost, RFID offers many more advantages than barcode in the process of the 
SCM. (Alkattan and Alkudair, 2008; Liu et al., 2010) as shown in table 3.3  
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 RFID Barcode 
Line of sight Not required Required 
Read range 
Passive RFID 400 feet for 
fixed reader 
20 feet for handle reader 
Active RFID up to 100 feet 
Several inches up to 
several feet 
Read data 
10’s, 100,s or 1000’s 
significantly 
Only one time 
Identification 
Can uniquely identify each 
item 
Most barcodes only identify 
the type of item (UPC 
Code) but not item uniquely 
Read/Write Read/Write in most Tags Read only 
Technology Radio frequency Laser  
Automation Collect data automatically Human operator 
 
Table 3. 3: Comparison between RFID and barcode technology (Alkattan and 
Alkudair, 2008) 
RFID has gained considerable attention from researcher to discuss the 
technology impact on inventory control management. According to Zeiimpekis 
et al. (2007), in supplying chain management RFID offers the ability to manage 
the identification of products in real-time information. This can correctly affect 
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and prevent error during the process of transportation management, inventory 
management, and order management. In addition, RFIDs will also help in taking 
advantage of automatic identification of objects, which reduce labour costs. 
Also, RFIDs can be used to reduce the problem of inventory inaccuracy (Kang 
and Gershwin, 2004). In comparison with the barcode, RFID technology offers 
more advantageous services than barcode technology. RFID is faster than 
barcode by 15-20 times, reduction in labor cost and reduction in time (Rekik, 
2010). Alkattan and Alkudairi (2008) compared with two systems, one uses 
RFID technology in supply chain management, and one uses barcodes to 
compare the inventory level between the two technologies. The inventory data 
becomes accurate and easier to share with supply chain management, which 
helps to control the whole SCM system. 
 
3.4 Security and Privacy Threats 
The main issues emerging from the use of RFID systems are security and 
privacy. The needs of protecting data privacy from an attacker during the 
authentication process has increased because of the use of wireless 
communication between the RFID tag and RFID reader which is not secured. 
Moreover, in some cases, the wireless communication is also between the RFID 
reader and back-end server, which increases the demand for data security and 
privacy (Lee and Yi, 2011). Some possible threats and risks can affect RFID 
systems. The possible threats and risks to the system need to be determined, 
and then threats can be used to set the security requirements for the system 
(Jules et al., 2006; Peris-Lopes et al., 2006). In this section, two main types of 
threats which can affect the privacy and security of RFID system are 
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investigated. Moreover, possible solutions for solving the problem of these 
threats are investigated. The possible solutions which will be investigated are 
physical solutions and solutions in the authentication process.   
3.4.1 Security needs 
For providing security to information systems, there are three main aspects of 
security which are called CIA triad. The CIA triad is applicable across the whole 
system that subject to security analysis. CIA triad contains three main objects 
for security confidentiality, integrity, and availability. If penetration is done for 
one of these aspects then the system may have serious consequences for the 
parties concerned (Layton, 2006; Menezes, 1996).  
Confidentiality:  Confidentiality means the ability to ensure the protection of 
information from unauthorised access that can disclose the information. This 
service is the most part of any security system, but it is also the most aspect 
that can be attacked. Cryptographic methods can be used to ensure 
confidentiality of information. 
Integrity:  Integrity means the assurance of data accuracy and unchanged 
representation of the original secure information. Integrity ensures information 
so that it is  not  changed, deleted and copied.  
Availability:  Availability means the assurance of providing, storing and 
processing information from the system. A type of attacks to this service is 
denying access to the appropriate user. 
3.4.2 Security Services and Characteristics 
In addition to these three aspects of security, there are also some services that 
need to be provided for ensuring enough information security which are 
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authentication, access control, non-repudiation, scalability, and performance 
(ISO7498-2, 1989); Menezes, 1996) 
Authentication: Authentication is the service that provides identification and 
validation of users during a communication session. Mutual authentication 
means the proof of authentication between two parties during a communication 
session. 
Access control: Access control is the service that controls the flow of information 
also it provides protection against unauthorised access to so as to change read, 
write or delete information. 
Non-Repudiation: Non-repudiation is a service that provides assurance of 
received or sent message. Parties can claim that the message has not been 
sent or received  
Scalability: A network protocol is said to be scalable if the number of nodes can 
increase without forcing an unacceptable workload on any entity in the network. 
3.4.3 RFID privacy Threats 
User privacy is one of the most important concerns of the users of RFID 
systems. Tag’s information can be disclosed due to unprotected communication 
through the wireless channel between a tag and a reader or a tag and a server 
(Jules, 2006). The most vital type of attacks RFID privacy occur due to tag 
information leakage and tag tracking. 
• Information leakage 
Typically, tag information leakage happens when an adversary gets information 
about the tag identifier through queries between a tag and a server. 
Unauthorised entities can obtain private information from the tag or from the 
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server database. This  happens when there are no encryption protocols for the 
message exchange between the tag and the server (Okubo et al., 2003). For 
example, RFID tags can be attached to some passports or ID cards to store 
user’s information. Using RFID system for labelling objects without a specific 
security mechanism makes RFID system vulnerable to disclosure. RFID system 
must have the ability to resist against tag information leakage threat by using 
encryption protocols, and protecting tag’s data against unauthorized access 
(Gafinkel et al., 2005). Moreover, RFID system needs to have the ability to 
control tag’s information by using protocols that allow only authorized access to 
access to the tag’s information (Garfinkel and Rosenberg, 2006). 
• Tracking  
Tracking or traceability is the most commonly discussed privacy leaking 
property of RFID; (Okubo et al., 2003). Simply it can disclose a tag’s location. 
Tracking happens when an attacker can join at the same time multiple tags’ 
interactions in one point or more than the tag’s location, which can be tracked 
by participating unauthorized entities (Najera and Lopez, 2008). For example, 
in a market when a person gets an object with an attached RFID tag and walks 
with a number of RFID readers controlled by the attacker. The attacker can 
deduce the person location at various points by linking reading protocols on 
different reader that is produced from the same tag. Thus, the susceptibility and 
the deduction of the person’s location in time at various points can be done by 
the attacker. RFID system needs to have the ability to resist against the tag 
tracking attack by making protocols that provide an anonymous message from 
tags (Najera andLopez, 2008) . This can be done by using authentication 
protocols or provide a physical solution attached to the tag. 
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3.4.4 Attacks on RFID system  
The nature of RFID systems makes the system vulnerable to several types of 
attacks. These attacks can prevent the system operation and expose RFID 
information. These types of attacks can be categorised into three categories. 
3.4.4.1. Attacks on the singulation protocol between RFID reader and RFID 
tags 
Singulation is the reader process for choosing the unique serial number of tag 
from a list of tags in the range of reader (Giusto et al., 2010). Readers need to 
have a protocol that can identify a unique tag to which it communicates at a 
time. The protocol of singulation is vulnerable to attack unless it is subject to 
protocol that limits the response process. The number of RFID tags that 
respond to the reader needs to be satisfied to avoid the collision in response to 
the RFID reader. The collision happens when two RFID tags or more respond 
together with a reader.  
Anti-collision protocols have been developed for preventing collision during the 
process of identification between the RFID reader and RFID tags. Tree walking, 
ALOHA are common protocols that are used today to avoid collision (Banks, et 
al., 2007). ALOHA protocol is considered as the first singulation protocol which 
was invented in 1970. Usually, ALOHA protocol is mainly used for HF tags while 
tree walking protocol is used in UHF tags. During the communication between 
RFID reader and tags, tags are detected and send their ID to the reader in a 
specific time interval. If same data has been sent from different tags during the 
same time interval, then the collision has occurred, and attempt to resend after 
waiting a random time interval. The main problem with ALOHA protocol is the 
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time period for avoiding the collision which affects the efficiency of the protocol. 
Therefore slotted ALOHA was developed to solve the time problem of ALOHA 
protocol. Slotted ALOHA is mainly based on the same idea of ALOHA protocol 
but with more constraints on the tag’s data. The tag’s data is transmitted at 
synchronised time intervals called slots.  
Tree walking algorithm is used for UHF RFID tags and run in a simple binary 
tree. A reader queries for each bit of tag identifier with either 1 or 0 to respond. 
If the reader receives more than one responds then the reader ask all tags with 
the serial number that starts with 01 and then 010 and so on. The tree walking 
protocol is an ideal method for searching tags but an attacker can eavesdrop 
the communication between the reader and tags.  
3.4.4.2. Attacks on the communication protocols 
The nature of the communication of RFID system that works via the insecure 
wireless channel is vulnerable to various types of attacks. Illegal RFID reader 
can exist in the range of RFID system from reader to tag (forward) or tag to the 
reader (backward). During the communication between the RFID reader and 
RFID tags, a closed adversary can eavesdrop both sides of the channel while 
a far located adversary can just eavesdrop the forward channel because the 
backward channel signal is weaker than the signal of forwarding channel 
(Ahson and llyas, 2008). The attacks of RFID communication can be classified 
into eight categories.  
1- Denial of Service attack (DoS): In this type of attack, the attacker can 
cause a loss synchronization between a server and tags by blocking the 
transmitted message (Weis, et al., 2003; Lee and Yi, 2011). The attacker 
sends a large number of tag’s identifier to the reader then to the back-
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end server (Sandhya and Rangaswamy, 2011). This attack also can 
make a smashing to a server when receiving fakes request. 
2- Replay attack: In this type of attack, the attacker can listen to the 
message exchanged between a server and tags then replay the query 
to the tag, reader and then the back-end server as a valid tag with a 
successful authentication process (Dimitriou, 2005; Wei, et al., 2011). 
3- Man in The Middle attack (MitM): In this type of attack. The attacker 
interferes and listens to the communication between a server and a tag, 
then manipulate information by insert, modify, delete and redirect it 
(Jules, 2004). 
4- Tag impersonation: In this type of attack, an attacker can communicate 
with a server instead of specific tag and be authenticated as a tag (Weis, 
2003).  
5- Location tracking attack: In this type of attack, the listing and analysing 
of the communication between RFID systems can track the location of a 
specific tag (Wei et al., 2011). 
6- De-Synchronization attack: In this type of attack, an attack can prevent 
the information from reaching the reader or the tag when the update of 
information is sent from the back-end server. On the next session, the 
back-end server cannot authenticate the reader or the tag because no 
information validates the authentication. 
7- Backward Traceability: In this type of attack, an attacker might be able to 
trace previous transactions between a service and a tag. this trace can 
be done by using the knowledge of the internal state of the tag and given 
all the internal state of the target tag at time T. The attacker can identify 
the tag’s past transaction at time𝑇/<T (Ohkubo et al., 2003) 
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8- Forward Traceability: In this type of attack, an attacker might be able to 
trace future transaction between a service and tags by using the 
knowledge of the internal state of the tag and given all the internal state 
of the target tag at tine T. In addition, the attacker can also identify the 
tag’s past transaction at time 𝑇/ > 𝑇 (Lim and Kwon, 2006).  
Moreover to these types of attacks, Song and Mitchell (2009) classified 
attacker into two groups; weak attacker and strong attacker. 
A weak attacker has capabilities to observe and dominate the 
communication between a reader and a tag. Commonly, this attacker 
has the ability to modify, insert or delete messages that agree with the 
corresponding protocol’s procedures. 
A strong attacker has the same capabilities as the weak attacker but also 
the ability to compromise tag and access all tag’s internal information. 
3.4.4.3. Side Channel Attack 
Side channel attack is a set of attacks that can analyse the behaviour of  a 
device for the sake of learning about the device (Kasper et al., 2012). This attack 
is used to obtain information from the physical implementation of the 
cryptosystem. Additionaly, side channel attack can involve of measuring the 
time which is taken by a tag to respond to a valid request in order to capture the 
tag’s information and to learn details about the tag from the response time. 
Additionally, a power analysis attack analyses the amount of energy that is 
spent by the tag during the computation. These attacks can involve different 
types of RFID layers from the physical layer to the application layer (Burmester 





 Although, RFIDs can enhance the competence of supply chain management 
there are also some issues that have to be considered, data, reliability and 
security challenges (Liu et al., 2010).   For the data challenge, RFID tags can 
store much information, and RFID reader can read many tags in one second in 
comparison with barcodes. However, these facilities can also cause some 
effects to the original data, such as incorrect data or duplicate data or 
inaccuracy in an inventory system. Collision tags or tags that can be in readable 
form are also issues for the RFID systems since many readers can confuse the 
whole system. In addition, the security and privacy problem is the important 
issue that can affect RFID systems in supply chain management. 
Confidentiality, integrity, authentication, anonymity, and availability are critical 






4. Survey on Existing RFID Privacy and 
Security Solutions 
4.1 Introduction 
As described in the previous chapter, the widespread threats that emerge with 
the use of RFID technology is related to security and privacy. Researchers have 
introduced abundant numbers of RFID authentication protocols in order to 
moderate the security and privacy problems. Meanwhile, the proof of security 
and privacy ensures that the security and privacy requirements are to formalise 
the problem regarding adversary ability that can raise the vulnerability of RFID 
systems.  Such security and privacy formalised definitions will be introduced in 
this chapter, followed by cryptographic authentication protocols that are based 
on solving the security and privacy in the single tag to reader authentication 
protocol, multi-tag or grouping tag authentication protocol and secret sharing 
schemes for RFID systems. 
 
4.2 RFID Security and Privacy Models 
Several models for privacy have been achieved in order to formalise privacy 
and security threats. 
In models, there is an RFID system composed of a set of tags, single reader 
and a data base.  
Legitimate tags information are stored in the system database. In all RFID 
systems, there are a series of composed procedures to set up a reader, tags 
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information and complete the interactive protocol between them.  These 
procedures are as follows (Voudenay, 2007): 
• InitiateReader (1𝜆) a probabilistic algorithm to generate a pair of public 
and private key and a database for a reader. 
• InitiateTag (𝐼𝐷𝒯) is a probabilistic polynomial which returns a pair of the 
secret key of tag then store its 𝐼𝐷 alongside with the secret in the reader 
database.  
• IDentify: A polynomial time interactive protocol which is executed 
between the reader and tag to identify legitimate tag 𝒯 or reject the tag. 
The ability of an adversary 𝒜 to interact with the RFID system is varied. Such 
adversary can play the role of legitimate reader and interact with tags, intercept 
the message exchange between the tag and reader, access to the tag’s 
information and can also access to the reader output.  
Vaudenay 2007 formalise the adversary ability as follows: 
• CreatTag(𝐼𝐷𝒯): This oracle is used to create a unique identifier and is 
used as a legitimate tag and Setup tag to add into the database. 
• Launch(𝒯) : This oracle is used to execute a new Identify protocol 
between the reader and tags.  
• SendReader: This oracle is used to send a message m to the reader wait 
for protocol execution to output the response of the reader. 
• SendTag: This oracle is used to send a message m to the tag and wait 
for protocol execution to output the response of the tag. 




• CorruptTag: Stores new information on the tag and output the secret of 
the tag.  
• DrawTag: Selects tags randomly and gives new pseudonyms and output 
all new pseudenms. 
• FreeTag: Makes the tag unavailable by moving tag with its pseudonym 
from the status of DrowTag to the status of FreeTag. 
 
In any RFID system, a legitimate tag is the tag that corresponds to the 
information that is provided by the database. To ensure the security of an RFID 
system, there are two notions of security which are correctness and soundness.  
The correctness notion means that an RFID system always accepts legitimate 
tags by a reader. In other words, an RFID system is called to be correct if the 
probability of failing legitimate identification tags is negligible.  Soundness 
notion refers to the denial of the database server of accepting illegitimate tags. 
An RFID system is called to have soundness notion if the probability of 
accessing illegitimate tags or impersonation tags to the database is negligible. 
Candara et al., (2010) and Vaudenay (2007) formalised the Soundness notions 
by the ability of an adversary to impersonate tag during the IDentyfy protocol. 
When the challenger initiates the reader and send the security notion  1𝜆 with 
the parameter and the private key to an adversary, then the adversary interact 
the RFID system and use the launch oracle at any time to output the protocol 
identifier 𝜋. The bit value 𝑏 is returned by using ReTurn(𝜋). The stong 
correctness notion is formalised by the ability of an adversary to interact with 
uncorrupted tag. When the challenger initiates the reader, sends the security 
notion  1𝜆 with the parameter and the private key to an adversary, then the 
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adversary interact with the RFID system and select uncorrupted tags identifier. 
At the final stage, the adversary uses the oracle Launch to output the return 
value 𝑏. 
The Avoine model for privacy 
Avoine (2005) proposed an adversary model that that conducts two notions of 
privacy Existential untraceability and universal untraceability. These two 
notions are based on the ability of an adversary to distinguish between two 
recognised tags as a challenge tags based on the protocol execution.  The 
ability of capturing the challenge tags at any time is the notion for universal 
untraceability while the capturing of the challenge tags at a specific time is 
called existential untraceability. Since Avoine model focuses on two tags in the 
system, this model does not allow corrupted tag to be traced. 
A modification model of Avoine was introduced by Juels and Weis. In their 
protocol, they introduced the notion of strong privacy and based on 
indistinguishability of tags. In their challenge model, an adversary allows to 
return the current secret of tag and allows the adversary to set new secret 
selects two challenge tags, and these tags should not be corrupted. The 
adversary selects two uncorrupted tag 𝑇0 and 𝑇1, then the challenger gives the 
adversary access to the challenge tag 𝑇𝑏 . The adversary wins the challenge 
phase of strong privacy if the bit output  𝑏 = 𝑏′. Thus an RFID system ensures 
strong privacy if the probability of winning the challenge phase in negligible.  
 
The Voudenay Model 
Voudenay (2007) introduced the most completed model for privacy as he 
defined and included the adversary classes such as strong, destructive, forward 
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and weak adversary. He also differentiated between the adversary ability in 
each class in terms of the using of corrupted oracle such as strong or wide 
adversary. The term of strong adversary refers to the unlimited access to the 
corrupted oracle by an adversary, while the destructive adversary has no 
access after the corruption of tag. The term of forward adversary refers to the 
using of corrupted tag by the adevrsary, while weak adversary cannot access 
to the corrupted oracle. Furthermore, Vaudenay added Result oracle that allows 
an adversary to decide if the adversary has completed the session successfully, 
which is called wide or narrow if the adversary failed. If the session does not 
complete, the adversary can access to the result oracle. Vaudenay also defined 
the privacy by introducing the notion of blinder and trivial adversary. Vaudenay 
considered the blinder as polynomial algorithms such that a blinder adversary 
knows nothing about the secret just simulate the communication oracles such 
oracles are Launch, SendReader, SendTag and Result oracles. Hence the 
blinder adversary does not use these oracles. A trivial adversary is called trivial 
if there exists a blinder such that the probability of adversary to win the output 
subtract the probability of blinder adversary to win the output is negligible. The 
privacy definition according to Vaudenay consists of two phases, attack phase 
and analyse phase.  The phase one involves the adversary with the system 
through the oracles. The second phase of privacy depends on the ability of an 
adversary to analyse the given a table of the tag’s information and output true 
or false. The protocol is called P-Private if the actual outputs are trivial. The 
Vaudenay privacy definition does not depend on the corruption of tags but 
depends on the information leakage during the communication between the 
RFID tag and the RFID reader. Vaudenay also showed that the statement of 
wide-strong privacy cannot be reached due to the ability of distinguishing 
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between the system and the blinder.  While the statements narrow strong 
privacy can be reached if there is a key agreement protocol in the RFID system.  
The Voudenay model does not consider the case of using mutual authentication 
in RFID system. However, Paise and Vaudenay (2008) extended the case of 
privacy in mutual RFID authentication protocol.  
 
Canard et al Model 
Canard et al. (2010) introduced a model that builds on the Voudenay work which 
supports the same oracles. The privacy has been introduced as a non-obvious 
link by using dummy adversary instead of using blender. In their model, the 
ability of linking multiple authentication of the same tag leads to winning the 
game by an adversary.  Linking multiple authentications is achieved if the 
adversary wins the game by successfully linking the pseudonyms through 
multiple sessions into the same tag. This notion is called non-obvious link. They 
defined the protocol to be untraceable in present or past or even in future if the 
probability of dummy adversary outputting non- obvious link subtracts the 
probability of blinder adversary outputting non-obvious link is negligible. Their 
model is similar to forward and backward secrecy because under corruption, an 
adversary can distinguish tag at present, past and future times. 
Hermans et al model 
Hermans et al. (2014) proposes a privacy model that is based on using the 
notion of simulation.  The privacy is defined by the advantage of an adversary 
to win a privacy experiment between the simulation and the adversary. The 
experiment starts when the challenger picks a random bit 𝑏, then the adversary 
 
 53 
interacts the system with oracles and output 𝑏′. The adversary wins if the 𝑏′ =
𝑏. The adversary is to determine the value 𝑏  based on the interaction with the 
oracle DrawTag(𝑇𝑖 , 𝑇𝑗). 𝑇𝑖 and 𝑇𝑗 cannot be redrawn unless the using of the Free 
tag oracle.  If 𝑏 = 1, then Drawtag = 𝑇𝑖  otherwise DrawTag=𝑇𝑗. According to 
Hermans et al, An RFID system is said to be unconditionally provide privacy 
with the notion X, where X meaning all types of adversaries, if and only if for all 
adversaries there is no advantage in winning the privacy experiment. 
 
4.3 Single tag RFID Authentication Protocol  
Various RFID authentication protocols have been designed to overcome 
security and privacy problems. The objective for designing an RFID 
authentication protocol is not only for security and privacy, but it should be fitted 
for the ability of the RFID tags in terms of power consumption and memory 
store. Therefore, several researchers introduced different and various methods 
for implementing RFID authentication protocol. 
 
4.3.1 Non-public key cryptography authentication protocol  
Hash based access control 
Weis et al. (2003) proposed a protocol based on using a one-way hash function 
to control the access of a tag by locking or unlocking the tag. In their protocol a 
back-end server stores unlocking keys for tags and each tag stores 𝐼𝐷𝑖 and 
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐼𝐷
𝑖
). In the authentication process, RFID tag answers temporary ID to all 
queries from random readers. Tag responds only with  𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐼𝐷
𝑖
) when it’s 
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locked. The reader unlocks tag by sending  𝐾𝑖 to the tag. If the value of 
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖) = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑘𝑖) then the tag unlock its information. The storing of the 
unlock key in the back-end server prevent the secret key from information 
leaking. The authentication process can be summarised as follows:  
1- The server sends query to the tag, then the tag replies with 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖).  
2- Server check 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐼𝐷
𝑖
), then sends 𝐾𝑖 to the tag 
3- If ℎ(𝑘𝑖) = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖), then unlock the value of the tag.  
 
Server 
𝑇𝑖: 𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾𝑖, 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖)                 Query 
                                                        𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖)  
                                                                𝑘𝑖 
                                                                  𝐼𝐷𝑖 
             Tags 




            Unlock 
 
 
Figure 4. 1: Hash-based access control protocol 
 
However, this protocol does not protect tag from tracking because of the fixed 
temporary ID repeatedly used in different sessions of authentication. Also, this 
scheme is vulnerable to replay attack, an adversary can impersonate a tag by 
temporary 𝐼𝐷𝑖 (Osaka, et al, 2006). 
 
Randomly access control 
Weis et al., 2004 proposed a protocol which is based on using a one-way hash 
function with a random number generator. Their protocol is based on the same 
idea of hash based protocol but using random number generator can prevent  
𝐼𝐷𝑖 to be replied. 
The authentication process can be summarised as follows: 
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1- Server stores 𝐼𝐷𝑖 for each tag 𝑇𝑖 where 𝑇𝑖 stores 𝐼𝐷𝑖 . 
2- 𝑇𝑖 generates a random response with different values in each session by 
making the pair of random number generator with the hash value of 
𝐼𝐷𝑖  concatenated with a random number.  
3- The server identifies the tag by total search to compute the hash value 




Search to find 𝐼𝐷𝑖                                                                
                                                                  𝐼𝐷𝑖 
 
       Tag 𝑇𝑖 
 
𝑇𝑖: 𝐼𝐷𝑖,           
Generate r 
 
ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖)//𝑟)   
 
Figure 4. 2: Randomly access control 
 
However, their protocol can be impersonated by the tag impersonated attack 
and a replay attack (Osaka, et al, 2006), . In addition, the fixed ID can be 
traceable and interceptor response can reply which leads to backward 
untraceability.   
 
Henrici and Muller Protocol 
In 2004, Henrici and Muller (2004) proposed a hash-based varying identifier 
protocol, which is based on using a one-way hash function and conjunction 
operation to protect the privacy of RFID tags. In their protocol, the shared secret 
keys are updated after the authentication process and the back-end server 
stores the hash value of tag’s ID in order to accelerate the search process. 
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Basically, tags store the value of 𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖) transaction number  𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖  and 
last successful transaction number 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝑖. In order to update tag values and𝐼𝐷𝑖, 
two hashed value of tag response are sent to the reader query during the 
authentication process. Tags usually reply with the same hashed ID which 
means that an adversary can trace the tag before the next authentication 
session (Chien and Chen,  2007). 
The authentication process can be summarised as follows: 
1- After the sent query from the reader, tag increases the 𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 by one, then 
computes 𝐻𝐼𝐷𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑇𝐼𝐷 =  𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 − 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝑖. 
2- Tag calculates the value of 𝑀1 = (𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖) and sends the set of 
{𝐻𝐼𝐷𝑖, ∆𝑇𝐼𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀1} to the server.  
3- Server matches the set of {𝐻𝐼𝐷𝑖, ∆𝑇𝐼𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀2 to find identification of the 
tag. 
4- After satisfying the identity, server generates a random value r with the 
message 𝑀2 = (𝑟 ⊕ 𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖) and sends message to the tag. 
5- Tag checks 𝑟, 𝑚2 if it satisfys the value of m2 then tag update its 









Compute 𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 from ∆𝑇𝐼𝐷 
 
if 𝑀1 = (𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖𝐼𝐷𝑖) 
 
Generate r 
𝑀2 = (𝑟 ⊕ 𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖) 
𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ← 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ⊕ 𝑟 













[𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝐿𝑆𝑡_𝑖] 
 
𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 ⇽ 𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 1 
 





if 𝑀2 = (𝑟. 𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 . 𝐼𝐷𝑖) 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 ← 𝐼𝑑𝑖 ⊕ 𝑟 
𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖 ← 𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 
 
Figure 4. 3: Henrici and Muller Protocol 
 
According to Chein and Chen (2007), this scheme cannot provide backward  
untraceability because an attacker can do the computing of the identifiers used 
in the previous session.  
 
OSK protocol 
OSK (Ohkubo-Suzuki-Kinoshita) protocol was proposed in 2003 for privacy 
protection. Their scheme is based on using one-way hash function to update 
the tag identifier in each query between the RFID tag and the RFID reader. Each 
tag stores a random identifier 𝑆𝑖
1. During the authentication process, reader 
queries the tag, then the tag will send its hashed identifier number H1 and uses 
second hash function H2 to update the identifier number. 
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The OSK scheme proposed a backward untraceability requirement which 
blocks the identification of tag in the past sessions of communications. Using 
hash chain in this scheme prevents an adversary from revealing the 
identification of the tag from the past secret key (Osaka et al., 2006). 
The OSK protocol can be summarised as follows: 
1- Reader sends identification query to tags and receives 𝑟𝑖
𝑘 = 𝐻1(𝑠𝐼
𝑘). 




3- The server checks the value of tag identifier by computing the 𝐻1(𝐻2
𝑗(𝑆𝑖
1), 
where j is the number of function iteration between two updates.  
 
Server [𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖
1]  
 









For each 𝐼𝐷𝑗 make 















Figure 4. 4: OSK protocol 
 However, this protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks by using communication 
messages to impersonate a tag without knowing the secret key. Moreover, this 
scheme is considered as an unscalable scheme due to numbers of tags in the 





Avoine and Oechslin protocol 
Avoine and Oechslin (2005) proposed a technique based on the OSK protocol 
to solve the scalability issues and enhance the privacy of OSK protocol. Their 
protocol is based on using hash function and aimed to reduce the complexity of 
the OSK protocol by using a  novel time-memory trade-off which is reduced the 
workload on the server tag identification.  
The authentication process can be summarised as follows: 
1- Tag queried by a reader with fixed public string 𝑤 and nonce 𝑟 will send 
 𝑎𝑖 = 𝐻1(𝑠𝑖 ⊕ 𝑟) to the reader and renews 𝑆𝑖 + 1 = 𝐻(𝑠𝑖). 















For each 𝐼𝐷𝑗 make 
iterations with check 
𝐻2(𝑆
𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝑤) 
 
Computes 
 𝑆𝑖 + 1 = 𝐻1(𝑠𝐼
𝑖) 
𝐻2(𝑆
𝑖+1 ⊕ 𝑟) 
 
Figure 4. 5:Avoine and Oechslin protocol 
 
Their protocol provides a modified identifier for improving privacy. The protocol 
uses a fixed string and nonce r to query tag during the authentication session 





Dimitriou protocol  
Dimitriou (2006) proposed a mutual authentication scheme for providing privacy 
and protect tag cloning. His scheme is based on the use of a one-way hash 
function that can guarantee the untraceability of past communication session 
and the server stores the hash value of tag’s ID to make the identification 
process efficient.  
The protocol can be summarised as follows: 
1- Server sends a random nonce 𝑟1 to the tag through the reader, then the 
tag will generate another random nonce 𝑟2. 
2- Tag evaluates 𝐻(𝐼𝐷𝑖) and 𝑀1 = 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑖(𝑟2 ∥ 𝑟1), where 𝑓 is keyed hash 
function. 
3- Tag sends a set of {𝑟2, 𝐻(𝐼𝐷𝑖), 𝑀1)} to the server through a reader. 
4- Server finds 𝐻(𝐼𝐷𝑖) in the data base list to check if the value 𝐻(𝐼𝐷𝑖) is in 
the list then checks the value of 𝑀1 = 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑖(𝑟2 ∥ 𝑟1) also.  
5- Server replaces 𝐼𝐷𝑖 with 𝐻2(𝐼𝐷𝑖) and computes𝑀2 = 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑖
′(𝑟2 ∥ 𝑟1). 
6- Tag receives 𝑀2 and calculates 𝐼𝐷𝑖
′ = 𝐻2(𝐼𝑑𝑖) to satisfy the equation. 








𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝐻1(𝐼𝐷𝑖) 
 










                 Query  
𝑟1 
 
                𝑟2, 𝐻(𝐼𝐷𝑖), 𝑀1 
 
𝑀2 = 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑖










′(𝑟2 ∥ 𝑟1). 




Figure 4. 6: Dimitriou protocol 
 
This scheme is subject traceability threat as the Henrici and Muller protocol; an 
adversary can randomly query the tag to reveal the fixed hash value of the ID.  
Moreover, if the last message from the server cannot reach the tag, then the 
server will update tag identifier and that can cause DoS attack.  
 
Lim and Kwon Protocol 
Lim and Kwon proposed a mutual authentication forward untraceability scheme 
which protects tag identification in future communication sessions (Lim and 
Kwon, 2006). Their mutual authentication scheme is identified as linear search 
work. Their protocol provides untraceability and backward untraceability by 
using three pseudorandom functions. In the authentication process, both reader 
and tag update their shared secret key by using the old secret key blended by 
two random numbers exchanged in the authentication session.  
Their protocol uses three pseudorandom functions,𝑓: {0,1}𝑙 ∗ {0,1}2𝑙1 → {0,1}2𝑙1 , 
𝑔: {0,1}𝑙 → {0,1}𝑙, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ: {0,1}2𝑙1 → {0,1}2𝑙1, where 𝑙 is the bit-length of a tag 
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secret and 𝑙1 is the bit of length of random response. Usually, a server stores 
current data set and old data set for each tag 𝑇𝑖. The current data set contains 
tag identification which contains random secret 𝑠𝑖, 𝑚 identifiers 𝑡𝑖
𝑗
=
𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝑔𝑗(𝑠𝑖), ), where0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚 − 1, a random number 𝑢𝑖 for backward key chain, 
the length 𝑣𝑖 of the backward key chain, and two secret for server validation   
 𝑤𝑖, 𝑠 = ℎ
𝑣𝑖−1(𝑢𝑖) and 𝑤𝑖, 𝑇 = ℎ(𝑤𝑖, 𝑠), where 𝑚 is the maximum number of 
allowable authentication failures between two valid sessions, 𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝑥, 𝑙), denote  
a simple extract function returning 𝑙 bits out of 𝑥, 𝑔𝑗denotes 𝑗 iteration of the 
function 𝑔, and 𝑙2 is the bit length of  a tag secret sent by the tag to help the 
back end server to identify tags. The tag stores the tag secret 𝑠𝑖, the server 
validator 𝑤𝑖, 𝑇, a failure counter 𝑐𝑖 and the maximum number of the counter 𝑚, 
where 𝑐𝑖 is initialised to 0. When the authentication process completes 
successfully, the tag secret 𝑠𝑖 is refreshed within both the tag and the server by 
using exchanged random numbers 𝑟1, 𝑟2 and a secret for server validation𝑠𝑖 ←
𝑔(𝑠𝑖 ⊕ (𝑤𝑖, 𝑠 ∥ 𝑟1 ∥ 𝑟2)). If authentication fails, then a tag updates its stored tag 
secret 𝑠𝑖 to 𝑔(𝑠𝑖).  
Backward untraceability can be ensured by the pseudorandom number function 
and use of hash key chain makes it difficult to impersonate a server to tags. 
Forward untraceability can be achieved if an adversary misses one message 
from successful authentication session. However, the purpose of preventing 
denial of service attack can lead to another attack that allows an adversary to 


















′ = 𝑔𝑗(𝑠𝑖) 
Satisfying   
𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝑓(𝑠𝑖, 𝑟1 ∥ 𝑟2), 𝑙1) 
Computes  
𝑓(𝑠𝑖
′, 𝑟2 ∥ 𝑟1) ⊕ 𝑤𝑖, 𝑠 
𝑠𝑖





′ ← 𝑣𝑖 
𝑤𝑖
′, 𝑇 ← 𝑤𝑖, 𝑇 
𝑤𝑖
′, 𝑠 ← 𝑤𝑖, 𝑠  
𝑠𝑖 ← 𝑔(𝑠𝑖
′ ⊕ (𝑤𝑖, 𝑠 ∥ 𝑟1, 𝑟2)) 
𝑡𝑖
𝑘 ← 𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝑔𝑘(𝑠𝑖), 𝑙2) 
𝑛𝑖 ← 𝑣𝑖 − 1  
𝑤𝑖, 𝑇 ← 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑠 


























𝑤𝑖, 𝑠 ← 𝑓(𝑠𝑖, 𝑟2 ∥ 𝑟1) 
Verifying 𝑤𝑖, 𝑇 =
𝐻(𝑤𝑖, 𝑠) 
If OK update 𝑐𝑖 ← 0 
𝑠𝑖 ← 𝑔(𝑠𝑖 ⊕ (𝑤𝑖, 𝑠
⊕ 𝑟1, 𝑟2)) 
𝑤𝑖, 𝑇 ← 𝑤𝑖, 𝑠 
 Else  
𝑐𝑖 ← 𝑐𝑖 + 1 
𝑠𝑖 ← 𝑔(𝑠𝑖) 
 
Figure 4. 7: Lim and Kwon protocol 
 
The Chien and Chen protocol 
 Chen and Chen protocol proposed a mutual authentication protocol based on 
using pseudorandom number generator and Cycle Redundancy Code (CRC). 
Their protocol is proposed to be used with EPCglobal Class-1 Gen 2. The back 
end server stores new and old session keys to prevent denial of service attacks 
also their protocol prevents backward untracebility. However, their protocol can 
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be affected by denial of service attack, forward tracing and tag impersonation 
attacks (lopes et al., 2011). 
In this protocol server stores [𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑖, 𝐾𝑖, 𝑃𝑖, 𝐾𝑖
′, 𝑃𝑖
′] and tag stores [𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑖, 𝑃𝑖, 𝐾𝑖], 
where 𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑖 is the EPC identifier and 𝑃𝑖 , 𝐾𝑖 are the access and the current 
authentication keys and 𝑃𝑖
′, 𝐾𝑖
′ is the old access and authentication access. 
The authentication process can be summarised as follows:  
1- Server queries tag by a random number 𝑟1, then tag replay with another 
random number 𝑟2.  
2- The tag also computes the message  𝑀1 = 𝐶𝑅𝐶((𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑖 ∥ 𝑟1 ∥ 𝑟2) ⊕ 𝐾𝑖) 
and sends it as a response of the query.  
3- After receiving the value of 𝑀1, server checks whether the value of 𝑀1 is 
equal to 𝑀1 + 𝑘𝑖  𝑜𝑟 𝑀1 + 𝐾𝑖
′. 
4- If the value matches then sever computes the value of 𝑀2 = 𝐶𝑅𝐶(𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑖 ∥
𝑟2) ⊕ 𝑃𝑖 , or 𝑀2 = 𝐶𝑅𝐶(𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑖 ∥ 𝑟2) ⊕ 𝑃𝑖
′. 
5- The server updates the secret value as 𝐾𝐼
′ = 𝐾𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑖
′ = 𝑃𝑖 . 𝐾𝑖 =
𝑃𝑅𝑁𝐺(𝐾𝑖) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑅𝑁𝐺(𝑃𝑖). 
6- The server sends 𝑀2 to the tag and the tag updates the secret value to 
complete the authentication process.  
However, lopes et al (2009) showed that their protocol can be affected by tag 
and reader impersonation and de-synchronization attack. Also, their protocol is 
vulnerable to tracing attacks and forward security.  
Song and Mitchell protocol  
In 2008, Song and Mitchell proposed an RFID authentication protocol. In their 







. Secret 𝑢𝑖 is a string of 𝑙 bits assigned to 𝑇𝑖, and 𝑡𝑖 is a 
hash of 𝑢𝑖 . A tag keeps the value of 𝑡𝑖 as its identifier. This scheme uses a hash 
function to update the secret 𝑡𝑖, a keyed hash function 𝑓 to protect the message 
and a combination of simple function such as right and left shifts and a bit-wise 
exclusive or operation to combine data string. When an authentication session 





) )  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑖, and the tag also updates its secret 𝑡𝑖  using hash 
function.  
Reader 
















𝑢𝑖 = (𝑢𝑖 ≪ 𝑙/4) ⊕(𝑡𝑖 ≫
𝑙/4)  ⊕ 𝑟1 ⊕  𝑟2 
𝑡𝑖 = ℎ(𝑢𝑖) 
 





                    𝑀1,𝑀2 
 
𝑀2 = 𝑓𝐼𝐷𝑖




Computes 𝑀1 = (𝑡1 ⊕
𝑟2) 
(𝑀2 = 𝑟2 ⊕ 𝑟1), 
C=CRC(𝑀1 ⊕ 𝑟) 
 
Checks: 
ℎ(𝑀3 ⊕ 𝑟2 ≫ 𝑙/2)) = 𝑡𝑖 
updates 
𝑡𝑖 = ℎ(𝑢𝑖 ≪ 𝑙/
4)  ⊕(𝑡𝑖 ≫ 𝑙/4)  ⊕ 𝑟1 ⊕
 𝑟2 
 
Figure 4. 8:  Song and Mitchell protocol 
 
Shaoying (2009), showed that the Song and Mitchell protocol enables an 
adversary to impersonate any legitimate reader or tag which is vulnerable the 




Chia-Hui, Min-Shiang, and Augustin Protocol  
Chia-Hui, Min-Shiang, and Augustin (2011) proposed a mutual authentication 
scheme. Their scheme is based on a using hash function and pseudorandom 
number generator. When a reader queries with a tag, reader sends a random 
number to the tag then tag sends its hashed random number by using a shared 
secret key between the tag and a back-end server. The reader uses a random 
number and hashed its ID within the data of tag and sends the value to the back-
end server. The backend server verifies the tag and hashes the tag’s ID with its 
own random numbers then generates new secret key, stores the old secret key, 
and send the hash value of the tag’s ID and its random as they assumed, the 
protocol is secure against tracking attack, cloning attack, replay attack, forward 
security and DoS attack (Chia-Hui, Min-Shiang, and Augustin, 2011). However, 
there is no authentication between the reader and the back-end server. 
Although the reader sends random numbers, it does not prevent an illegal 
reader from penetrating the backend server and act as a trusted reader. In 
addition, the proposed protocol does not prevent or recover from the de-
synchronization attack.  
 
4.3.1.1. ECC RFID authentication scheme 
In 2005, Wolkerstorfer (2005) introduced and discussed the concept of using 
elliptic curve cryptography within RFID system and the feasibility of ECC. 
However, the author did not propose any specific authentication scheme.  
Tuyls and Batina (2006) proposed an identification scheme based on using 
Schnorr identification protocol, which is a zero-knowledge proof on elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm problem ECDL. They proved that their protocol can resist 
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against a passive attack such as counterfeiting and replay attack (Lee et al., 
2008).  The protocol starts when the RFID tag picks a random number 𝑟 and 
sends  𝑥 =∝𝑟  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 to the reader as a commitment. After receiving the 
commitment, the reader then selects a random number 𝑒 as a challenge to the 
tag. The tag responding to the challenge by computing  𝑦 = 𝑎. 𝑒 + 𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 and 
send it to the reader. After receiving 𝑦, the reader computes 𝑧 =∝𝑦 . 𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. If 
the the value of 𝑥 = 𝑧, then the authentication success.  
Lee et al. (2008) proved that the Tuyls and Batina protocol suffered from 
tracking attack and cannot provide anonymity. Also, this protocol cannot provide 
forward security and suffered from scalability problem. 
In 2007, Batina et al. (2007) proposed Okamoto’s identification RFID protocol 
which is also based on using on ECDLP. They proved that their protocol can 
resist against active attack,. Batina et al 2007, protocol is described in figure 
4.10. 
The protocol is also based on zero knowledge protocol, in their scheme the tag 
selects two random numbers and computes   𝑥 =∝−𝑘1∝−𝑘2 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) then sends 
the value to the reader. After receiving these values, the reader sends a random 
number 𝑒 and sends it to the tag as a challenge.  
The tag computes and sends y1 = k1 + α1e (mod q) , y2 = k2 + α2e (mod q) to 
the reader. The authentication success if 𝑧 =∝1
𝑦1∝2










Tag/claimant  Reader/verifier 
 
Random 𝑘1, 𝑘2 
𝑥 =∝−𝑘1∝−𝑘2 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
 
y1 = k1 + ∝1e (mod q) 























𝑦2 𝑣𝑒 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
 
Figure 4. 9: Batina et al protocol (Batina et al, 2007) 
 
Lee et al (2008) presented that Batina et al protocol has issues with location 
tracking and forward attack.  
In 2007, Mcloone and Robshaw (2007)  implemented an authentication protocol 
based on using GPS identification protocol (Girault, Poupard and Sterm 
protocol) which is a version of zero-knowledge proof of elliptic curve. The idea 
of GPS protocol is similar to Schnorr protocol in term of the zero-knowledge 
proof but GPS protocol “does not require knowledge of the order of the group 
nor the group element”  (Mcloone and Robshaw, 2007). The protocol starts 
generating 𝑟1 ∈ [0, 𝐴 − 1]then computes 𝑥 = 𝑔
𝑟1, then sends the value to the 
verifier. The verifier sends a random challenge 𝑐, where 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝐵 − 1] and 
𝐴, 𝐵 are integer number. After receiving 𝑐, the prover calculates 𝑦 = 𝑟1 + 𝑠𝑐. 
The verifier then checks 𝐼 ∈ 𝐿 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑔𝑦𝑥−1 = 𝐼𝑐 and 0 ≤ 𝐴 − 1 + (𝐵 −
1)(𝑆 − 1). Complete these calculations then the identifying is achieved.  
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In their protocol, they proved that the GPS scheme can resist against passive 
attack. However, the authentication protocol does not provide privacy.  
Tag/claimant  Reader/verifier 
Picks r1 
Computes 𝑥 = 𝑔𝑟1 
 





If 𝑔𝑦𝑥−1 = 𝐼𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 ≤
𝐴 − 1 + (𝐵 − 1)(𝑆 −
1) 





𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝐵 − 1]  
Figure 4. 10: GPS protocol (Mcloone and Robshaw, 2007) 
 
In order to provide privacy to the GPS protocol, Bringer et al. (2009) also 
proposed the randomized GPS to ensure privacy. Similar to the GPS protocol, 
the randomized GPS protocol starts generating a private and a public key for 
the claimant and the verifier where the secret key for the claimant is 𝑠 ∈
[0, 𝑆 − 1] and the public key for the claimant is 𝐼 = 𝑔𝑠. For the verifier, v is the 










Tag/Claimant  Reader/Prover 
Selects 𝑟1𝑟2 ∈ [0, 𝐴 −
1] 
Computes and sends  





Computes and send 












If 𝐼 ∈ 𝐿 and 0 ≤ 𝑦, 𝑦 ≤
2𝐴 − 2 + (𝐵 − 1)(𝑆 −
1)  then accepted  
 
           
   Picks𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝐵 − 1] 






Figure 4. 11: The randomized GPS protocol (Bringer et al, 2009) 
 
The difference between this scheme and the original GPS protocol is that the 
privacy here insured and the calculation of 𝐴2𝑣 ensuring that the verifier can 
make the final verification. Since the verifier performs constant numbers of 
operation without slowing down the identification process. This protocol is 
considered as a scalable protocol. 
Bringer et al (2009), proposed randomized hashed GPS protocol which is a 
zero-knowledge proof protocol. This protocol is similar to the previous protocol 
and provides security against active attack. Also, this protocol can ensure 
privacy even the data is corrupted. The only difference here is using the hash 
function to the first message, and the calculation of this protocol can be done 
off-line with the property that all information can be revealed. The protocol is 






Tag/Claimant  Rader/Prover 
Selects 𝑟1𝑟2 ∈ [0, 𝐴 −
1] 
Computes and sends   
𝑍 = 








Computes and send 









If 𝐼 ∈ 𝐿 and 𝑧 =
𝐻(𝐴1𝐴2)0 ≤ 𝑦, 𝑦 ≤ 2𝐴 −
2 + (𝐵 − 1)(𝑆 − 1)  
 
Picks 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝐵 − 1] 
            








Figure 4. 12: the randomized hash GPS protocol 
In 2008, Lee et al proposed an elliptic curve called EC-RAC (Elliptic curve 
Random Access control) protocol. This protocol is aimed to enhance security 
and provide anonymity. However, Bringer et al (2009) broken the protocol and 
found that Lee et al.’s scheme cannot resist to tracking attack as well as the tag 
impersonation attack. Furthermore, lee et al. (2010), proposed a second version 
called EC-RAC II to solve these problems. However, Deursen and Radomirovic 
(2009) proved that the EC-RAC II suffered from man in the middle attack and 
tracking attack. Lee et al.. (2010) proposed a new scheme called EC-RAC III to 
avoid the security problem of EC-RAC and EC-RACII. According to Fan et al. 
(2010), The EC-RACIII protocol is still not secure against man in the middle 
attack. Later, Lee et al. (2010), proposed a final version of EC-RAC family called 
EC-RAC IV, this protocol is proposed to solve the privacy problem. However, 
Deursen and Radomirovic (2010) pointed out that EC-RAC IV still vulnerable to 
the man-in-the-middle attack.  
Bringer et al. (2008), proposed the randomized Schnorr protocol to solve the 
privacy issued by the original Schnorr protocol. The randomized version of 
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Schnorr protocol ensures the privacy of by computing 𝐴2 = 𝛽𝑣𝑃 to ensure that 
only the prover can verify and compute the identity. 
Tag/claimant  Reader/Verifier 
Picks 𝛼, 𝛽   
Computes  𝐴1 =∝
𝑃, 𝐴2 = 𝛽𝑉𝑃 
 






Checks if 𝐼 ∈ 𝐿 
                                                                         
𝐼 = 𝑐−1(𝑦𝑝 − 𝐴1 −
𝑣−1𝐴2 
 
Figure 4. 13: Randomized Schnorr protocol 
In 2009, Martinez et al. proposed an authentication protocol that is based on 
using zero knowledge prove and ECC. In their scheme, they worked on the finite 
field of 137 to make the work faster than other. They proved that Schnorr 
protocol is secure against relay attack and man in the middle attack. In the case 
of DoS attack, the author assumed that there is no danger against DoS attack. 
This is because tag only changes its secret key when authentication 
successfully. In the case of tracking tag, the only information to be considered 
is random number challenge. According to Lv et al. (2011), Martinez et al 
scheme is vulnerable to tracking attack. 
In 2011, Zhang et al., (2011) proposed two modifications to improve EC-RAC 
and Schnorr protocol. Their scheme is aimed to resist to tracing attack. 
However, Babaheidarian et al., (2011) proved that the impersonation attack 
could affect Zhang et al. schemes. 
Chen et al. (2011) proposed a based RFID authentication protocol based on 
using ECC. Their scheme aimed to overcome security and privacy issues of 
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RFID system and to be more efficient than EC-RAC IV. In their scheme, the 
server responsible for generating, random numbers and time stamp. The RFID 
tags run ECC computations, random numbers generator, and a hash function 
for the tag's ID.  He and Zeadally (2015) pointed out that Chen et al. protocol is 
suffered from a replay attack. The Chen et al. protocol is shown in figure 4.14 
RFID tags 
𝐼𝑑𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑃, 𝑃, 𝑌, 𝑡𝑖 
 Server 
𝑌 = 𝑠𝑃, 𝑃 
check the value of time 
stamps 𝑡𝑠 and 𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑞 
Generate random r & k 
Compute 𝐶1 = 𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑃 
𝐶2 = 𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑌 
Compute 𝑥1 = ℎ(𝑟𝑖, 𝐶1) 
𝑥2 = ℎ(𝑟𝑖, 𝐶2) 
Check the value of 
gcd(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = l 
Compute B𝐵1 =
𝑥1ℎ(𝐼𝑑𝑖) 
𝐵2 = 𝑥2ℎ(𝐼𝑑𝑖) 
𝐵3 = ℎ(𝑟𝑖, 𝐶1, 𝑟𝑠) 
 
 
Generate random 𝑟𝑠, 









𝑟𝑖 = 𝐶2 − 𝑠𝐶1 = 𝐵
′
3 
Checks the value 𝐵′3 =
𝐵3 
Compute 𝑥1 = ℎ(𝑟𝑖, 𝐶1) 
𝑥2 = ℎ(𝑟𝑖, 𝐶2) 
Check the value of 
gcd(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = l 
Find 𝑘1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘2 by using 
Euclidean algorithm 
ℎ(𝐼𝑑𝑖) = 𝑘1𝐵1 + 𝑘2𝐵2) 
 
 




Liu et al. (2013) proposed a lightweight ECC- based authentication protocol 
(LRAP) aimed to reduce computation cost over RFID tags by reducing operation 
over RFID tag and put the high operation over the RFID reader.  Their scheme 
is aimed to provide security and mutual authentication by using elliptic curve 
digital logarithm problem and to avoid using the digital signature. Their system 
consists of four phases that starts with initial phase, tag identification phase, 
mutual authentication phase and updating phase. Although Liu et al protocol is 
produced as a lightweight authentication protocol; the tag produces a number 
of operations that increase the complexity and efficiency of the protocol as 
shown in figure 4.15. Therefore, their system is not applicable in a real RFID 
application. Together with the complexity of the protocol, Liu et al protocol is 






𝐼𝑑, 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝐼𝑑, 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐼𝑑  
𝑑𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑘𝑒𝑦 𝑑𝑘 
  










(𝑐1, 𝑐2)=𝑑𝑘. 𝑐𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟3 






𝐼𝑑, 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑘𝑒𝑦 𝑒𝑘 
 
 
Generates random numbers 
(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑛3)  
Computes (𝑐1, 𝑐2)=𝑛3𝑒𝑘 
𝑐𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟1 = 𝑐1𝑛1 
𝑐𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟2 = 𝑐2𝑛2 
𝑐𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟3 = 𝑛3𝑃 
Computes 
 𝐴 = (𝐼𝑑 + 𝑛1 + 𝑛2) 𝑒𝑘 
Sends 





𝑛2 = 𝑐𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟2. 𝑐2
−1 
𝐴′ = (𝐼𝑑 + 𝑛1 + 𝑛2) 𝑑𝑘𝑃 
Checks the value of 𝐴′ = 𝐴 
Computes and sends  𝐵 =
(𝑛1 𝑛2) + 𝐼𝑑 for 
authentication 
Updates tags 𝐼𝑑 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝐼𝑑 = 𝑖𝑑 





Check the value of 𝐵′ = 𝐵 
Updates 𝐼𝑑 = (𝐼𝑑 + 𝑛1) 𝐼𝑑 +
𝑛2) 
 
Figure 4. 15: Liu et al (2013) protocol 
Wang et al. (2014) proposed an authentication protocol that is based on using 
ECC and hash function to achieve backward secrecy. In their scheme the server 
is responsible for generating system parameter and store the secret and public 
key values in database and tag’s memory. Their protocol is aimed at providing 
mutual authentication, however, the protocol receives random number from the 
back-end server and cannot authenticate with the data-base server also their 
protocol is not scalable with large numbers of RFID tags. 
















𝐼𝑑𝑖 , 𝑆𝑒𝑐, 𝑝𝑢𝑏, 𝑃 
 Server 
𝑉 = 𝑣. 𝑃 
Generates random 
number 𝑟 ∈ 𝑍𝑞
∗ 
Computes and sends  
𝐵1 = 𝑟. 𝑃  
 
Computes 𝐵2 =
𝑟. 𝑝𝑢𝑏. 𝑃 
Challenges 𝐶ℎ =
ℎ(𝐵2,𝑟1) 
Computes and sends  





Generate and sends 









′ , 𝑟1) 
Check   the value of 







Figure 4. 16: Wang et al. (2013) protocol 
Songhela and Das (2014) proposed an authentication protocol that is based on 
using ECC and a pseudo-random function. Their scheme is aimed at providing 
a strong privacy preservation and to provide a mutual authentication with a 
backward and forward secrecy.  However, Ryu et al (2015) showed that 
Songhela and Das protocol does not provide forward secrecy and vulnerable to 
replay attack and impersonation attack. Songhela and Das (2014) 






𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖, 𝑝𝑢𝑏, 𝑃 
 Server 
𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖, 𝑃, 𝑝𝑢𝑏 
Generates random 




𝑓(𝑟, 𝑘. 𝑝𝑢𝑏. 𝑃), 𝐾 = 𝑘𝑃, 
𝐵1 =
𝑓(𝑟, 𝑘. 𝑝𝑢𝑏. 𝑃). 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑏. 𝑃 
















Computes 𝑓′(𝑟, 𝑘. 𝑝𝑢𝑏. 𝑃), 
Compute 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑖. 𝑃 =
𝑝𝑢𝑏−1. 𝑓(𝑟, 𝑘. 𝑝𝑢𝑏. 𝑃)−1𝐵1 
Checks validation of  𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑖 
Computes  and sends 
𝐵2 =
𝑝𝑢𝑏. 𝑓′(𝑟, 𝑘. 𝑝𝑢𝑏. 𝑃). 𝐾 
 
Figure 4. 17: Songhela and Das (2014) 
 
Chou  (2014) proposed an authentication protocol by using elliptic curve 
cryptography and hash function. In contrst with Songhela and Das protocol, 
Chou protocol store shared secret tag identifiers with the server and does not 
need to store private or public key for tags. Chou et al. protocol is aimed to 
provide forward secrecy and mutual authentication and resistance to RFID 
security attacks, however, Zhanq and Qi (2014), and Ryu et al. (2015) showed 
that this scheme cannot provide forward privacy and vulnerable impersonation 






𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖, 𝑝𝑢𝑏, 𝑃 
 Server 






Computes and sends 
𝐾 = 𝑘𝑃, 𝐴1 = 𝑘𝐴0 
 𝐴2 = 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖. 𝑃 + 2𝐾  







Checks if 𝐴4 =
ℎ(𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖, 3𝐾) 
 
Generate randomly  𝑟 ∈
𝑍𝑞
∗ 








Compute 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑖′. 𝑃 = 𝐴2 −
2𝐾′ 
Checks validation of  
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑖 
Checks if h(𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖, 𝐾′) =
𝐴3 
Computes  and sends 
𝐴4 = ℎ(𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖, 3𝐾
′) 
Figure 4. 18 Chou et al. authentication protocol (2014) 
 
4.4 Multi-Tag RFID Authentication protocol  
 
The term of enabling multi-RFID tags to be presented within an RFID reader 
and to be scanned simultaneously is referred to be called a grouping proof.  The 
grouping proof protocol aimes  to enable a pair of multi-tags to generate a proof 
which shows that they have been scanned at once by a reader. An RFID reader 
can read several tags by recognising all tags after identification procedure. The 
result of the yoking protocol is to produce a proof of verification to offline parties 
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instead of direct involvement. Grouping proof was first introduced by Jules in 
2004 as a yoking proof protocol ( Jules, 2004). The yoking proof starts with two 
tags 𝑇𝑎𝑔𝐴 and 𝑇𝑎𝑔𝐵 share the secret keys 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝐴 and 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝐵 and a back-end server. 
The protocol starts when a reader sends a command to 𝑇𝑎𝑔𝐴 , then the tag start 
to generate and send a random number 𝑟𝐴 to the reader. Upon receiving tag 
identify and 𝑟𝐴, the reader sends 𝑟𝐴 to the  𝑇𝑎𝑔𝐵.  𝑇𝑎𝑔𝐵 calculates the MAC of 
𝑟𝑎 with the key 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝐵 , generate a random number 𝑟𝐵 and then sends to the reader 
𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑠𝑒𝑐𝐵[𝑟𝐴] with 𝑟𝐵 with tag’s identity. The reader sends 𝑟𝐵 to the  𝑇𝑎𝑔𝐴 to 
compute the challenge 𝑀𝑎. The tag calculates and sends 𝑀𝑎 = 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑋𝐴[𝑟𝐵]. For 
the proof verification, the reader sends to the back-end server  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑓𝐴𝐵(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑀𝐴, 𝑀𝑏) with 𝑟𝐴 and 𝑟𝐵. The back-end server generates a proof 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑓′𝐴𝐵(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑀𝐴, 𝑀𝑏) and compares it with the previous proof. If these values 
are equal then both tags 𝑇𝐴 and 𝑇𝐵 are scanned simultaneously.  
The Yoking-proof protocol produces only a basic computation and does not 
include cryptographic functions only including MAC function.  
Saito and Sakurai (2005) pointed out weaknesses in the work of Jules and 
showed that it is vulnerable to replay attacks. So they proposed a new solution 
using timestamps. They also generalized the concept for a group of tags and 
introduced the corresponding grouping proof. Piramuthu (2006) proved that 
Saito’s protocol is also vulnerable to replay attacks so Piramuthu (2006) 
proposed to include random values instead of timestamps to thwart replay 
attacks. However, in 2007 Peris-Lopez et al. (2007) and Lin et al. (2007) proved 
Piramuthu’s protocol using random numbers is subject to multi-proof session 
replay attacks and proposed a new grouping-proof protocol. 
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Chien and Liu (2009) proposed an anonymous tree based yoking proof to 
reduce the computational cost of identifying a tag in the verifier from O (n) to O 
(1). Huang and Ku (2009) proposed an online protocol for enhancing medication 
safety of inpatient which supported low-cost RFID tags. Unlike previous 
proposals, it replaced message authentication code (MAC) and hash function 
with 16-bit pseudorandom number generation (PRNG), bitwise operations and 
cyclic redundancy check (CRC) function. 
Burmester (2011) proposed three grouping-proof protocols based on the idea 
of sharing of group identifier ID, and the third supports anonymity and forward-
security properties.  
Peris-Lopez (2011) did security analysis about protocols described above, and 
the result showed that: the scheme of Burmester (2011) is vulnerable to multiple 
impersonation attacks and the schemes of Huang and Ku (2009) are vulnerable 
to privacy attacks and forgery attacks. Shen et al. (2014) proposed a grouping 
proof protocol that provides mutual authentication and can support a group of 
tags with multiple readers. In their protocol, the communication is run through 
using fixed values of the tag’ identifier with the tag’s group identifier and reader 
identifier which lead to information leakage as these values are plain text valued 
(Shi et al., 2017).  
A key distribution method for RFID grouping proof was introduced by Huang 
and Mu (2015). In their challenge-response protocol, it functions by interacting 
tag and reader three times during the process. In the first process, the reader 
sends a secret value with a random number then tag responds and updates it 
secret and send the previous secret to the reader. The reader checks the 
legality of the tag and response by generating random values that are related 
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to the secret key and send it back to the tag. After receiving from a reader, tag 
updates its secret again and send it to the reader as a proof of authentication.   
Shen et al. (2016) proposed a grouping authentication protocol that uses bitwise 
operation and without any encryption method or hash function. In their protocol, 
a series of signature methods are used to generate the grouping proof through 
three authentication process. In the first process, a reader obtains a number of 
tags identity and associate them with random numbers. In the second process, 
linking the whole tag group is produced by proofing a set of tags. The final 
process is the verification process that verifies the final verification to a 
database. As the protocol does not involve any encryption method, their 
protocol can be vulnerable to eavesdrop the message in the first process and 
assume the group key and the tag sequence of numbers. 
The grouping-proof protocols which have been discussed above use only 
simple bit-wise operations, like XOR, AND, OR and rotation, and non-public key 
encryption techniques such as: hash functions, MACs, pseudo-key functions, 
due to their simplicity compared to public-key algorithms. However, security and 
privacy alongside with scalability are issues with these schemes.  
Public key algorithms provide strong security and privacy for RFID system as 
well as scalability when applying for a large amount of RFID tags. The only 
problem was the hardware ability of low-cost RFID tags. Since the introduction 
of ECC with RFID tags, many researchers proved that ECC can be suitable for 
implementation in low-cost RFID 
 Batina et al. (2011) proposed an ECC protocol that can allow a pair of tags to 
be authenticated at once. As shown in figure 4.19, a reader starting from left to 
send a message to the first tag then start right to point out. The first tag 
generates a random number with the corresponding to the EC point then sends 
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this message to the second tag. The second tag also generates a random 
number and compute a corresponding message and compute its response by 
using the private key. Both correspondings from each tag are exchanged to the 
reader then the reader will send the corresponding message of the second tag 
to the first tag to compute the challenge phase by using its private key. All of the 
challenge response will be forwarded to the reader for the final authentication. 
Lv et al. (2011) and Hermans and Peeters (2012) showed that it Batina et al. 
(2011) is  unsecured to the tracking attack, man-in-the-middle-attack (MITM) 
and impersonation attack.  
 
First tag (𝑠1, 𝑌) Reader Second Tag (𝑠2, 𝑌) 
 
generate random 𝑟1 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 
computes 𝑇1 = 𝑟𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝             𝑟 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 
                                                                      𝑇1, 𝑟𝑠 
                                                                                                            𝑟2 ∈ 𝔽𝑝     
                                                                                                            𝑇2 = (𝑟2 +
𝑥(𝑟𝑠𝑇1)𝑠2        
                                                 𝑇2                                           𝑇1, 𝑇2 
𝑇12 = 𝑟1 + 𝑥(𝑇2)𝑠1𝑌 
                                          𝑇12                                      
                                               
Figure 4. 19: Batina et al.(2011) 
 
Lin et al. (2012) proposed an improvement for Batena et al. protocol. However, 
Ko et al. (2014) found that Lin et al. protocol is vulnerable to impersonation 
attack as well as to tracking attack. Hong- Yang (2015) proposed a grouping-
proof protocol to overcome the low generation efficiency of the grouping-proof 
protocol by conducting a parallel processing.  Later, Cheng et al. (2017) 
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proposed a protocol that is based on ECC and should be secured against MITM 
attack and provide strong privacy. However, these protocols have been not 
tested in terms of tag impersonation attack.  
4.5 Secret Sharing Techniques 
This idea was first introduced by Langheinrich and Marti (2007) The idea of their 
work is mainly based on using Shamir secret sharing scheme to split the tag’s 
ID into the secret. Although their protocol is secured against eavesdropping 
attack, Lv et al. (2011) found that there is a scalability issue within large 
numbers of tags.  
Another attempt of using Shamir secret Sharing scheme was in Langheinrich 
and Marti (2007) protocol; they proposed a distribution process to share the 
tag’s secret ID between reader and tags as a set of encoded shares and stored 
in the RFID tag memory. In their authentication process, a combination of secret 
shares is required to verify that the secret key is correct.  
Later a key distribution protocol has been proposed by using the Ramp secret 
sharing scheme where the size of each share is smaller than the size of the 
secret (Jules et al., 2008). However, Cai et al. (2009) found that Jules et 
al.(2008) suffers from tracking and counterfeiting attacks. 
In order to reduce the computation cost of Shamir base scheme, Lv et al. (2011) 
proposed two secret sharing schemes based on XOR and an addition operator. 
However, Sato et al., (2016) showed that a shared secret can be learned by 
eavesdropper adversary.  
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Cai et al. (2009) proposed a scheme that can be secured against tracking by 
using a hash function to update the tag secret key. However, their scheme still 
vulnerable tracking attack (Abughazalah et al., 2014)   
In order to ensure privacy and prevent tracking attack, Abughazalah et al. 
(2014) proposed a secret key update scheme that is based on dividing and 
distributing shares by addition operator, then using a hash function to ensure 
privacy. Later, Sato et al., (2016) proposed an idea for a secret sharing scheme 
by suing Shamir secret sharing scheme and used dummy RFID tags and real 
RFID tags. However, Sato et al. (2016) assumed that when using a few amount 
of products, the number of dummy tags are increased. For this reason and for 
the real implementation of RFID applications, the dummy tags need to be 
reduced (Sato et al., 2016). 
 
4.6 Summary  
Cryptographic RFID authentication protocols have been briefly reviewed in this 
chapter. Authentication protocols which are based on using non-public key 
encryption and public key encryption and secret sharing schemes are also 
reviewed.  
In general, Authentication protocol based on non-public key encryption is faster 
and less complex than public key encryption protocols. However, non-public 
key encryption protocols are more vulnerable than public key encryption. This 
is because of the sharing key between the participant. Therefore applying public 
key encryption for a large distributor is more suitable than non-public key 
encryption. The feasibility of public key encryption protocol is till now an open 
problem due to computation complexity and high cost. 
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5. Zero-Knowledge Authentication protocol and 
RFID Tags 
5.1 Introduction 
The design of an RFID authentication protocol is considered to be complicated 
due to the ability of building a secure protocol that can fit the lack of 
computational capability of RFID hardware. As described in the previous 
chapters, there are some major security and privacy problems that occur during 
the wireless communication between the RFID tag and the RFID reader. These 
security problems are varied and depend on the ability of an attacker to 
eavesdrop and interrupt the communication session, modify the broadcast 
exchange message and even can block the channel between the RFID tag and 
the RFID reader. Therefore there is a need to build up a secured system that 
can prevent these types of attacks. In addition to the security concerns, the 
privacy of tag is also an issue due to the ability of an attacker to track the RFID 
tags during the communication. An RFID system needs to be provided with un-
traceability property for the RFID system by disabling an attacker to recognise 
the interaction with RFID tags and derive the tag’s information. This information 
can be used by an attacker to trace the tag.  
 Therefore, this chapter will discuss the weaknesses of an existing protocol 
which was introduced by Tulys and Batina (2006). They  proposed an RFID 
authentication protocol that used ECC version of Scnorr identification protocol 
that can be used for RFID systems. The weaknesses of their protocol are 
highlighted in terms of Tracking attack problem and Man in The middle attack 
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problem.  Although another modifications of the original Tulys and batina (2006) 
protocol have been introduced, most of these protocols are still vulnerable to 
tracking attack as mentioned previously in chapter four.  Some other 
researchers have introduced other protocols which are based on using Zero 
Knolwege proof with the ECC. However, as mentioned  in the previous chapter 
some of theses protocol do not satisfy the security and privacy requirement for 
an RFID system.  Therefore, in this chapter, we try to beat the vulnerability of 
tracking attack of an existing RFID protocol proposed by Tuyls and batina 2006. 
The modification of the existing protocol can overcome the problem of tracking 
attack by enhancing the ability of the protocol is to prevent such attack by 
ensuring the integrity of the message exchange between the RFID tag and the 
RFID reader.  
5.2 Backgrounds 
In this section, we will introduce some of the basic techniques that will be used 
in the improvement of the modification protocol. 
5.2.1 Definitions 
 The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) 
“Given the finite cyclic group 𝑍𝑝
∗  of order 𝑝 − 1 and a primitive element ∝∈ ℤ𝑝
∗  . 
The DLP is the problem of determining the integer 1 ≤  𝑥 ≤  𝑝 − 1 such that 
∝𝑥≡ 𝛽 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) “  
Coprime number 
Two integer numbers a and b are said to be relatively prime or coprime if the 
only positive integer that evenly divided both of them is 1. i.e the greater 
command divisor gcd(a,b)=1. 
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Primitive root modulo n 
A number g is a primitive root modulo n if every number coprime to n is 
congruent to a power of g modulo n such that 𝑔𝑘 ≡ 𝑎 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛). In other words, 
g is the multiplicative group of integers modulo n. 
5.2.2 a  Schnorr Identification Protocol  
In 1989, C.P Schnorr (Shnorr, 1989) introduced Schnorr identification scheme 
as an improvement of ElGamal signature scheme which was introduced in 1985 
(ElGamel, 1985).  At that time, Schnorr proposed a signature and authentication 
protocol that is based on the discrete logarithm problem and satisfying zero 
knowledge proof. The Schnorr identification scheme is based on the idea of 
ElGamal and Fiat and Shamir Schemes. However, Schnorr was enhanced 
further in a way that can improved the speed of ElGamal signature scheme. The 
advantage of Schnorr scheme comes from the intractable computation of a 
discrete logarithm over a finite field.  
The Schnorr scheme needs a trusted authority to choose a domain parameter 
with the properties: 
1- 𝑃 is a large prime number such that 𝑝 − 1 is divisible by another large 
prime number 𝑞. 
2- ∝ is an element in ℤ𝑝
∗  with order 𝑞.  
3- 𝑡 is a security parameter such that 𝑞 > 2𝑡. 
The user chooses a private key 𝑎 such that 0 ≤  𝑎 ≤ 𝑞 − 1. Then computes the 
public key 𝑣 ≡∝−𝑎  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) or 𝑣 ≡∝𝑞−𝑎  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). 
As shown in figure 5.1, the protocol starts after the claimant chooses a random 
value 𝑟 ∈ {1, … , 𝑞 − 1}, then computes 𝑥 =∝𝑟 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) and sends it to the 
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verifier. The verifier sends random value 𝑒 ∈ {0, … , 2𝑡 − 1} to the claimant. The 
claimant computes and sends 𝑦 = 𝑎 ∗ 𝑒 + 𝑟 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). The verification process is 
done after the verifier computes 𝑧 = 𝛽𝑦 ∗ 𝑣𝑒 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). It will be accepted if 𝑧 =








Check if 𝑧 =
𝑥 otherwise reject 
Verifier 
    random 𝑟 
     𝑥 =∝𝑟 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
 






𝑧 =∝𝑦 𝑣𝑒 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
Figure 5. 1: The Schnorr Identification Scheme 
The last step of the scheme is the conviction of the claimant’s identity to the 
verifier, therefore the calculation of ∝𝑦 𝑣𝑒 ≡∝𝑟+𝑎𝑒 𝑣𝑒 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
                                                        ≡∝𝑎𝑒 (∝−𝑎)𝑟 ≡∝𝑟+𝑎𝑟−𝑎𝑟≡∝𝑟≡ 𝑧 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
The claimant uses the private key 𝑎 along with the protocol without revealing its 
value. The claimant convinces the verifier about the private key information and 
the verifier should compute the calculation without knowing the value of the 
private key. This scheme was introduced to enhance the speed of the 
computation and was designed to fit smart cards that have a limitation in 
computation. The desirable property of the Schnorr protocol is that it can used 
in applications that have a low computation capability with a limit power such 
as smart card and RFID tags. 
Schnorr identification scheme was designed to be very fast and secure. 
However, there is a possible probability to cheat and break this scheme. Taking 
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into consideration, if an attacker guesses the correct value of the verifier 
challenge 𝑒 then the attacker can calculate the value of 𝛼𝑦𝑣𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 and sends 
the value to the verifier that will send the challenge 𝑒. Then the attacker can 
send the value of 𝑦 to the verifier and then the verifier accepts. The probability 
of guessing the verifier challenge is equal to 2−𝑡 because 𝑒 ∈ {1,2, … . 2𝑡} unless 
the verifier sends the same challenge in each round (Schnorr, 1989). Another 
possibility to break this scheme, if an attacker tries to compute the value of the 
private key 𝑎 which is 𝑎 = − log∝ 𝑣. However, the computation is infeasible 
(Schnorr, 1989) because it will take a lot of time and memory until finding the 
value a.  
Another possibility to break the protocol is suggested by (Stinson, 2006). He 
supposed that an attacker can compute 𝑟1 𝑟2 with 𝑦1 𝑦2 from the value of 𝑥.  
Then 𝑥 ≡∝𝑦1 𝑣𝑟1  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 ≡ 𝑥 ≡∝𝑦2 𝑣𝑟2  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝  
∝𝑦1−𝑦2≡ 𝑣𝑟2−𝑟1  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝  
 Since  𝑣 =∝−𝑎  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 then ∝𝑦1−𝑦2≡∝−𝑎(𝑟1−𝑟2)  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 
Since ∝ has order 𝑞 so 𝑦1 − 𝑦2 ≡ 𝑎(𝑟1 − 𝑟2). 
The attacker aim is to find the private key 𝑎. Since 𝑟1 𝑟2 ∈ {1,2, … , 2
𝑡}, then 1 ≤
𝑟1 ≤ 2
𝑡 , 1 ≤ 𝑟1 ≤ 2
𝑡 and 0 </𝑟2 − 𝑟1/≤ 2
𝑡 . Hence gcd(𝑟2 − 𝑟1, 𝑞) = 1 and (𝑟1 −
𝑟2)
−1𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 exist, then  
𝑎 = (𝑦1 − 𝑦2)(𝑟2 − 𝑟1)
−1𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 . 
Now, if the attacker knows the private key a then he can impersonate the 
claimant’s private key with probability P = 1. This implies that at schnorr protocol 
is soundness if the private key not impersonate. The Schnorr protocol is 
completeness and soundness that leads to proof of knowledge.  
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The amounts of the message exchanged requirements during the 
authentication process are acceptable because of the multiplication property in 
the finite field. Using discrete logarithm problem in the finite field makes 
computation efficient and intractable. In the first step, 1024 bits of information 
are sent from the claimant’s computation including the amount of certification. 
This information is the most important information that needs to be transmitted. 
In the second step, 40 bits of information are for generating verifier random 
number. 160 bits of information for the claimant calculation of 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑒 +
𝑟 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). The last process of the protocol is for the verification and does need 
transition (Stinson, 2006). The efficiency speed of the protocol is because the 
claimant does not do too much computation. Most of computation is done by 
the verifier. Taking in consideration that the value of 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∝ are public and 
used by every user in the network range.  
5.2.3 Random oracle model and Keccak Hash function 
Random oracle model is used in security proofs as an ideal comprehensive 
hash function. The Keccak hash function now a standard SHA-3 is a close 
practical realisation of the random oracle model. Keccak is a cryptographic hash 
function that wins the competition SHA-3 by National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). It is a hash function that based on a sponge construction 
as a building block of permutations.  The sponge construction is used to build a 
function that maps an input of variable arbitrary lengths then outputs arbitrary 
permutation lengths by using a repetitive construction. The width of the function 
𝑓 is a fixed number of bit b which operates on a state 𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝑐 where 𝑟 is the 
bit rate and 𝑐 is the capacity. Initially, the root bit of the state are zero then the 
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input message 𝑀 is interleaved to the function by padding the r-bits and dividing 
into blocks then XOR with the first r- bit such as 𝑀||𝑝𝑎𝑑[𝑟](|𝑀|), where |𝑀| is 
the length of the message 𝑀. This process is called absorbing phase. After that, 
the squeezing phase starts with returning  the output blocks from the first r-bit 
and interleave with the function  𝑓 of the fixed length permutation. 
The sponge construction has advantages to be used in cryptographic 
applications due to its permutation process and the output of arbitrary variable 
length also it can be used as a stream cipher. The security of sponge 
construction is varied, since it can determine the pseudorandom bit generator 
with the output that leads to providing security against generic attack (Bertoni 
et al., 2009).  
The Keccak hash function Keccak-f[b]  is depending  on the choosing of  width 
permutation  b where b is the [25,50,100,200,400,800,1600]. To obtain the 
Keccak-f[b] sponge function, it needs to apply the sponge construction to 
Keccak-f[r+c] with the parameters capacity c, and bit rate r. The state is a three 
dimensional array of 5*5*w with the property that each length of w bits are [1, 2, 
8, 16, 32, 64] such that b=25w. Depending on the permutation width rounds, 
there are 7 types of Keccak hash function. The Keccak-f [25]  has 12 number of 
rounds, where the number of rounds can be calculated as 12 + 2 × 𝑙 such that 
2𝑙 = 𝑤. As a result, the other Keccak functions such as Keccak-f[50] has 14 
number of rounds, Keccak-f[100] has 16 number of rounds, Keccak-f[200]has 
18 number of rounds, Keccak-f[400] has 20 number of rounds, Keccak-f[800] 
has 22 number of rounds and finally Keccak-f[1600] has 24 number of rounds 
(Bertoni et al., 2009).  
 
 92 
5.3 Review of RFID Authentication Protocol based on 
Schnorr Identification protocol  
Tuyles and Batina (2006) introduced an authentication protocol that is based on 
challenge response mechanism by using Schnorr identification protocol. In their 
model, the Schnorr identification protocol is introduced as an elliptical curve 
version of the original Schnorr identification protocol. Their protocol is aimed to 
design an RFID authentication protocol that can resist to passive attacks. Their 
protocol is based on the challenge-response mechanism that is used a zero 
knowledge procedure to generate a verification for the verifier.  
Their protocol has two phases, setup phase and the challenge phase between 
the prover and the verifier. In the first phase, a server is responsible for 
generating the elliptical curve and finding the base point which it will be used 
for the further processes. After generating the base point of the elliptical curve, 
the server will generate the public key, the private key, the tag’s identifier and 
other system parameters that need to be used for the challenge phase.  The 
challenge phase is used for the generating the proof of verifier.  As shown in 
figure 5.2, the challenge phase starts after the hello message of the reader, and 
then the RFID tag response to the hello message by generating and sending a 
random 𝑟 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 and generating and sending  𝑅 = [𝑟[𝑃 where 𝑃 is a base point 
is in the elliptical curve proof. The verifier responds to the received message is 
by generating and sending a random  𝑒 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 . The prover starts to challenge 
the verifier by computing 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑒 + 𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝, then sends the challenge to the 
prover. The verifier accepts the challenge by computing [𝑦]𝑃 + 𝑒𝑋 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. If the 
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value of the [𝑦]𝑃 + 𝑒𝑋 = 𝑅 then the challenge is accepted otherwise the session 
is rejected. 
The zero knowledge proof in the elliptical curve version of Schnorr identification 
scheme provides the perfectly zero-knowledge property that means providing 
completeness, soundness and honest-verifier zero-knowledge. The only 
problem with this protocol is when applying within RFID system there is a 
danger in providing security and privacy when illegitimate reader involved with 
the protocol. Illegitimate reader can choose many challenges to the tag which 
leads to losing the zero-knowledge property. However, the elliptical curve 
version of Schnorr identification protocol is secure against passive attacks but 
leak some security and privacy property with active attacks.  
 
Tag  Reader 
Random r 
𝑅 = 𝑟𝑃 













𝑍 = [𝑦]𝑃 + 𝑒𝑍 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 
 








5.3.1 Tracking Attack  
An important property for a tag is to provide un-traceability property so that an 
adversary cannot able to recognise any change in the tag information. In other 
words, an adversary can intercept the channel between the RFID tag and the 
RFID reader and derive tag’s information from the tag’s response to the reader. 
As the RFID tag response to the reader by a challenge response, it is necessary 
to deny illegitimate reader to derive the tag’s information. In the challenge-
response between the RFID tag and the RFID reader, the tag usually responds 
with a function of the secret and the challenge and keeps the created nonce.  If 
the attacker involves his control with the challenge information, then he can 
evaluate the value of the function of the secret and the challenge after the round 
challenge. This leads to the tracing problem with the RFID tags. 
To ensure untraceability property in challenge-response protocols, an RFID tag 
needs to ensure the validity of its nonce and refresh the nonce after each 
successful session. In other words, if the tag receives two challenges with the 
same value of challenge, then the tag needs to respond with two different values 
of the nonce. An authentication protocol is said to be secured against tracking 
attack, if there is no polynomial time oracle that can control the protocol. For 
instant, let 𝑐ℎ be the challenge, 𝑟 is the tag nonce then 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘(𝑐ℎ1, 𝑔(𝑐, 𝑟1) … . . , 𝑐ℎ𝑛, 𝑔(𝑐ℎ𝑛, 𝑟𝑛)) = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘
′(𝑐ℎ1, … . 𝑐ℎ𝑛) 
Where 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘′(𝑐ℎ1, … . 𝑐ℎ𝑛) is the tracking polynomial time function that output 
the tag’s information by an adversary. Hence, by recording the challenges, the 
adversary track the tag’s response then compute the 
function 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟
′ (𝑐ℎ1, … . 𝑐ℎ𝑛). An adversary also can determine if there are 
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two different tags or one by repeating the tracking function and check if the 
outputs are equal for one tag there are two different tags.  
Lee et al., (2008), showed up the Tuyles and Batina (2006) protocol is suffered 
from attacking attack by eliciting tag’s information −𝑎𝑃 by computing: 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘(𝑟𝑃, 𝑒, 𝑎𝑒 + 𝑟, 𝑃) = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘′(𝑟𝑃 − (𝑥𝑒 + 𝑟)𝑃. 𝑒−1 
Thus, there is a polynomial time oracle that can output the value– 𝑎𝑃 and there 
is no random notion from the tag reminded by the equation. 
5.3.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
 A man-in-the-middle-attack is a type of eavesdropping attack that can be used 
to intercept the message exchange between the RFID tag and the RFID reader. 
An attacker should have the ability to monitor the communication channel to 
launch this attack. The ability of the attacker can be just monitored the channel 
or can be injected some message in the message exchange between the RFID 
tag and the RFID reader and act as an intruder who relays the communication.  
The man-in-the-middle attack affects many cryptographic protocols including 
elliptical curve cryptography. 
Tuyles and Batina (2006) protocol is also vulnerable to man-in-the middle 
attack. The data in the exchange message are related to the tag by generating 
the nonce 𝑒. The tag sends the message 𝑦 = 𝑠𝑒 + 𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 to the verifier. In the 
meantime, the adversary can tamper the message and send his own message 
𝑦′ = 𝑦 + 𝑐 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. Upon receiving the message from the adversary, the verifier 
thought that the message from the tag then the final computation complete the 
session by checking if the value of 𝑦′𝑃 + 𝑒𝑍 = 𝑅′ otherwise reject. The final 
value usually leads to 𝑅′ since 𝑦′𝑃 + 𝑒𝑍 = (𝑦 + 𝑐)𝑃 − 𝑒𝑠𝑃 = (𝑠𝑒 + 𝑟 + 𝑐)𝑃 −
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𝑒𝑠𝑃 = (𝑟 + 𝑐)𝑃 = 𝑇′. Thus lead to having the tag information by an adversary. 
An adversary can intruder between the RFID tag and the RFID reader then 
tamper the original message while the tag and the reader complete the session.  
Upon receiving the first message from the tag which includes 𝑅 = 𝑟𝑝 the 
adversary can modify the message and send his own message 𝑅′ = 𝑟𝑃 + 𝑐𝑃. 
The reader response normally.  
 
5.4 The Zero- Knowledge authentication Protocol 
In this section, we will introduce an enhancement method that can be applied 
to the elliptical curve version of Schnorr identification protocol. These 
enhancements can determine the ability of an intruder adversary by introducing   
a secure mutual authentication between the RFID tag and the RFID reader.  
Ensuring the privacy and security properties of the modification protocol will be 
also introduced.  
5.4.1 Design Aim Statement 
The consideration in enhancing or designing a new protocol is depending on 
the status of the adversary ability assumptions. The aim of the proposed design 
is to achieve the set of security and privacy requirements such as providing 
confidentiality of the information, integrity and availability against threats. In 
addition, provide secure mutual authentication between the RFID tag and the 
RFID reader. Moreover, the proposed RFID authentication protocol will take into 
consideration the possibility of an adversary to threaten the protocol. The 
statement of defining the goals of an authentication protocol is needed to 
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simulate the adversary ability and furthermore to discuss the vulnerability 
according to the possible threat.  
The confidentiality of the proposed protocol will be achieved by using elliptical 
curve version of Schnorr identification protocol which is secure against passive 
attacks and the enhancement of the system will achieve immunity against 
tracking attack. The integrity of the data will be achieved by using Keccak hash 
function so an adversary cannot able to modify, insert or delete the message 
exchange between the RFID tag and the RFID reader. Ensuring availability of 
the system is ensured by refresh the random nonce of the proposed protocol so 
using different random nonce in each authentication session will keep the 
property of the availability of the proposed protocol.  The proposed system will 
consider the following adversary ability: 
• During the authentication, an adversary can eavesdrop and change the 
message exchange between the tag and the reader. At the end of the 
authentication protocol, the adversary win if the reader returns a 
successful response. 
• An adversary select random tag to inject his own message and complete 
the authentication 
• An adversary can intercept the message exchange and monitor the 
communication or send his own message to get the tag’s information 
• An adversary blocks the message exchange in order to prevent further 
message exchanges. 
• An adversary can trace RFID tags 
• An adversary can impersonate tag and act as legitimate tag. 
• An adversary can impersonate the reader and act as a legitimate reader. 
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5.4.2 System Overview 
The proposed system considers uses the elliptical curve version of Schnorr 
identification protocol. It also supposed that RFID tags have the ability to 
calculate a Keccak hash function with an elliptical curve. The consideration of 
the protocol is to suppose that the communication between RFID tag and RFID 
reader is insecure as the communication is run through RF channel while it 
supposes that the communication between the RFID reader and the back-end 
server is secured. The adversary ability in the proposed protocol consideration 
it can be a passive adversary that try to eavesdrop the communication channel 
or active adversary that try to  reply the intercept message or adding, deleting 
or modifying  the exchange message. As a challenge-response protocol, the 
proposed protocol has two phases, set up phase and authentication phase. The 
set up phase is responsible for generating system parameter such as 
generating the elliptical curve, the based point of the elliptic curve, private and 
public keys. The public key in the proposed scheme is public for the reader and 
for the tags. The authentication phase is a challenge-response procedure to get 
the proof of identity by sending a challenge then encrypting the message and 
then sending to the verifier for the verifying process.  The final stage in the 
authentication process is to check if the information is valid otherwise the 
process will be rejected. To be specific, in the authentication phase, there are 
two verifying processes. The first process is to check if the reader is a legitimate 
reader that can compute the hash value from the first challenge otherwise the 
process is rejected. The second process is to compute and verify the hash 
values of the encryption message and then compute the verifying challenge.  





𝐸   an additive cyclic group of prime with order 𝑝 . 
𝑃  a base point of 𝐺. 
𝑥  the tag private key 
𝑍  the cryptographic tag of x 
𝑆ℎ𝑎3  The Keccak hash function standard  
𝑟   a random number 
𝑒  a random number  
Table 5. 1: The zero- knowledge authentication protocol notations 
Setup Phase 
The set up phase involves with the following steps 
1- The system generates an elliptic curve group 𝐸of prime order 𝑝.  
2- The system will choose the base point that satisfies the elliptic curve 𝐸, 
then find a based point on the curve 𝐸 .  
3- The system will generate a 128 bits of information as a private key 𝑥 
which assigned to tags then compute the public key 𝑍 such as 𝑍 =
−𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑥) which is also 128 bits of information.  
4- The system will initialise each tag with the private key 𝑥 and the public 
key 𝑍 while the system public key 𝑍 will be available in a data base for 
the verifier process.  
Authentication Phase 
The authentication phase is going through the following processes and 
summarised in figure 5.3  
1- The tag generates a random notion 𝑟  
2- Computes  𝑅 = [𝑟]𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 
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3- Computes 𝑆 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑅). 
4- Sends 𝑆, 𝑅 to the verifier to check the first consistency of the 
authentication procedure. 
5- Upon receiving 𝑅 and 𝑆,  the verifier checks the value of 𝑆 if the value is 
correct then , chooses a random notion 𝑒 and sends it back to the prover. 
Otherwise the authentication will be failed. 
6- Upon receiving the random notion 𝑒 from the verifier, the prover will 
computes 𝑣 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑆). 𝑒 then sends 𝑣 to the verifier. 
7-  Upon receiving the message 𝑣, the verifier will check the value of 𝑣  if 
the value is correct then accept the next step then sends it back to the 
prover as prove of calculation.  
8- Next step, the prover will compute a new secret 𝑥1 = [𝑥. 𝑣] 𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 then 
hash the value of the new secret as 𝑥2 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑥1) . 
9-  The prover also computes 𝑦 = 𝑥2𝑒 + 𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 and finally sends the value 
of 𝑦 to the verifier with its hashed value for verification.  
10- Upon receiving the message 𝑦, the verifier will first compute 𝑥1 = 𝑥. 𝑣 the 
check the value of 𝑥2 then compute the challenge as 𝑥2. 𝑟 + 𝑟 − 𝑍1𝑃 = 𝑅 if 









Tag (𝒙, 𝑺, 𝑹, … 𝑷) Reader  𝒁 = −[𝑺𝒉𝒂𝟑(𝒙)]𝑷, 𝒙 𝒄𝒐𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒆 
𝑟 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 
𝑅 = [𝑟]𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝                                   R,S                
  𝑆 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑅)                                                                          Checks the consistency of 𝑅, 𝑆 
                                                                                          𝑒 ∈ 𝔽𝑝                       
                                                               𝑒 
 
𝑣 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑆). 𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝                  𝑣                                                      Checks the value of 𝑣 
Update secret key 𝑥1 = 𝑥. 𝑣  
𝑥2 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑥1) 
𝑦 = (𝑥2. 𝑒 + 𝑟) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝   
     𝑦2 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑦)                              𝑦, 𝑦1𝑥1, 𝑥2 
Compute 𝑥1 = 𝑥. 𝑣 
Compute 𝑧1 = −[𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑥1)]𝑃 
Check the value of 𝑥2 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑥1)  
Compute and check if 
 [𝑦]𝑃 + [𝑧1𝑒]𝑃 = 𝑅 
 
Figure 5. 3: Zero-Knowledge authentication protocol for RFID tags 
 
5.4.3 Security analysis  
In order to analyse the security of the proposed protocol, we will assume there 
are security and privacy threats that can affect the protocol. The following 
privacy and security threats will be considered: 
• Correctness  
The Correctness property gives the confirmation to the data base oracle to 
refuse illegitimate or corrupted tags from accessing to the RFID system. The 
Zero-Knwoledge authentication protocols runs three mutual authentication 
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process between the RFID tags and the reader. These process give different 
values in each process.  Therefore, its hard to an adversary to insert corrupted 
tags to the system and complete the verification process. To penetrate the 
system, An adversary will first try to check the status of the RFID system by 
interacting the system with a legitimate tag’s information. Subsequently, the 
adversary will run interactive protocol to check the ability of the system to accept 
illegitimate tags. In this case, the system directly will detect illegitimate tags as 
there are three mutual authentication processes that uses different hashed 
values. This fact will lead to confirm that the zero-knowledge authentication 
protocol has the correctness property.    
• Soundness 
The Zero-Knwoledge authentication protocol has the soundness property as its 
nigligiable to  an adversary to penetrate the tag’s information. An adversary can 
access to RFID system in order to access to the output of the protocol or to 
corrupt tags. In this case the adversary involves with the execution protocol 
between the reader and the RFID tags to impersonate some iligitimate tag’s 
information. The adversary takes the advantage of the soundness property  if 
his challenge return a correct  bit of information from the output protocol 
execution. As the Zero knowledge authentication protocol based on using 
mutual authentication between the RFID reader and tags, the adversary needs 
to impersonate the reader information to have a correct bit of information. Thus, 
its hard to an adversary to complete the all verification process in the system 
until know both the authentication process and all private information. Therefore 
the Zero-knwoledge authentication protocol satisfy the soundness property.  
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• Resists to Man-In-the-Middle-Attack 
The proposed protocol satisfies the property of resistance against the man-in-
the-middle-attack. Let us suppose that an adversary can interrupt the 
communication between the prover and the verifier and establish his own 
communication. The adversary tries to monitor the communication then insert 
his own message and act as a legitimate party. In this case, the adversary will 
first intercept the message 𝑇 which should be received by the verifier. Upon 
receiving the message 𝑇, the adversary tries to compute the hash value of 𝑇. 
Therefore; there is no chance to the adversary to compute the hashed value 
without knowing the original value of the random nonce 𝑟. Suppose that the 
adversary intercepts the second challenge (𝑣, 𝑦, 𝑦′, 𝑥, 𝑥′′) previously exchanged 
by the prover and then re-exchange with his own message. However, this phase 
cannot be completed since the encrypted message 𝑦 and its hashed value are 
combined with the new value of the private key and the hashed value of the 
private key. If the adversary succeeds to insert his own message 𝑦1 = 𝑦 + 𝑐 
and complete the verification process. In this case, the verification process will 
be not valid since the adversary cannot complete the hash procedure of his own 
message, therefore, the proposed protocol is immune against the replay attack.  
• Supports mutual authentication 
The proposed protocol provides the concepts of mutual authentication between 
the verifier and the prover by ensuring the authenticity of the parties. The 
authentication process first takes the proof of the reader by calculating the hash 
value of the first entity otherwise the tag turn to be silent. This shows that it’s 
important to prove the authenticity of parties before exchanging data. In fact, 
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the first mutual authentication to verify the first message and to start to send the 
exchanged message. In the earlier phase, the authentication is generated by 
the tag for the reader to verify the first value is correct.  Then the second phase 
is to check if the random response from the reader is legitimate, therefore, the 
tag verifies the reader message with a challenge. After that, the exchanged 
message is also sent with a challenge to the reader in order to complete the 
verification process and check the tag’s information. Thus, the only genuine 
party can take part in the authentication process. 
 Supports anonymity  
The protocol provides anonymity property, in facts, the random notion is 
generated randomly in each authentication session and has different values 
since they are generated through pseudo random number generator. Moreover, 
the protocol generates one way hash function that the challenge phase has 
different values in each authentication session and the tag secret is exchanged 
through a hash function. Therefore, the only legitimate party can respond to 
verification and update the status of the tag secret to complete the challenge 
response and verify the final message. Furthermore, as the protocol works on 
zero knowledge proof with elliptical curve operations, extract the tag’s secret 
from the exchange message is a difficult process for an illegitimate party. 
• Resistance to tracking attack 
The protocol is resistant to tracking attack since an adversary has no control 
over the value of the first message 𝑅. It’s obvious that the protocol hashed the 
value of 𝑅 then the protocol transcripts is impractical for an adversary since the 
success of predicting the message exchange is negligible. Moreover, if a tag 
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executes two messages, an adversary cannot determine if these executions are 
executed by the same tag or not. For instant, if an adversary receive the 
challenge messages 𝑅, 𝑆, 𝑣, 𝑥2, 𝑦1 and𝑅
′, 𝑆′, 𝑣′, 𝑥2
′ , 𝑦1
′  of the protocol and try to 
determine if these values are generated from different tags or one tag. Hence, 
there is no normal distinguished response from tag since these values are 
different and based on using random nonce 𝑟 from tag and 𝑒 from the reader 
also these values are hashed by Keccak hash function. Moreover, even if an 
adversary act as a reader and send his own random message   𝑒2 and send it 
twice to get different responses from the tag. In this case, the tag will generate 
the message 𝑣 that is based on the value of 𝑅 and its hashed value 𝑆. Thus the 
result cannot be a fixed value for determining a tag. Therefore, the adversary 
cannot be tracked the system. 
• Resistant to replay attack 
A replay attack happens when an adversary replaies to the previous message 
exchanged between the RFID tag and the RFID reader. If the adversary 
successfully eavesdrops the messages exchange 𝑅, 𝑆, 𝑣, 𝑥2, 𝑦1 previously 
exchanged by a tag then, the adversary now able re-exchange these message 
to the reader. In this case, the authentication process will not succeed as the 
reader need to complete the verification stage by using Keccak hash function 
then re-compute and update the secret to complete the final verification stage.  
The tag’ secret is combined with Keccak hash function and the message 𝑣 
which is related to the random nonce 𝑒. These combinations require multi 
verification by a reader to complete the final verification process. Moreover, if 
the adversary tries to use some information from the past valid messages, then 
the adversary need calculate the valid response 
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 𝑣 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑆). 𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 then update the secret 𝑥1 = 𝑥. 𝑣 and compute 𝑥2 =
𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑥1) which is negligible to get to the final response.  As a result, the 
adversary cannot pass through the mutual authentication process and cannot 
replay the query. Therefore, the protocol is resistant to replay attack. 
• Impersonation attack 
Suppose that an adversary tries to communicate with the reader instead of a 
specific tag in order to complete the authentication process. In this case, the 
adversary needs to reply to the reader with the specific challenge. Meanwhile, 
the adversary needs to have a valid message to respond to the reader. In other 
word, the adversary needs to have the knowledge about the secret information 
about the tag which is combined with the Keccak hash function and generated 
after successful verification stages. Moreover, it is intractable for the adversary 
to compute 𝑥1 = 𝑥. 𝑣 since the the message 𝑣 is generated by the random nonce 
𝑒 that combine with the hash value 𝑆. Therefore, tag impersonation is infeasible 
for an adversary to act as a legitimate tag.  
In the case, if an adversary tries to impersonate the reader and act as a 
legitimate reader in order to get the tag’s information. The only possibility for the 
adversary is to generate a nonce 𝑒 and wait for the response from the tag. After 
receiving the first challenge 𝑅 and 𝑆, the reader will force the difficulty in 
computing the verification process as the Keccak hash function is involved with 
the verification process before the stage of sending the exchange message. 
Therefore, there is no information to be considered if the adversary successfully 
impersonates the reader. Thus, there is no information leakage since the tag 
secret is combined with the Keccak hash function.  
• Denial of service 
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An adversary attempts to intercept or block the exchanged message exchange 
between the RFID tag and the reader. This can be done by numerously 
replaying the exchanged message in order to enforce the system from 
completing the verification session. However, as both the RFID tag and the 
RFID reader update their record in each authentication session, there is no 
further consideration for this type of attack. 
• Forward traceability 
Through the authentication process of the protocol, there are calculations of 
random nonce in each session and these are always fresh. So an adversary 
cannot obtain the final t message from the communication messages. 
Therefore, the protocol can ensure the forward traceability. 
Table 5.2 presents comparison results for the protocol with related elliptical 
curve authentication protocol. The table shows that the protocol is the most 
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Table 5. 2: Comparison between related work and the zero knowledge 
authentication protocol 
5.5 Summery  
In this chapter, a mutual authentication scheme has been proposed which is 
based on enhance the security vulnerability of the Tulys and Batina (2006) 
protocol. The vulnerability is related to replay attack and lack of resistance to 
tracking attack. Their protocol is based on zero-knowledge proof by using 
elliptical curve version of Schnorr identification protocol.   Based on these two 
attacks, a modification and enhancement of the original protocol is proposed to 
overcome these issues. So far, the protocol uses the Keccak hash function in 
the authentication phase to ensure the data integrity and to provide mutual 
authentication between entities. Alongside with the tracking attack and replay 
attack, the protocol aims to provide privacy properties such as anonymity and 
mutual authentication. Security analysis of the protocol is discussed with a 




6. Quorum RFID Based Systems 
6.1 Introduction 
Supply chain management is one of the important applications of RFID system 
as it allows products to be genuineness verified. Products are needed to be 
traced in every step from manufactures to distributors to confirm verification and 
identification of products. However, the use of RFID tags comes with some 
major problems that are related to distributing secure keys among multi-RFID 
tags and providing secure authentication protocol. In this chapter, two models 
of a secure based RFID system protocol are proposed for the case of 
distributing keys among multi RFID tags. The security and privacy properties of 
the proposed protocols are varied and depend on the hardness of the 
cryptographic techniques that are used in the design of the protocols. The 
design goal of the two proposed protocols is to build up a secure RFID based 
system that can be applied in a supply chain management scenario when key 
distribution techniques are required. Ensuring security and privacy for the RFID 
system is a major aim for the proposed protocols to overcome the security and 
privacy threats in RFID based system. Our protocols are addressing these 
security and privacy requirement alongside with the hardware limitations of the 
low-cost passive RFID tags. Therefore, the major cryptographic techniques are 
used in the server.  
The main idea of the first proposed protocol is to store tags keys securely by 
using elliptical curve version of ElGamal cryptosystem and distribute keys 
among RFID tags by using Shamir secret sharing scheme. The ElGamal 
cryptosystem enables parties to securely identify tags while using symmetric 
key cryptosystem to ensure mutual authentication between parties. After each 
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successful authentication, the information is gathered securely in other servers 
and using authentication techniques are used to complete the process.   
The second proposed protocol is also stored tag securely but using elliptical 
curve version of the light scheme of Cramer-Shoup to achieve forward and 
backward traceability and to provide high security and privacy against RFID 
threats. 
 The sequence of this chapter is as follows: section 6.2 will introduce the design 
aim and define strategies of the proposed protocol then followed by the design 
approach. Section 6.3 will introduce the first system approach with all system 
characters. Section 6.4 will introduce the second protocol approach. Section 6.4 
will introduce the implementation of both systems with worked example and 
algorithms. Section 6.5 will discuss the performance and security analysis of 
the protocols. Finally, section 6.6 will conclude this chapter.  
 
6.2 A Quorum RFID based system Design  
RFID was applied to the supply chain management system to ensure work 
accuracy and to automate work as well as ensuring security for the system. 
RFID applications with supply chain management consist of series of steps that 
take a product to go through a series of steps. Each step is equipped with an 
RFID reader, and when a product moves to the subsequent step of a supply 
chain, an interaction takes place between the product’s RFID tag and the reader 
associated with the steps. The verification is in the last method in each step to 
know whether a product in their range went through a correct sequence of steps 
in the supply chain or not.  
 
 111 
Like other RFID applications, supply chain management is susceptible to 
security and privacy threats that can lead to information leak about products. 
Thus specious products can be introduced with the system.  Therefore, security 
and privacy in system is a major part of the system to stop specious products 
and to prevent the vulnerability of the system.  
 
6.2.1  System scenario 
Usually, in supply chain management products are packed into boxes at 
manufacturers, shipped to warehouses, and then sent to retailers and 
distributors. As an RFID-tagged box leaves the manufacturer, it scans the 
information of the tag and records the tag’s ID to create lists of items for the 
inventory purpose.  The manufacturer then updates their database that lists the 
tags associated with the shipped items. This database tracks the tags and the 
tagged items. So, for example, the manufacturer may mark the state of shipped 
items as possible with the location of the warehouse. When the warehouse 
receives the package, it scans the case and the tags which are attached to 
items, and then a scanner compares the results of the scan with the listing of 
goods. The warehouse system can detect any of the goods that are lost or 
stolen even that tags that did not respond or failed to deliver to an appropriate 
place. The warehouse can determine these faults by checking the existing 
parcel with the listing of goods 
For this scenario of distributing and shipping goods, the design model will be 
introduced to help with the procedure of this scenario.  The idea of the design 
is based on a problem of scanning one parcel which contains multi-RFID tags 
that attached to products. Taking into consideration, the distribution keys 
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among multi-RFID tags and the way of authenticating multi-RFID tags in one 
package. Therefore, the system design will introduce a procedure for 
distributing and authenticating multi-RFID tags. 
6.2.2  System Design  
An application example application using RFID tags considers that a package 
in the process of supply chain management moves from manufacture to other 
transit steps. During the transit, the package will contain several RFID tags and 
critical logistic about the package is stored on the RFID tags. Since the package 
contains several RFID tags, there are possibilities to lose one or more RFID 
tags during the transit or there is a possibility to fail in transit. Therefore, the 
consideration for this case is to use a threshold cryptosystem system that 
ensures there are no effects of loss or damage in some part of the tagged 
package. Moreover, the threshold system considers the cases when intruder 
adversaries try to eavesdrop the communication channel in order to have some 
information related to the package.  Therefore, multi servers will be used to 
ensure the authenticity of the package and to ensure there is no danger of 
possible RFID privacy and security threats. 
An illustration of the system is sown in figure 6.1 which describes the main ideas 
of the system and the main goals for using multi-server for authenticating the 
tagged package.  
The threshold cryptosystem uses multi-servers such as dealer server, re-
construction server, decryption server and finally logistic information. The 
dealer server is responsible for creating encrypted tag identifier then generating 
a threshold polynomial with degree of 𝑘 − 1, where 𝑘 is the number of tags, to 
distribute the encrypted identifier among multi-RFID tags. By considering, the 
 
 113 
encrypted identifier will not use on the RFID tags, only a pair of polynomial 
coefficients will be distributed among the tags. This procedure is used to prevent 
threats that can expose the system. The re-construction server is responsible 
for reconstructing the coefficients pair on the RFID tags, then sends these 
information to the decryption server after a successful authentication. Upon 
receiving the pair of coefficient, the decryption server will decrypt the coefficient 
by extracting the key identifier from the logistic dealer after a successful 
authentication. The final step is to send the tag’s identifier for the logistic 
information after a successful authentication to complete the final procedure.  
Alongside with threshold cryptosystem, the integrity of the data is ensured by 
using Keccak hash function to prevent any possibility for an attacker to tamper 
the information during the authentication process.  Additionally, the 
authentication protocol between servers in each step is based on using TLS 
protocols. 
The main features of the system are basically as follows: 
• Using secret sharing schemes for distributing multi-RFID tags. 
•  A package of multi-RFID tags will be authenticated within one reader. 
• The system is applicable to use a large scale of RFID tags when the 
scalability in other schemes is an issue. 
• In normal operation, the tag does not need to use a heavy computation 
just only ensure a mutual authentication between parties. 
• The system is considered on using one reader to send the tag 
information to servers, 
• The most complex computation is dependent on servers. 
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• The system is ideal to be used for low-cost RFID tags that can be 
applicable with supply chain management scenarios. 
• The security and privacy of the system are ensured by using threshold 
cryptosystem with a hash function. 
 
Figure 6. 1:Threshold cryptosystem using multi-RFID tags 
6.2.3 Adversary threats  
In the threshold cryptosystem, we assume that the communication channel 
between the tagged package and the reader is insecure therefore there is a 
chance for an adversary to have the following ability: 
• During the authentication, an adversary can eavesdrop and change the 
message exchanged between the tag and the reader. At the end of the 




• An adversary selects a random tag to inject his own message and 
complete the authentication 
• An adversary can intercept the message exchange and monitor the 
communication or send his own message to get the tag’s information 
• An adversary blocks the message exchange in order to prevent further 
message exchanges. 
• An adversary can locate the tagged package by tracking the movement 
of the tags 
• An adversary can impersonate tag and act as legitimate tag. 
• An adversary can impersonate the reader and act as a legitimate reader. 
• An adversary can impersonate one of the communication channels 
between servers. 
 
6.3 A quorum RFID based system first Approach  
Here, we present our approach for the quorum RFID based system that securely 
distributes tag’s key and using encrypted value for the tag identifier. The 
protocol approach has four phases and relies on combining threshold system 
with public key cryptosystem.  
The threshold system is used to securely distribute the secret message on RFID 
tags while the cryptosystem is used to encrypt the message before the 
distribution process.  
The protocol uses the elliptical curve version of the ElGamal cryptosystem 
combined with the Shamir secret sharing scheme. The integrity of the message 
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exchange is ensured by using the Keccak hash function associated with the 
threshold cryptosystem 
6.3.1 Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme 
In 1979, Shamir came up with an idea to share a key within a based polynomial 
interpolation (Shamir, 1979).  The threshold scheme is divided as a secret key 
within parties. A secret key is defined by a polynomial ( )f x   such that  
                               𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑥 + 𝑎2𝑥
2 + ⋯ . 𝑎𝑛−1𝑥
𝑛−1            (6.1)                                              
Where the polynomial coefficients are from a finite field
pF , where p is a prime 
number. The polynomial coefficients have to be different and unique to each 
party and should not be equal to zero as that leads to revealing the secret key. 
The idea behind the scheme is to create shares by choosing points on a 
polynomial (𝑥, 𝑓(𝑥)). These points are distributed randomly to the parties by 
using equation (1) where 𝑎0 = 𝑠 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 then find k points in 2-dimension 
plane (𝑥1, 𝑦1), … . (𝑥𝑘, 𝑦𝑘) there is only one polynomial of degree k-1such that 
𝑞(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑦𝑖 for all 𝑖 . The secret key is split it out to the points (𝑥, 𝑓(𝑥)) , where 
(𝑥0, 𝑓(𝑥0)), the secret keys, at all other points, are called shares.  
To reconstruct the secret share from the shared points which are received, the 
party that involve revealing the secret value need to have the knowledge of any 
𝑖 shares. The secret key is reconstructed by using Lagrange interpolation as 
shown in equation (6.2) and equation (6.3) respectively. 
    𝑓(𝑥) = ∑ 𝐿𝑗(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1                    (6.2) 
 





𝑖≠𝑗,𝑗=1                           (6.3) 
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6.3.2 6.3.2 ElGamal Cryptosystem  
ElGamal cryptosystem was first introduced in 1984 and based on the difficulty 
of Diffie-Hellman one way trapdoor function which turns the function into a 
public key cryptosystem ElGamal Cryptosystem can be formed using a cyclic 
group in which the discrete logarithm problem is intractable.   
In ElGamal Cryptosystem there are three processes, the key generating, and 
the encryption and the decryption process  
• Key generating process: the sender is responsible for generating the 
private key and the public key by firstly  
1- Chooses a random prime 𝑝 then computes a random multiplication 
generator elements 𝑔 ∈ 𝔽𝑝. 
2- Picks a random number 𝑥 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 such that 1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑝 − 1 as a private key 
then computes the public key  
                                 𝑋 = 𝑔𝑥 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝             (6.4) 
3-  Sends (p,g,X) as a public key. 
 
• Encryption process: the encryption process starts when receiver 
chooses a plain-text m such that 𝑚 < 𝑝   
1- picks 𝑘 ∈ 𝔽𝑝  
2- computes the cipher-texts  such that  
                      𝑌 = 𝑔𝑘𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝                         (6.5) 
               𝐶𝑚 = 𝑋




• Decryption process: After receiving the cipher-text, the sender decrypts 
the cipher-text to find the message 𝑚 by computing  









= 𝑚                       (6.7) 
The elliptical curve version of ElGamal cryptosystem is considered as IND-CPA 
which can provide security against eavesdropper adversary.  
The ElGamal cryptosystem can be used as a threshold cryptosystem. As the 
cipher-text of ElGamal cryptosystem consists of 𝐶𝑚 and 𝑌, these values are 
encoded into a polynomial 𝑓(𝑥)  where 𝑓(0) = 𝐶𝑚 and 𝑓(1) = 𝑌. The degree of  
𝑓(𝑥)  is equal to 𝑘 − 1. 
                 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝐶𝑚 + (𝑌 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝑎2)𝑥 + 𝑎2𝑥
2 . . 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝     (6.8) 
The secret shares values can be determined for any 𝑛 distinict values of 𝑥 
except 0 and 1. The weights applied to the shares are dependent on the 




 such combinations each combination may be expressed as 




Generalise back 𝑘 and 𝑛  leads to equations (6.9) and (6.10) respectively. 
𝐶𝑚 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗,𝑖𝑓(𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝       (6.9) 
And                                           
𝑌 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗,𝑖𝑓(𝑖)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
𝑛
𝑗=1                     (6.10) 
Where 𝛼𝑗,𝑖 and 𝛽𝑗,𝑖 are the Lagrange coefficients for the particular combination 
of 𝑘 shares from 𝑛  shares, represented by index 𝑗. 
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6.3.3 Dealer initialising phase  
As shown in figure (6.1) the system design has four phases, here we will explain 
the first phase which is the dealer initialising phase. 
The logistic dealer server is a main server for generating the whole system. Its 
responsibility is to generate the system parameter, generate the tags keys and 
distribute the shared keys among RFID tags.  
The logistic dealer phase aim is to protect the identifier of the tag by using the 
elliptical curve version of ElGamal cryptosystem to encrypt the tag secret key. 
We assume that it is not possible for revealing the secret key for any parties 
except the decryption server and that happens when the two servers 
authenticate successfully.  
The dealer phase has three processes, the set up process, the encryption 
process and the distributing key process. In the setup process, the dealer 
generates the parameter for the system such that choosing the private and 
public key and choosing the secret point on the curve. The encryption process 
involves the encryption of the logistic information about the package. The 
distributing process is to distribute information among RFID tags. 
 
• The set up process: 
The first process of the dealer is to choose a prime number, then to define the 
elliptical curve  𝐸 = 𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 and any point on the curved is 
defined by coordinates 𝑥 and 𝑦. 
The dealer chooses the base point 𝑃 = (𝑥, 𝑦) which satisfies the elliptical 
curve 𝐸. Any point 𝑃 has order Φ such that ΦP = 0. 
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The dealer picks a random 𝑟 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 then securely sends the random value to the 
decryption server.  
The dealer chooses a public key by choosing randomly value 𝑞 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 such that 
the public key 𝑄 = 𝑞𝑃 = (𝑥𝑞 , 𝑦𝑞). 
The dealer generates the secret point on the curve 𝑆 such that 𝑆 = 𝑆. 𝑄 =
𝑟. 𝑞. 𝑃 = (𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠). 
 
• The encryption process: 
The second process of the dealer server is to encrypt the critical logistic 
information of the package into two parts messages 𝑚1 and 𝑚2.  
This encryption process is done by transforming the two parts of the message 
into a cipher-text message. This process includes a point of the elliptic curve by 
multiplying the first message by the first coordinator of the secret point and 
alternatively, the second message by the second coordinator of the secret point. 
Therefore the cipher-text message will be represented as a point 𝐶𝑚 on the 
curve 𝐸 where 𝐶𝑚 = (𝑚1𝑥𝑠, 𝑚2𝑦𝑠).  
The cipher-message point 𝐶𝑚 and the public key point 𝑄 are the information that 
will be hidden in the key distribution process.  
 
• The Distributing key process 
The distributing key process is used for a quorum system that needs to present 
𝑛  tags. The dealer will first determine the number of tags that needed to store 
information then generates two polynomial of degree 𝑘 − 1 𝑓1(𝑥) and 𝑓2(𝑥) each 
with 𝑘 − 2 random coefficients. For example, if the package needs four tags to 
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be presented, then the dealer will generate four shared keys that can be stored 
in each tag by generating two polynomials of degree thress. 
The dealer will use the Shamir secret sharing approach to generate a shared 
key that will be stored in each RFID tag.  The information that are stored on 
each tag is determined by the dealer and depend on the memory of the RFID 
tag. Generally, we consider that each RFID tag can store 256 bits of information. 
After generating the two polynomials, the dealer knows that the secret key point 
(𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠) and the public key (𝑥𝑞 , 𝑦𝑞) therefore the dealer will hide the values of the 
cipher-message and the public key points into the polynomials 𝑓1(𝑥) and 𝑓2(𝑥) 
respectively. Alternatively, each coordinator of the cipher-message point and 
the public key point will be represented as secret values for the polynomials. 
The dealer will keep these values securely in its data base and distribute the 
shared values from both polynomials into RFID tags. For the size 𝑘 polynomial 
using 𝑛 RFID tags, the dealer generates two degrees 𝑘 − 1 polynomials 𝑓1(𝑥) 
and 𝑓2(𝑥) each with 𝑘 − 2 random coefficients.  
The values of the first polynomials  𝑓1(2), 𝑓1(3), … . 𝑓1(𝑛 + 1) alongside with the 
values of the second polynomial 𝑓2(2), 𝑓2(3), … . 𝑓2(𝑛 + 1) are stored on 𝑛 RFID 
tags respectively. Note that the first two values of the first polynomial and the 
second polynomial are the secret information that will be not be revealed.  The 
secret information are the values of 𝑥𝑐 , 𝑦𝑐, 𝑥𝑞 and 𝑦𝑞 ,theses information are the 
values of 𝑓1(0), 𝑓2(0), 𝑓1(1) and 𝑓2(1).  
The determination of the cipher-message and the public key points are not 
possible to be revealed only just for the cipher-text reconstruction process as a 




6.3.4 RFID tags and Cipher-text reconstruction phase  
After the successful process of the dealer to distribute the stored information 
among RFID tags, the step now is to reconstruct the secret information that 
have been hidden into two polynomials and send these secrets to the decryption 
process for revealing the critical information about the package.  
In this process, the RFID tags will include response to cipher-text 
reconstruction. The first step is sending a hello message by the reader to the 
RFID tags for  the first identification of the package. Then, the cipher-text 
reconstruction server will determine the values of 𝑥𝑐 , 𝑦𝑐, 𝑥𝑞 and 𝑦𝑞 from the given 
information in the RFID tags. As described before, the only information that 
have been stored in the RFID tags are the values of polynomials  
𝑓1(2), 𝑓1(3), … . 𝑓1(𝑛 + 1) and 𝑓2(2), 𝑓2(3), … . 𝑓2(𝑛 + 1). To determine the secret 
keys from each polynomial, the cipher-text reconstruction will use the Lagrange 
interpolation to reveal the secret information of each polynomial 𝑓1(0), 𝑓2(0),
𝑓1(1) and 𝑓2(1). 
In order to determine and calculate these information, the cipher-text 
reconstruction implements these equations respectively. 
The first secrets of the first polynomial are calculated as  
𝑥𝑐 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗,𝑖𝑓1(𝑖) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
𝑛
𝑖=1 ,                                         (6.11) 
And   
𝑥𝑞 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗,𝑖𝑓2(𝑖) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,
𝑛
𝑖=1                    (6.12) 
To evaluate the other point, the cipher-text reconstruction calculates the secrets 
from the second polynomial as  
 
                          𝑦𝑐 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗,𝑖𝑓1(𝑖)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,
𝑛
𝑖=1                  (6.13) 
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And     
𝑦𝑞 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗,𝑖𝑓2(𝑖)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
𝑛
𝑖=1 .                                                 (6.14) 
The index j depends on the number of RFID tags responding and only 𝑘 of the 
𝛼𝑗,𝑖 and 𝛽𝑗,𝑖 coefficients will be non-zero. 
At this stage the cipher-message reconstruction has successfully reconstructed 
the cipher-message 𝐶𝑚 and the public key𝑄. 
The final stage of the cipher-text reconstruction is to ensure the integrity of the 
message exchange by hashing the value of the cipher-message and the public 
key.  The integrity of the exchanged message is ensured by using the Keccak 
hash function𝑓[1600].  The value of adding Keccak hash function is to ensure  
there is no option for an adversary to construct message exchaneged , insert or 
modify his message and outcome the same hash output with avalue of 256 bits 
of information.  Before sending the hashed value of the secrets, cipher-message 
reconstruction will be authenticated with the decryption server in order to verify 
the secrets 𝐶𝑚 and 𝑄. 
 
6.3.5 Decryption server phase 
After successful authentication between the cipher-message reconstruction 
and the decryption server, the decryption server phase is to determine the 
original message of the package. In order to determine the original message of 
the package, the decryption server will first determine the secret point that has 
been introduced by the dealer, then calculate the two messages that have been 
used in the cipher-message point. 
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This process first determines the point 𝑆 by deriving the component of the secret 
point as was calculated. Firstly by using the pre-stored private key, the secret 
point  𝑆 = 𝑆. 𝑄 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 thus leads to𝑆 = 𝑟. 𝑞. 𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 = (𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠). 
To determine the messages of the package information, the decryption server 
derives the two messages from the cipher-text point 𝐶𝑚, then evaluate the first 










𝑝−2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. 
The messages 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 will also be hashed by using Keccak hash function 
𝑓[1600] then sends the outputs from the decryption server after a successful 
authentication with the recipient of the information.  
 




6.3.6 Server authentication Phases 
This phase involves with using Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols to 
ensure privacy between servers. TLS protocols allow servers to authenticate 
each other using a certificate and exchange an encryption algorithm based on 
their computational capability to encrypt the data being exchanged between 
servers. There are several TLS methods that have been proposed such as TLS 
1.1, TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 is currently proposed. Different cryptographic 
techniques are used in these methods to achieve security and efficiency by 
implementing two protocols in the TLS algorithm.  These two protocols are TLS 
record and TLS handshake protocols. The TLS record protocol is responsible 
for ensuring a private connection between servers. Most of the TLS record 
protocols depend on using hash function generated by a message 
authentication code. The TLS handshake is used to authenticate parties by 
producing an agreement upon using an encryption method and the keys that 
are used for the authentication. After the agreement is established, parties send 
their information for verifying the authentication process. The data that has been 
exchanged is encrypted by the agreement between servers. The flexibility of 
using TLS leads researchers to implement different cryptographic approaches 
in TLS (Oppliger, 2016).  
 In the quorum system, we consider using perfect security method that relaies 
on using elliptical curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange and certificate based 
authentication in the TLS authentication between servers. The first 
authentication is done by the cipher-text reconstruction and the decryption 
server. As shown in figure 6.2, the authentication session starts by assuming 
that the secret hashing key 𝑘ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ and the secret key 𝑘𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 are known for both 
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parties. The secret key contains the message 𝐶𝑚and 𝑄, while the hashed key 
contains the hashed value of the messages 𝐶𝑚 and 𝑄. In the authentication 
phase, both servers set up a secure communication between each other using 
elliptical curve Diffie-Hellman key exchanged and certificate based 
authentication. The cipher-text reconstruction and the decryption server start 
their session by generating a prime 𝑝, then choosing elliptical curve 𝐸 and a 
base point 𝑃 that satisfies the elliptical curve equation. 
The key exchange process will start after the cipher-text reconstruction 
generates a nonce 𝔽𝑝 , then sends 𝑞 to the decryption server. Upon receiving 
the nonce 𝑞, the decryption server chooses a nonce 𝑟 𝜖𝔽𝑝 and sends back to 
the cipher-text reconstruction.  
Both servers are required to complete the key exchange session by checking 
the value of 𝑞. 𝑟𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 and 𝑟. 𝑞𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 respectively. If both values are correct, 
then the key exchange session is complete otherwise reject the session. 
Consequently, the cipher-text reconstruction will compute and send the value 
𝑝1 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑘𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝑘ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ) to the decryption server. Upon receiving𝑝1, the 
decryption server will fetches 𝑝1
∗ from secure database, then compares both 
values 𝑝1 and 𝑝1
∗. If both values are equal, then decryption server sends a 
verification message. Otherwise, the connection will be failed. 
The same procedure is required between the decryption server and the logistic 
information for the final step of the quorum system approach. Same as before, 
the decryption server and the logistic information set up the communication by 
using elliptical curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange and generate the parameter 
for the key exchange. Accept if the value of 𝑞. 𝑟𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 and 𝑟. 𝑞𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 is 
equal. After that, the decryption server will hash the value of the two messages 
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𝑚1 and 𝑚2 using Keccak hash function 𝑓[1600]. The 𝐾𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 holds the values of 
the messages 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 respectively. The 𝐾ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ holds the hashed value of the 
original messages 𝑚1 and 𝑚2. The decryption server sends 𝑝2 =
𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝐾𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝐾ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ) to the logistic information, then the logistic information 
fetches the value 𝑝2
∗ = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝐾𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝐾ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ). If both values are equal then the 
logistic information sends a verification to the decryption server. Otherwise, the 
communication failed. 
The TLS authentication process in our scheme replaces the idea of using 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶 
with an encryption method and replace it with the using of Keccak hash function 
for keys and the authentication process. The Diffie-Helman key exchange 
ensures the forward security, so there is no chance to track the previous 
session. 
 




6.3.7 Security analysis 
As described before, the quorum RFID based system uses elliptical curve 
version of ElGamal cryptosystem and Shamir secret sharing schemes. 
Therefore, we consider that any RFID system is considered to be secured if the 
following properties are satisfied: 
 
• Correctness 
Correctness ensures that when a tag stores its secret information, it follows 
there is a verifier that accept tags. Thus, only legitimate tags are accepted. The 
experiment for an adversary is considered able to access to the database 
oracles in order to change the situation of the system. 
In the case of the quorum RFID based system, the use of threshold ElGamal 
ensures that only uncorrupted RFID tags have the ability to be verified. 
However, we consider if the adversary launches his own experiment to check 
the status of the system. Similar notion will be used as in section 4.2 to prove 
the correctness property of the system. 
For the first step, the challenger initialises the system and sends the 
InitiateReader algorithm with the public key to an adversary. The adversary 
chooses a random uncorrupted tags information by interacting the system. The 
adversary then executes a new interactive protocol between the tag and the 
reader. If the adversary wins the output then the correctness property does not 
satisfied. The quorum RFID based system satisfy the correctness property 
because only un corupted RFID tags have secret shares that have been 
generated by dealer. When cipher-text reconstruction obtains the secret shares, 
directly use reconstruction procedure to obtain the secret values. The secret 
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values have been distributed through a polynomial then only shared keys have 
been stored in the RFID tags. The cipher-text reconstruction will refuse any 
corrupted tags. Therefore, the adversary has a negligible advantage to win the 
procedure for accepting corrupted tags.  
• Soundness 
Soundness property ensures that it’s infeasible for an adversary to forge tag’s 
information. In other words, fake tags cannot be accepted by the system. As a 
package of RFID tags moves from place to another, there is a chance to replace 
a legitimate RFID tag with another illegitimate RFID tag. To ensure the 
soundness property, an RFID system needs to refuse illegitimate tags to go 
through other processes. The legitimate RFID tags are issued by the dealer and 
the information of tags has been updated. Therefore, an adversary cannot have 
the ability to update the tag’s information. Consequently, we need to consider if 
the adversary launches his own experiment to break the soundness property. 
The challenger initialises the system and sends the InitiateReader algorithm 
with the public key to an adversary. The adversary is able to interact the system 
and output a challenge tag with a new identifier. The adversary now 
successfully creates his own challenge tag and produces it to the system. 
In the quorum RFID based system, only legitimate RFID tags have secret 
shares that are generated by using threshold ElGamal. In this case, the 
adversary needs to know the way of how the tag information has been stored in 
order to complete the process. Illegitimate tags will be directly refused by the 
cipher-text reconstruction as they do not have  valid shares similar to other 
legitimate tags. Therefore, the system is provided with soundness property as 
the adversary has no chance to complete the verification process. 
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6.3.8 Evaluation in terms of RFID security threats 
The quorum RFID based system can be used in low-cost RFID tags. The 
information that will be stored in the tags are only shared keys that have been 
generated two polynomials and the secret information about the package are 
encrypted by using ElGamal cryptosystem with the elliptical curve. Therefore, 
the complexity of the protocol is very low in terms of tag calculation and reader 
calculation. The reader only reads tag’s information and send it to servers while 
keeping the heavy computation running over servers. Additionally, the dealer 
can store hashed value by using Keccak hash function alongside with the 
shared key to provide mutual authentication. 
 In order to analyse the security of the protocols, the following security attacks 
on RFID systems need to be considered to determine the functionality of the 
system. 
• Anonymity  
The quorum RFID based system provides anonymity by generating random 
shared keys that have been derived from the secret keys. Therefore, these 
shared keys are randomly generated from the encrypted secret keys and cannot 
obtain the original secret shares from the shared keys.  
• Resistance to the man-in-the-middle-attack:  
The quorum RFID based system satisfies the property to resist this attack. As 
the quorum RFID based system has three phases, we consider this attack in 
term of the process of the tag to cipher-text reconstruction only.  
Suppose that an adversary establishes an independent communication with the 
RFID tags and can intercept the message communication between the dealer 
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and RFID tags and tries to redirect them. In the quorum system, the cipher-text 
message is distributed as secure shares by using Shamir secret sharing and 
only the dealer can know the cipher-text message and only the cipher-text 
reconstruction can reconstruct the cipher-text message and compute the secret 
key and authenticate with the decryption server. Hence the adversary cannot 
decrypt the cipher-text. 
• Resistance to Replay attack:  
An adversary intercepts the data transmission between the logistics dealer and 
the RFID tags. In case of successful interception of the message exchange 
between the logistic dealer and RFID tags, the adversary will receive some key 
shares keys but cannot obtain a quorum of key shares needed to reconstruct 
the cipher-text message and cannot exploit the information between the RFID 
tags and the logistic dealer. 
• Resistance to tracking attack 
The tracking attack involves tracking the user behaviour and the movement of 
the tags. Since the RFID tags consist only of randomly chosen shares and the 
secret shares are stored in the logistic dealer, the only information available to 
the eavesdropper is the random shares. The server reconstruction does the 
only way to compute the secure shares from the original shares. Thus, there is 
no useful information available for tracking attack. 
• Denial of service 
The denial of service consists of blocking the transmission between the logistic 
dealer and RFID tags in order to lose their synchronisation of them by sending 
a large number of tag’s information. In that case, RFID tag shares may be 
checked for authenticity to avoid DoS attack. However, without using Keccak 
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hash function, an adversary can write some content that affects the verification 
process. Even though, this type of attack is considered to be limited as only 
legitimate parties are involved with the verification and decryption server. 
However, we consider that it may be causing the denial of service with the 
system. 
• Cloning Attack  
This type of attack is considered one of the major attack against the quorum 
RFID based system as the system is assumed  to be used with low-cost RFID 
tags. The low-cost RFID tags cannot perform authentication with a reader. 
Therefore, an adversary can clone the content of the RFID tags in the stage of 
the movement of the package as it impossible in the stage of the generating 
keys by the dealer. However, this type of attack cannot perform for further 
stages as the servers can recognise any changes with the tags by checking the 
tag status. Even though, we consider the case when an adversary can 
impersonate the reader in order to clone the tag’s information by using an 
illegitimate reader.   
6.4 Anti-cloned quorum RFID based system (second 
approach) 
Although the first quorum approach provides an excellent solution for privacy 
and security, the system has two drawbacks. An adversary can clone the tag 
itself in order to copy the information about each tag. This can happen when 
there is a chance to impersonate the reader itself which lead tags to respond to 
an illegitimate reader. The second possible attack is the denial of service attack, 
this can happen when an adversary tries to tamper the tag’s information in order 
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to stop the verification process. The information of the tags cannot be used until 
the session of the decryption server is completed. However, we consider these 
threats against the previous approach even these threats can be a complex and 
heavy in the computation for an adversary to perform the final steps with other 
servers.  
Therefore a new approach will be introduced to perform better security and 
privacy against cloning attack and other attacks that can affect the system. 
Based on the same idea of the first approach, the anti-cloned system is also 
used for solving the problem of distributing multi-RFID tags in a package and 
authenticating these tag within a reader. The procedure also is illustrated in 
figure 6.1 and based on using encrypted shared keys alongside with hash keys 
and involve with using symmetric key encryption by the tag to ensure privacy. 
The shared keys are generated by using polynomials that keep the encrypted 
secret information as points inside each polynomial . 
The new approach is designed to be the anti-cloned approach that provides a 
strong encryption in the tag itself as well as provides mutual authentication for 
the tag to reader authentication to avoid penetration of the reader or tags. The 
dealer system will use Cramer-Shoup lite scheme for the secret information 
about the package and distribute secrets by generating shared keys using 
Shamir secret sharing scheme. 
6.4.1 System features 
In the anti-cloned system, an RFID tag stores a random shared key that has 
been encrypted and distributed through a dealer by using elliptical curve version 
of Cramer-Shoup lite scheme combined with Shamir secret sharing scheme. 
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This combination offers a secure design for any system as Cramer-Shoup 
provides IND-CCA property that can prevent active and passive attacks on the 
system. The main feature of the anti-cloned system system is it can be 
implemented in passive RFID tags that can perform AES encryption. Therefore, 
a strong privacy and security will be achieved by the combination of the secured 
system with a secure tag that will lead to having the anti-cloned quorum RFID 
based system that can be used in passive RFID tags. 
Similar to the previous approach, the anti-clone approach will have a dealer 
phase that generates an elliptic curve with Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem and 
generates polynomials to distribute the secret shares among RFID tags. The 
main difference to the previous approach is the tag authentication. The tag 
authentication will ensure the privacy and security of the tags during transiting 
from stage to other stages. The confidentiality and integrity of the tag 
authentication phase will be ensured by using AES cryptosystem with a Keccak 
hash function to prevent further attacks. The other verification steps by cipher-
text reconstruction and decryption server will be slightly different from the 
previous approach.  
6.4.2 Passive RFID tag 
In the anti-cloned system, the tags themselves need to be inexpensive for the 
system to be viable. Up until now, some passive RFID tags had no security 
apart from manufacturers’ ID, but disreputable manufactures clone these tags. 
Therefore, we consider using new NXP tag called NTAG DNA as it passive 
RFID tag support and mutual authentication by using symmetric key or 
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asymmetric key cryptosystem. Thus, these types of tags can solve the problem 
of cloning attack.  
The NTAG 413 DNA tag support mutual authentication by ECC signature or by 
using AES cryptosystem. The mutual authentication is challenge-response 
protocol to authenticate tags with a reader.  In the anti-cloned system, we will 
use a mutual authentication protocol that uses three rounds of AES protocol 











Figure 6.4:Block diagram of NTAG 413 DNA (NXP, 2017) 
6.4.3 Cramer-Shoup lite scheme 
Cramer and Shoup (1998) developed a lite cryptosystem that its security is 
based on the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman decision. The scheme was 
developed to achieve security against the adaptive chosen cipher text attack. 








































The ElGamal cryptosystem does not satisfy the property of the IND-CCA and 
only satisfies the IND-CPA. Therefore, Cramer-Shoup scheme achieves the 
required level of security by using a one-way hash function in the encryption 
process.  
In this section, we will describe the Cramer-Shoup lite scheme that does not 
need hash function, and it is proved to be secure in terms of IND-CCA1. The 
lite version of Cramer-Shoup scheme has three processes: the key generation 
process, the encryption process and the decryption process. 
• Key generation process 
The key generation process involves with generating private and public keys by 
computing the following steps.  
1- Selects a group 𝐺 of prime order 𝑞. 
2- Selects a prime 𝑝 ∈ 𝐺 such that  𝑝 − 1 = 2𝑞. 
3- Selects two primitive roots 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 of the prime 𝑝 such that 𝑔1, 𝑔2 ∈ 𝐺. 
4- Selects four private keys such that 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ [0, … , 𝑞 − 1]. 




 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝                                   (6.15) 
6- Computes the second public key 𝐶 such that 
𝐶 = 𝑔1
𝑎 . 𝑔2𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝                                 (6.16) 







• Encryption process 
The encryption process starts when the receiver chooses a message 𝑚 ∈ 𝔽𝑝, 
then randomly selects 𝑟 ∈ [0, … 𝑞 − 1]. The sender computes and sends the 
cipher text (𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤, 𝑒) as follows: 
1- 𝑢 = 𝑔1
𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,                                                                                                            (6.17) 
2- 𝑣 = 𝑔2
𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,                                                                                                        (6.18) 
3- 𝑤 = 𝑚. ℎ𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,                                                                                                   (6.19) 
4- 𝑒 = 𝐶𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝.                                                                                                         (6.20) 
 
• Decryption process 
The decryption process starts to decrypt the cipher (𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤, 𝑒) as follows: 
1- The sender uses the private keys 𝑎 and 𝑏 to check if the value of 𝑒 =
𝑢𝑎 . 𝑣𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝, otherwise reject.  
2- If the value is correct, then the sender uses the private keys 𝑥 and 𝑦 to 
check the value of the message 𝑚 by computing 𝑚 =
𝑤
𝑢𝑥𝑣𝑦
 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝.  
 
6.4.4 Logistic dealer initialising phase 
Similar to the first approach, the logistic dealer initialising phase has the 
responsibility for setting up the whole system by configuring out the key 
parameters that are needed in another verification stage. Not only that, the 
system provides protection for the data exchange by encrypting the secret 
information then hide these secrets as points in polynomials then distribute 
these points into required number of RFID tags. 
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This phase involves three processes; the setup process, the encryption process 
and the key distributing process.  
• Set up process 
The setup process involves with selecting an elliptical curve 𝐸 over a finite field 
𝔽𝑝 such that 𝑦
2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. There is a base point 𝑃 = (𝑥, 𝑦) whose 
order is Φ such that ΦP = 0. The dealer chooses two arbitrary values 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 
then randomly selects four private keys 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑎, 𝑏. The dealer next step is to 
compute the public key points on the curve 𝐸as follows: 
𝑐𝑃 = 𝑔1
𝑎𝑔2




 𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 = (𝑥𝑐2, 𝑦𝑐2) 
• Encryption process 
The encryption process is run after successfully generating a random𝑟 ∈ 𝔽𝑝. 
The critical logistic information about the package 𝑚 encrypted into cipher-texts 
by generating secret points 𝑆1 = (𝑥𝑠1, 𝑦𝑠1) and 𝑆2 = (𝑥𝑠2, 𝑦𝑠2) on the curve 𝐸.  
The generation of cipher-text and the secrets points are as follows: 
𝑢𝑃 = 𝑔1
𝑟 𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝, 
𝑣𝑃 = 𝑔2
𝑟𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝, 
𝑤𝑃 = 𝑚. ℎ𝑟 𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 = (𝑥𝑠1, 𝑦𝑠1) 







• The Key Distributing process 
In order to split secret points and public key points, the logistic information 
generates four polynomials 𝑓1(𝑥), 𝑓2(𝑥), 𝑓3(𝑥) and 𝑓4(𝑥) each with 𝑘 − 2 random 
coefficients. The values of the secret points and the public keys will be hidden 
into these polynomials such that the value of 𝑓(0) and 𝑓(1) will represent the 
coordinate of secret key and public key points respectively. In other words, the 
value of public key points will be 𝑓1(0) = 𝑥𝑐1, 𝑓2(0) = 𝑦𝑐1, 𝑓1(1) = 𝑥𝑐2 and 𝑓2(1) =
𝑦𝑐2. Consecutively, the value of secret points will be represented as 𝑓3(0) =
𝑥𝑠1, 𝑓4(0) = 𝑦𝑠1,𝑓3(1) = 𝑥𝑠2, 𝑓4(1) = 𝑦𝑠2. The values 𝑓1(2) through 𝑓1(𝑛 + 1), 
𝑓2(2) through 𝑓2(𝑛 + 1),𝑓3(2) through 𝑓3(𝑛 + 1) and 𝑓4(2) through 𝑓4(𝑛 + 1) are 
stored on 𝑛 RFID tags. 
Now the information in RFID tags are stored with shared keys that are not 
related to the original secret information and ready to be used. Additionally, a 
hashed value of each shared key will be stored in tags as a key for the mutual 
authentication process. 
6.4.5 A mutual authentication phase and cipher-text reconstruction  
This phase is the main feature for the anti-cloned quorum RFID based approach 
as it provides a mutual authentication between the tagged package and a 
reader before the stage of the cipher-text reconstruction. This phase starts 
when the package of RFID tags moves from the logistic dealer to transit toward 
its destination. Upon receiving the package, the first step is to scan the package 
and get the related information about the package. Before sending the package 
information to the cipher-text reconstruction, a mutual authentication process 
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will be involved to check the legitimacy of the process and to prevent cloning 
attack by an illegitimate reader. 
As RFID tags can perform 𝐴𝐸𝑆 encryption process, we will consider the 
following mutual authentication procedure. 
Both tags and cipher-text reconstruction have master keys 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑦𝑖) where 
𝑦[𝑖] is the shared key that is stored in each tags. The cipher-text reconstruction 
computes 𝐶1 = 𝐴𝐸𝑆(𝑚, 𝑘𝑖) and send it to the reader. The reader challenge tags 
with 𝐶2 = 𝐴𝐸𝑆(𝐶1, 𝐾𝑖2) and sends 𝐶2 and 𝐾𝑖2 to tag and wait for the tag’s 
response. Each tag will accept the challenge by computing 𝐴𝐸𝑆(𝐶1, 𝐾𝑖2) and by 
using the master key 𝑘𝑖. If the challenge response is correct then tags can be 
read by a reader. Decrypt tag’s responds with 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑦𝑖). In the above procedure, 
only a valid tag has the correct 𝐴𝐸𝑆 key stored on it; thefore tags cannot be 
faked unless the 𝐴𝐸𝑆 keys are compromised.  
































Upon receiving the tag response, the reader will send the shared keys to the 
cipher-text reconstruction for extracting the information from the shared keys 
and then sends these information to the decryption server.  
The cipher-text reconstruction determines the secret information by using the 
Lagrange interpolation and implement the following equation that determines 
the secret points and the public key points. 
                                          𝑥𝑐1 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗,𝑖𝑓1(𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=2 𝑚𝑑𝑜 𝑝,                                          (6.21)                           
                                          𝑦𝑐1 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑖𝑓1(𝑦) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,
𝑛
𝑖=2                                            (6.22) 
And  
                                          𝑥𝑐2 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗,𝑖𝑓2(𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=2 𝑚𝑑𝑜 𝑝,                                               (6.23) 
                                          𝑦𝑐2 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑖𝑓2(𝑦) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,
𝑛





To determine the secret points  
                               𝑥𝑠1 = ∑ 𝜒𝑗𝑖𝑓3(𝑦) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,
𝑛
𝑖=2                                            (6.25) 
                                 𝑦𝑠1 = ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑖𝑓3(𝑦) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,
𝑛
𝑖=2                                            (6.26)                                               
And  
                                𝑥𝑠2 = ∑ 𝜒𝑗𝑖𝑓4(𝑦) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,
𝑛
𝑖=2                                            (6.27)    
                                𝑦𝑠2 = ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑖𝑓4(𝑦) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝.
𝑛
𝑖=2                                             (6.28)                                      
At this stage, the cipher-text reconstruction has reconstructed the value of 
secret points and the public key points. Before sending these information to the 
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decryption server, the TLS authentication process will be implemented in order 
to have a mutual authentication between the two servers. Before that, the 
cipher-text reconstruction will hash the value of the revealed information and 
send these hashed values to decryption server after a successful authentication 
process. The same procedure in section 6.3.5 is used in order to get a perfect 
security mutual authentication process. 
6.4.6 Decryption server phase 
At this stage and after successful authentication, the decryption server is now 
able to compute and derive the critical logistic information about the message 
from the secret points and the public key points. The first verification process is 
to check if the value of = 𝑢𝑎. 𝑣𝑏 𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 . If the value is correct, the decryption 




 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. If the value is correct, then the decryption server will hash 
the value of 𝑚 by using Keccak hash function and furthermore will authenticate 
with the logistic information. 
6.4.7 Security and privacy analysis  
The anti-cloned quorum RFID based system satisfies the following properties: 
• Correctness 
The system ensures the correctness property as only legitimate RFID tags have 
the ability to complete the verification process through a reader, then the reader 
sends the information about tags to the cipher-text reconstruction. 
Nevertheless, if corrupted RFID tags have been inserted, the system will 
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directly recognise these tags as there are no similar information between 
corrupted tags and uncorrupted tags. Thus, the only uncorrupted tags are 
accepted as they produce the mutual authentication process and have  valid 
shared keys that are previously stored.   
Therefore, the experiment for an adversary to create RFID tags with their ID 
information and execute these tags with the interactive protocol is negligible. 
The output will be recognised that the tag cannot hold the same pre-stored 
information which leads to the satisfying correctness property. 
• Soundness 
Soundness property is ensured by the system as there is no way for the system 
to accept illegitimate tags. If an adversary interacts the system through his own 
experiment, the adversary needs to know the way of how the tag’s information 
has been stored. As the shared keys are generated by using IND-CCA 
cryptosystem then distributed randomly by polynomials, there is no chance for 
an adversary to output his own identifier through the system. The adversary 
experiment will fail to output a correct bit information in the mutual 
authentication phase and before the information goes through verification by 
cipher-text reconstruction. Therefore, the anti-cloned RFID based system is 
sound as the adversary experiment to succeed in the interaction tag identity is 
negligible. 
• Privacy 
The privacy of the system is ensured as there is no chance for an adversary to 
access to the tag authentication protocol. However, we will consider if an 
adversary knows the way of the mutual authentication procedure and tries to 
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create two tags to check the correspondence of his tags in order to break the 
privacy of the system. The main idea for the adversary is to generate corrupted 
tag then initialise the authentication protocol with the reader and receive the 
challenge then respond to the challenge by his own message. The adversary 
will receive the hello message with a key by a reader and send these message 
to the uncorrupted tag in order to compute the challenge-response procedure. 
As the adversary tags have not master keys then the adversary will fail to read 
his corrupted tags by the reader. The adversary experiment will fail to produce 
the challenge-response authentication. Therefore, the adversary cannot 
recognise his corrupted tag. 
 
6.4.8  Evaluation in terms of RFID security threats 
The anti-cloned quorum RFID based system can satisfy the following RFID 
threats: 
• Anonymity  
The system provides anonymity by generating random keys by a reader and 
random shared keys that have been pre-stored by the dealer.  These keys are 
randomly generated in each session and can hardly obtain the original secret 
shares from the shared keys until the other verification and authentication 
phases are completed. 
• Mutual authentication  
By using AES challenge-respond phase, the mutual authentication property is 
achieved by a reader and a package of RFID tags before data being exchanged. 
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The tags can verify the challenge and respond to the challenge to complete the 
authentication. The first step of the mutual authentication involves with a hello 
message encrypted by AES, then tag complete the other challenge phase that 
involves AES encryption in order to complete the authentication and read the 
tag’s information.  
• Replay attack:  
Suppose that an adversary with the ability to eavesdrop the data exchange 
between the RFID tags and a reader. If the adversary successfully eavesdrops 
on the message exchange, then producing a new message from the previous 
session is not compatible as each tag compute the response with the master 
key, and the master keys are only defined in the RFID tags and in the cipher-
text reconstruction database. Thus, this yields to different values in each 
authentication session. Although the reader can gain the value of the tag’s 
response, it can’t get the correct response from the tags and can’t know the 
tag’s ID as only shared keys are stored in each RFID tags. As a result, the 
adversary cannot pass through the mutual authentication process and cannot 
replay the query to the server as a valid tag. Therefore, the system is resistant 
to replay attack.  
• Man-in-The-Middle Attack:  
Suppose an independent communication between an attacker and RFID tags 
has been intercepted. In that case, an adversary can intercept the message 
communication between the reader and RFID tags and try to redirect them or 
block by producing false messages. In the system, the secret messages are 
distributed as of secure shared keys by using Shamir secret sharing scheme, 
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and only the dealer knows the value of secrets, therefore, only the cipher-text 
reconstruction can reconstruct the secret shares from the shared keys and 
authenticate with the decryption server for the original message. If the 
adversary tries to produce the false message, the verification process will detect 
any modification in the original message. Hence the adversary does not have a 
related information be successful in the verification, and the system is secured 
against this type of attack. 
• Tracking attack 
The tracking attack consists some of the users’ behaviour and tags movement. 
All of the tag’s information are encrypted as random shares then only 
information to be considered is the master keys. Since the adversary has no 
control on the master keys values and all of the information are confidential, the 
attacker has to break the AES to access the tag’s information which is not 
feasible. However, if the adversary succeeds in these proceedings, all of the 
information that found on the tags are shred keys which are not related to the 
secret details on each tag. Additionally, after each session different keys are 
produced therefore the system is unlikable, and the adversary cannot 
distinguish a typical response to obtain the tag location or the private 
information on each tag.  
• Impersonation tag and cloning attack 
Suppose that an adversary tries to copy and reuse tags’ information by 
impersonating the tags shares. Since the shares of RFID tags are generated 
randomly, and these shares can be used for one authentication session and not 
valid for other sessions. In both cases for eavesdropping tags shares, an 
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adversary needs to obtain the secret shares from the server in order to 
impersonate tags. In the case of cloning attack, the adversary must obtain the 
tag’s information. 
Obtaining the tag’s information requires completing the authentication session. 
Therefore, an attacker needs to compromise the AES cryptosystem and the 
master key in order to compromise the tag’s information.  
• Denial of service:  
In this type of attack, an adversary attempt to intercept the message exchange 
between the RFID tags and the reader that contain the information for the 
authentication process. The idea of the adversary is to numerously replay the 
intercepted message in order to enforce the system from completing the 
verification session. Or to block the transmission between the reader and RFID 
tags which leads to failure in the system communication. In this case, the 
authentication process updates the keys in each session. Therefore, both tags 
and reader are available to communicate at every authentication session. 
Moreover, the records of each tag are stored in the cipher-text reconstruction in 
order to check the authentication process. Thus, the system can resist this 
attack. 
• Forward and backward traceability:  
These types of attacks consist of corrupting some tags challenge information at 
a specific time. In that case, if an adversary can corrupt some information about 
the tag information, he /she cannot link past or future execution from the 
corruption. Because no public information are available for the adversary to be 
tracked. The only information that is stored in the tag is share values from the 
 
 148 
original secret key and it is hard to reconstruct the shares from random 
polynomial and know the way for decrypting the secret key, therefore there is 
no danger about future or previous information to be revealed especially when 
using the threshold version of Cramer-Shoup lite scheme. 
 
6.5 Implementation and worked examples  
The section will exemplify implementation procedure. In this section we haven’t 
presented any hardware implementation. However, the bench test for the anti-
cloned quorum system will consider the previous hardware works from  
Feldhore et al., ( 2004) , Chew et al.,(2010)  and Fu et al (2014). 
Feldhore et al., (2004) proposed an authentication protocol that is based on 
using AES with RFID tag. In their scheme, the implementation of data path of 
an AES-128 deisgn has a current consumption of 8.15 µA on 0.35 µm CMOS 
process. It operate at frequence of 100 kHz and needs 1.016 clock cycle of 
encryption 128-bit data block. The required hardware is estimated to be 3.595  
Gate Equevelant (GE). In addition to Feldhore et al (2004) work, Chew et al., 
(2010) tested the time cost for the AES encryption and decryption process with 
RFID tag by using Demo RFID tag. The time cost experiment for running AES 
128, 192, and AES 256  showed that the encryption process for AES 128 took 
only 2.8 Millisecond (ms) and the decryption process was 3.1 ms. While the 
time cost experiment for running AES 192 showed an extra time in running 
encryption process and decryption process 3.3 ms and 3.6 ms respectively. The 
last test was to estimate the time cost for running AES 256. The result showed 
that the time cost for encryption process is 4.1 ms while the decryption process 
was 4.3 ms .  
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Fu et al., (2014) designed a UHF rfid tag chip with AES encryption engine. 
Their design based on proposing an authentication protocol for  ISO 18000-6C  
RFID system. In their protocol, the implementation of AES 128 in a tag chip 
has a current consumption is 20.9 µW  on Semiconductor Manufacturing 
International Coperation (SMIC) 0.13 µm EEPROM process. The required 
hardware is estimated to be 4952  Gate Equevelant (GE). 
  
The software implementation has been achieved by using the GNU Multiple 
Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP). The GMP library is a robust open source 
library that operates on integers, rational number, and float numbers. In the 
implementation, we use the prime p from the form 𝑝 = 2𝛼 − 𝛾. This type of prime 
is called pseudo-Mersenne prime and it is used to enhance the performance 
and to ensure there are no backdoors that could compromise security [10]. The 
curve selection is based on using Weierstrass equation but with the form 𝑦2 =
𝑥3 − 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. This curve selection is much more efficient regarding of 
security (Costello et al,.2016). Valid curve satisfies the condition 4𝑎3 + 27𝑏2 ≠
0.   
Before going through worked examples for the quorum RFID based system and 
the anti-cloned quorum RFID based system, basic operation algorithms will be 
presented. These algorithms are mainly focus on the operation over the 
elliptical curve, the Shamir secret sharing scheme algorithm and the Keccak 
hash function algorithm.  
6.5.1 Elliptical curve operations 
An elliptical curve over a finite field of prime numbers has operations to produce 
valid points over the elliptical curve. Such operations over the finite field are 
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addition, subtraction, multiplication and multiplication inversion. These 
operations are used to produce operations over an elliptical curve such that 
points addition, points doubling, and scalar multiplication. 
• Addition  over 𝔽𝒑 
Algorithm 6.1 Addition over 𝔽𝒑 
 
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝐴, 𝐵  
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝐶 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 
1- 𝐶 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 
2- 𝐼𝑓 𝐶 > 𝑝 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
3- 𝐶 = 𝐶 − 𝑝 
4- 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓  
5- 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (𝐶) 
 
 
•  Subtraction over 𝔽𝒑 
Algorithm 6.2 Subtraction over 𝔽𝒑 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡: 𝐴, 𝐵 𝑑 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑝 + 1 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡: 𝐶 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 
1- 𝐶 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 
2- 𝐼𝑓 𝐶[𝑑 + 1] == 1 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
3- 𝐶 = 𝐶 + 𝑝 
4- 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓  
5- 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (𝐶) 
 
 
• Multiplication over 𝔽𝒑 
Algorithm 6.3 Multiplication over 𝔽𝒑 
 
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑝 𝑑 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑝 + 1 
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝐶 = 𝐴 ∗ 𝐵 ∗ 2−𝑑 
1- 𝑢 = 𝑜 
2- 𝑓𝑜𝑟 (𝑖 = 0 𝑡𝑜 (𝑑 − 1) 𝑑𝑜  
3- 𝑢 = 𝑢 + 𝐴[𝑖], 𝐵 
4- 𝑖𝑓 (𝑢[0] == 1)𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
5-      𝑢 = 𝑢 + 𝑝 
6-    𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
7-   𝑢 = 𝑢 
8- 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
 
 151 
9- 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑢 
 
• Multiplication Inversion over 𝔽𝒑 
Algorithm 6.4 Multiplication Inversion over 𝔽𝒑 
 
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝑝, 𝑎 ∈ [1, 𝑝 − 1] 
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝑎−1 
1-  𝑢 = 𝑎, 𝑣 = 𝑝 
2- 𝑥1 = 1, 𝑥2 = 0 
3- 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 (𝑢 ≠ 1 & 𝑣 ≠ 1) 𝑑𝑜 
4-      𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 (𝑢[0] == 0) 𝑑𝑜 
5-     𝑢 = 𝑢 
6-       𝑖𝑓 (𝑥1[0] == 0 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥1 = 𝑥1 
7-       𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒     𝑥1 = 𝑥1 + 𝑝 
8-      𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
9-    𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 
10-   𝑖𝑓 𝑢 ≥ 𝑣 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑢 = 𝑢 − 𝑣, 𝑥1 = 𝑥1 − 𝑥2 
11-   𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑣 = 𝑣 − 𝑢, 𝑥2 = 𝑥2 − 𝑥1 
12-   𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
13- 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 
14- 𝑖𝑓 (𝑢 == 1) 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (𝑥1𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)  
15- 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (𝑥2𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
16- 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
 
• ECC Point addition  
Algorithm 6.5 ECC point addition 
 
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝐸, 𝔽𝒑, 𝑃 = 𝑥1, 𝑦1, 𝑄 = (𝑥2, 𝑦2), 𝑃 ≠ 𝑄 
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝑃 + 𝑄 = (𝑥3, 𝑦3) 
1-  𝐴1 = 𝑥2 − 𝑥1 
2- 𝐴2 = 𝑦2 − 𝑦1 
3- 𝐴3 = 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐴1) 
4-  𝐴4 = 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐴3, 𝐴2) 
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5-    𝐴5 = 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐴4, 𝐴4) 
6- 𝐴6 = (𝑥1 + 𝑥2) 
7- 𝐴7 = (𝐴5 − 𝐴6) = 𝑥3 
8- 𝐴8 = 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐴4, 𝐴6) 
9- 𝐴9 = 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐴4, 𝐴8) 
10- 𝐴10 = (𝐴8 − 𝑦1) = 𝑦3 
 
• ECC point doubling  
Algorithm 6.6 ECC point doubling 
 
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝐸, 𝔽𝒑, 𝑃 = (𝑥1, 𝑦1) 
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕: 2𝑃 = (𝑥3, 𝑦3) 
1-  𝐴1 = 𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥1 
2- 𝐴2 = 3 ∗ 𝐴1 
3- 𝐴3 = (𝐴1 + 𝑎) 
4-  𝐴4 = (2 ∗ 𝑦1) 
5-    𝐴5 = 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐴4) 
6- 𝐴6 = (𝐴3 ∗ 𝐴5) 
7- 𝐴7 = (𝐴6 ∗ 𝐴6) 
8- 𝐴8 = (2 ∗ 𝑥1) 
9- 𝐴9 = (𝐴7 − 𝐴8) = 𝑥3 
10- 𝐴10 = (𝑥1 − 𝑥3) 
11- 𝐴11 = (𝐴6 ∗ 𝐴9) 
12- 𝐴12 = (𝐴10 − 𝑦1) = 𝑦3 
 
• ECC Scalar Multiplication  
Algorithm 6.7 Scalar multiplication 
 
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝐸, 𝔽𝒑, 𝑃 = (𝑥1, 𝑦1) 
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕: 2𝑃 = (𝑥3, 𝑦3) 
1- 𝑘 = 𝑛 − 1 
2- (𝑥1, 𝑦1) = (𝑥0, 𝑦0) 
3- 𝑖 = log2 𝑘 + 1 
4- 𝑓𝑜𝑟 (𝑗 = 𝑖 𝑡𝑜 2)𝑑𝑜 
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5-         (𝑥2, 𝑦2) = 𝐸𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑥1, 𝑦1) 
6-         𝑖𝑓 (𝑘[𝑗 − 2] == 13 
7-                (𝑥1, 𝑦1) = 𝐸𝐶𝐶 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥0, 𝑦0), (𝑥2, 𝑦2) 
8-          𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
9-                (𝑥1, 𝑦1) = (𝑥2, 𝑦2) 
10-          𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
11- 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
12- 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (𝑥1, 𝑦1) 
 
 
6.5.2 Shamir secret sharing scheme 
 
Shamir secret sharing scheme consists of two algorithms, generating shares 
and reconstructing  
Shares. 
 
• Generating shares 
Algorithm 6.8 Shamir secret sharing generated shares 
 
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑎0, 𝑎1, 𝑛 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑘, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝 
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) 
1- 𝑎[0] = 𝑎0 
2- 𝑎[1] = 𝑎1 
3- 𝑓𝑜𝑟 (𝑗 = 𝑖 𝑡𝑜 2)𝑑𝑜 
4-      𝑎[𝑖] = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝑎[𝑖]) 
5- 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
6- 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 𝑑𝑜 
7-     𝑦 = 0 
8-    𝑓𝑜𝑟 (𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑘 𝑑𝑜 
9-        𝑦 = 𝑦 + 𝑎[𝑖]. 𝑖𝑗−1 
10-      𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
11-     𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠[𝑖] = (𝑖, 𝑦) 
12- 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 





• Reconstructing shares 
Algorithm 6.8 Shamir secret sharing generated shares 
 
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝 
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕: 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑎0, 𝑎1 
1- 𝑎[0] = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒1, … . . 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛) 
2- 𝑎[1] = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒1, … 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛) 
3- 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑎[0], 𝑎[1] 
 
6.5.3 Keccak hash function 
 
The procedure for generating Keccak hash function f [1600] starts as follows : 
 
1- Chooses the rate r and the capacity c =1600such that [𝑟 + 𝑐] = 1600, 
where r =576 and c=1024. 
2- Chooses the input value of message and the input bytes provided in the 
input message.  
3- Initialize the state as an array 𝑠[𝑥, 𝑦] = 0, ∀(𝑥, 𝑦) = 0 … 4,0 … 4).  
4- Pads the message 𝑀(𝐾𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 , 𝐾ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ) into blocks  P such that,  
𝑃 = ||0𝑥01|0𝑥01|| … ||0𝑥01|| 
𝑃 = 𝑃⨁0𝑥00||0𝑥00||0𝑥08 
 
5- Absorbs the last few bits and add the first bit of padding for every block 
Pi in P 
𝑆[𝑥, 𝑦] = 𝑆[𝑥, 𝑦]⨁𝑃𝑖[𝑥 + 5𝑦] 
𝑆 = 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘 𝑓[𝑟 + 𝑐](𝑆). 
 
6- Squeezes out all the output blocks 
Z=empty string 
While output >0 
𝑍 = 𝑍||𝑆[𝑥, 𝑦], 
𝑆 = 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘 − 𝑓[𝑟 + 𝑐](𝑆) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑍 





6.5.4 Worked example 1: 
 
This example is 256 bit implementation of the Quorum RFID based system. The 
system uses ElGamal threshold cryptosystem to hide two secrets per 
polynomial and reconstruct secrets by using Lagrange interpolation. The TLS 
authentication protocol is also illustrated in this example. 
Consider that the prime p =  2562 189−  and the order is also prime. 
PrimeOrd=11579208923731619542357098500868790785323308046562550
7841270369819257950283813. 
The parameters of the elliptical curve are a=3, b=152961.  





The public key are chosen arbitrarily such that 𝑛 = 313310. The private key 𝑚 =
65123. 
The public key point  Q is 










The cipher message  𝐶𝑚 = (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) is generated by randomly choosing two 





The secret information Q and  Cm  will be hided into two polynomial of degree 5 
thus increase the security level for the polynomial generation.  
𝑓1(𝑥) = 330799𝑥
5 + 297165𝑥4 + 476633𝑥3 +
212938𝑥2 +7373393268584027436773872785641238579702902848999791
359428266995512926506693853𝑥+423295822133017890946203950717528
58437232599150252051885455153672497905234011 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 
𝑓2(𝑥) = 330799𝑥
5 + 297156𝑥4 + 476693𝑥3 +
212938𝑥2+11066116735565104935616751518411243267897776117069219
4622379894638685717309430𝑥+11019643774357417067787715416266551
031094537434090225476433609493887443321723 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 
The information of the two polynomials is secret for the dealer and no 
information to be leaked to the RFID tags. The RFID tags store only shares such 
that 𝑓1(2) through 𝑓1(𝑛 + 1) and 𝑓2(2) through 𝑓2(𝑛 + 1). For example if the 








607967708378121455401. These shared values are reconstructed by the 
cipher-text reconstruction by applying reconstruction equations to get the secret 
shares. 
The two parties first use TLS to set up a secure communication between each 
other using perfect security method such as using elliptical curve Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange and certificate based authentication. 
By defining an elliptical curve such that 𝐸 = 𝑦2 = 𝑋3 − 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 with prime 
𝑝 =  2256 − 189 




The cipher-text reconstruction will choose a random nonce q for example 
q=35021 and send to the decryption server. The decryption server replies with 
a nonce r for example r=12587. 
The cipher-text reconstruction calculates [𝑞. 𝑟] 𝑃 which is equal to a point 




The decryption server calculate [𝑟. 𝑞] 𝑃 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 which is equal to a point 





1899879755228464945640089281310437091414), then the initiation of TLS is 
achieved. 
 
After successful initialising, the cipher-text reconstruction will hashed the value 
of the secret shared 𝐶𝑚 and 𝑄 in order to send 𝑝1 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑘𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝑘ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ) to the 
decryption server 𝑝1 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑥𝑐, 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑥𝑐) =0x004D 0x008F 0x0028 0x00EA 
0x0052 0x0011 0x00C6 0x006A 0x0028 0x00B6 0x00A0 0x00F9 0x008B 
0x0034 0x00B4 0x005E 0x009C 0x0051 0x00CA 0x0067 0x0059 0x0019 
0x003F 0x00F5 0x002D 0x0010 0x00EE 0x0057 0x009D 0x0064 0x0044 
0x001D, 0x0026 0x0008 0x009C 0x00A7 0x00D1 0x0029 0x00A7 0x004E 
0x00AA 0x009E 0x00BE 0x007E 0x00B4 0x0038 0x00BB 0x0037 0x0007 
0x00E1 0x00A2 0x00C4 0x0051 0x0016 0x0001 0x00F1 0x005B 0x0014 
0x00E9 0x00B4 0x0043 0x0083 0x0099 0x00D6). 
𝑝1 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑥𝑞 , 𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑥𝑞) = (0x0001 0x0000 0x0000 0x0000 0x0000 0x0000 
0x0000 0x0000 0x0058 0x0097 0x00DA 0x0006 0x00AB 0x007F 0x0000 
0x0000 0x0050 0x0094 0x00DA 0x0006 0x00AB 0x007F 0x0000 0x0000 
0x0048 0x00A8 0x006D 0x0085 0x00FD 0x007F 0x0000 0x0000, 0x00F9 
0x0091 0x00D4 0x003C 0x0028 0x004D 0x00C8 0x007D 0x0085 0x00A2 
0x00B1 0x003F 0x00FF 0x0010 0x0070 0x00AE 0x0096 0x0099 0x0018 
0x0037 0x008A 0x0023 0x00C1 0x0063 0x00D1 0x00F3 0x00DF 0x0037 
0x00A5 0x00D3 0x00F2 0x00A9  ).  And so on for the other secrets.  
The decryption fetches  𝑝1
∗ from secure data base then compare the value of 𝑝1 
and 𝑝1
∗ . If the match process is correct then the sends a verification. The 
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decryption server will apply decryption equation in order to decrypt the logistic 
information about the package  and find the values of logistic information which 
are 𝑚1 = 60, 𝑚2 = 70. The decryption server sends these information to the 
logistic information after successful TLS authentication and by computing 𝑝1 =
𝑆ℎ𝑎3(𝑘𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝑘ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ) where , the 𝑘𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 is the value of 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 respectively 
and 𝑘ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ is the hashed value of 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 respectively. 
 
6.5.5 Worked example 2: 
This example is an implementation of 256 bits of the anti-cloned quorum RFID 
based system which uses the Cramer-Shoup lite scheme with Shamir secret 
sharing scheme. The secrets are hidden into four polynomials in order to 
complete the system. The AES protocol is considered to be implemented by the 
DNA 413 tag so the implementation is not involved in this implementation.  
Consider that the prime p = 2256 − 189   and the order is also prime. 
PrimeOrd=11579208923731619542357098500868790785323308046562550
7841270369819257950283813.The parameters of the elliptical curve are a=3, 





The dealer chooses two arbitary values 𝑔1 = 3 and 𝑔2 = 5 and four private keys 
such that 𝑥 = 111, 𝑦 = 121, 𝑥1 = 131, 𝑦1 = 141. 
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The secret points 𝑆1 = (𝑥𝑠1, 𝑦𝑠1) and 𝑆2 = (𝑥𝑠2, 𝑦𝑠2) are generated after 
randomly selecting 𝑟 = 15 and choosing the message 𝑚 = 150. 
𝑒 = 𝐶𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 = 
79537240437709841517266574974199252791530044528077049065798393
195531183479542 







The secret information (𝑥𝑐1, 𝑦𝑐1), (𝑥𝑐2, 𝑦𝑐2), (𝑥𝑠1, 𝑦𝑠1) and 𝑥𝑠2, 𝑦𝑠2) will be hided 























The information of the two polynomials is secret for the dealer and no 
information to be leaked to the RFID tags. The RFID tags store only shares such 
that are 𝑓1(2) through 𝑓1(𝑛 + 1) and 𝑓2(2) through𝑓2(𝑛 + 1). The hashed value 
of each shared keys are stored as a master key in each RFID tag to complete 
the authentication process. 
Theses shared values are reconstructed by the cipher-text reconstruction by 
applying equations to get the secret shares. 
Similar to worked example 1, the cipher-text reconstruction will authenticate 
with the decryption server in order to send the secret information for the 
decryption process. the authentication process 
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The decryption server verified if the [𝑒]𝑃 = [𝑢𝑥1𝑣𝑦1]𝑃= 
79537240437709841517266574974199252791530044528077049065798393
195531183479542, then computes 𝑚 =
𝑤
𝑢𝑥𝑣𝑦
 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. 
6.5.6 Timing Analysis 
The timing performance for the quorum RFID based system generating secret 
shares is shown in figure 6.5. The performance is evaluated by applying the 
generation of secret shares procedure on 5th - 25th polynomials degree amongst 
10-100 RFID tags. Additionally, increasing the polynomials degrees leads to 
decrease in the security threats to the system. In the other word, the increase 
of polynomials degrees supports the strength of the system against such RFID 
threat through the difficulties of guessing how the shares are generated. Figure 
6.6 presents the timing performance for entity system including the secret 
shares procedure, cipher-text reconstruction, decryption process and the 











Figure 6. 7: Timing analysis for the quorum RFID based system 
 
The timing performance for the anti-cloned RFID quorum system is presented 
in Figure 6.7 and figure 6.8. Figure 6.7 shows the key generation performance 
for generating and applying secret shares procedure on 5th - 25th polynomials 
degree amongst 10-100 RFID tags. Figure 6.8 presents the timing performance 
for the entity system.  
It’s clear that the firsts system requires less computation which leads to lower 
timing performance. However, both systems have achieved the requirements 




Figure 6. 8: timing analysis for generating secret shares of the anti-cloned 
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In this chapter, two RFID systems have been introduced in term of supporting 
a package of multi RFID tags to be securely authenticated with one reader. Both 
protocols are designed to be used for the passive RFID tags. 
This is done by allowing the logistic information to be securely distributed secret 
key among multiple tags such that not all tags have to be utilized in a threshold 
cryptosystem. The first system is based on using elliptical curve version of 
ElGamal threshold cryptosystem. Each RFID tag has a shared key that is 
generated from a polynomial that contains the encrypted secret information. A 
reader is used to send tags shared key information to the cipher-text 
reconstruction for verification stage while the final verification is to check the 
original secret information after authentication and decryption process. The 
security of the system relies on the security of the elliptical curve version of 
ElGamal cryptosystem and Shamir secret sharing scheme. As a result, this 
system provides security and privacy for the RFID system by using distributed 
Shamir cipher-text secret amongst several RFID tags. Thus, an adversary 
cannot reveal the secret key or learn any information from the RFID tags. 
However, the system is vulnerable to cloning attack by an adversary. 
The second system is based on using the elliptical curve version of the lite 
scheme of Cramer-Shoup with Shamir secret sharing for distributing n RFID 
tags. To overcome the cloning attack in the first system, a mutual authentication 
scheme between RFID tags and a reader is achieved by using AES with Keccak 
hash function. Thus, an adversary cannot clone tags and cannot reach the 
privacy property for the RFID tags.  
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The second system can be also implemented by using the elliptical cuve version 
of the full version Cramer-Shoup scheme as it achieves the IND-CCA2 property. 
The full version involves of using a one –way hash function in the key generation 
process and the encryption process. A particular  addition to the Cramer – Shoup 
cryptosystem can be achieved by using the Keccak hash function. This will 





7. Conclusions and Future Work 
7.1 Conclusions  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the security and privacy concerns of RFID 
system. These concerns come from the fact that wireless channel increases the 
demand for possible threats to affect the security and privacy of the RFID 
system. Although traditional cryptographic solutions can improve the immunity 
against most of these threats, they are still impractical due to computation 
limitation of passive RFID tags. The problem of satisfying security and privacy 
properties for RFID system and minimising the computation in RFID tags at 
minimum computation has increased research for developing several RFID 
authentication protocols. However, several RFID authentication protocols still 
lack provision of enough requirements for security and privacy of RFID system. 
Designing secure and private authentication protocol that supports low 
computation ability of RFID tags is considered to be difficult to achieve. 
Combining high computation cryptographic protocols with RFID system leads 
to affecting the scalability of the system or even cost effectiveness of the tags. 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on implementing RFID protocols that can 
enhance security and privacy levels for RFID system. This is achieved by 
classifying the ability of an adversary to threaten the security and privacy level 
of the system. Then, design a mutual authentication protocol that can ensure 
good security and privacy levels and can be applied to single RFID tag to reader 
authentication. Additionally, this thesis also considers designing a mutual 
authentication protocol that can support multi-RFID tags to be authenticated.   
Furthermore, the thesis targets are to meet the following investigations: 
 
 169 
The first investigation is how to design an efficient mutual authentication 
protocol that can be used to overcome the security and privacy threats in related 
work. 
The authentication protocol is based on using a zero-knowledge proof 
technique as a challenge-response authentication. Thus, the tag’s secret 
cannot be revealed until the final verification process is completed. The protocol 
combines using Schnorr identification protocol that can run over the elliptical 
curve of prime numbers and Keccak hash function. The confidentiality of the 
exchanged message is ensured by using the zero-knowledge protocol and 
ensuring the integrity of the message is achieved by using Keccak hash 
function. This combination assures that the mutual authentication is run through 
legitimate parties that need to complete the challenge otherwise, the 
authentication fails to process. The authentication process requires each party 
to compute the challenge in each step then the final stage requires the verifier 
to compute the final challenge and then get the secret information about the tag.  
Although, the computations are run through RFID tag is considered to be a high 
computation, the security and privacy achievement is promising. Therefore, this 
chapter discusses how to apply secure mutual authentication process and can 
be done with passive RFID tags but with computations ability.  
The possible security threats were discussed and showed that only legitimate 
tags could participate in the mutual authentication phase. The privacy threats 
are also discussed and it can be proved that an adversary cannot affect the 
privacy of tag by tracing tag or accessing future transactions. The security of 
the protocol relies on using Keccak hash function in random oracle to validate 
the overall model design of the protocol.  
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The second investigation is to design and implement a low-cost RFID system 
that supports multi-RFID tags.  In chapter six, two RFID protocols were 
introduced. The aim of these protocols is to consider the scenario of including 
multi-RFID tags in a package, and during the transmission, there is a possibility 
of losing one or more tags. Therefore, Shamir secret sharing scheme is used to 
ensure there is no problem to complete the verification process if one or more 
tags are damaged or lost.  The idea behind these systems is to store shared 
keys that are generated from the secret information in each RFID tag instead of 
using tag’s secret in the authentication process. Both protocols establish a 
combination of encrypting process and distributing process of RFID tags that 
can be used in supply chain management. These protocols rely on using 
servers to generate shares, reconstruct shares and then decrypt the secret 
information. The first protocol is an efficient and compact protocol that can be 
implemented in storage only tags that do not perform any computation. The 
secret information is encrypted by using ElGamal cryptosystem with elliptical 
curve operations. The distribution process is done by using Shamir secret 
sharing scheme that hides these secrets into two polynomial and generated 
shared keys that can be stored in each tag. The way of distributing shared keys 
are varied as they are generated through encrypted procedures and depending 
on the complexity of the polynomials. Tags only require storing encrypted 
shared keys; therefore, a reader will only send tag shared keys to the cipher-
text reconstruction for verifying the shared keys reconstructing them to the 
original shares without revealing any secret information. The final stage is to 
decrypt the shares and return them to the original message after specific 
decryption process. In addition, a specific TLS authentication is illustrated by 
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using Keccak hash function to verify and ensure the integrity of the message 
exchanged between servers and to provide forward privacy.  
The combination of the system ensures security and privacy, and only 
legitimate parties can participate in the system. However, since the RFID tags 
cannot perform any computation, there is a possible vulnerability of the tag to 
be cloned.  Therefore, the second system is introduced as the anti-cloned 
quorum RFID based system. 
The same procedure is followed in the second system, but additionally, it 
includes a mutual authentication phase that performs computations on each 
RFID tag. The mutual authentication phase involves a combination of AES 
encryption and Keccak hash function in order to satisfy security against the 
cloning attack. This procedure can be applied to NTAG 413 DNA tag which uses 
AES primitive as a basic authentication scheme. Moreover, the secret 
information is encrypted by using the elliptical curve version of the lite Cramer-
Shoup scheme to ensure IND-CCA property for the system. The authentication 
phase has two rounds of verification in order to send the shared keys to a 
reader. A reader is required to complete the authentication process by using the 
authentication keys then verify the validity of the tags and send tag’s shared key 
to the decryption server. The security of the system relies on the fact that only 
legitimate tags and reader can complete the authentication process. Therefore, 
the system considers most of security and privacy threats that can affect an 
RFID system and designed to enhance the immunity against these threats. 
Possible threats have been analysed and timing performance has been 
achieved by implementing 256 bits of both protocols.  
In summary, both protocols combine different cryptographic techniques and can 
be used in low-cost RFID tags.  
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7.2 Future works 
Possible research directions can be investigated in further research are 
summarised as follows: 
 
• Investigate possible quantum cryptography in RFID system by 
implementing 512 bits of elliptic curve authentication protocol.  
• Investigate the possibility of using a lattice-based authentication in low-
cost RFID tags. 
• Investigate the possibility to design an efficient distance bounding 
protocol. 
• Investigate the possibility of designing an authentication protocol that is 
based on error correction code by using McEleese cryptosystem. 
• Design an RFID system that is based on using multi-party computation 
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